Mitsubishi HC Capital UK PLC · DRN-6247620

The complaint Ms M’s complaint is, in essence, that Mitsubishi HC Capital UK PLC, trading as Novuna Personal Finance (the ‘Lender’), acted unfairly and unreasonably by being party to an unfair credit relationship with her under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the ‘CCA’). What happened Ms M and Mr K purchased membership of a timeshare (the ‘Fractional Club’) from a timeshare provider (the ‘Supplier’) on 13 April 2017 (the ‘Time of Sale’). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 1,200 fractional points at a cost of £10,338 (the ‘Purchase Agreement’). Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Ms M and Mr K more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the ‘Allocated Property’) after the end of their membership term. Ms M and Mr K paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £10,338 from the Lender in Ms M’s name (the ‘Credit Agreement’). As the finance used for the purchase was in Ms M’s sole name, only she is eligible to bring this complaint. Hereafter, I shall only refer to Ms M. Ms M – using a professional representative (the ‘PR’) – wrote to the Lender on 28 November 2023 (the ‘Letter of Complaint’) to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven’t changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn’t necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above. As the Lender did not issue a final response to the complaint, the PR referred it to the Financial Ombudsman Service on 30 January 2024. While the complaint was awaiting allocation to one of our Investigators, the Lender issued a final response, rejecting it on every ground. The complaint was then assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits. The PR, on behalf of Ms M, disagreed with the Investigator’s assessment and asked for an Ombudsman’s decision – which is why it was passed to me. I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the ‘PD’) dated 24 February 2026. In that decision, I said: “I have considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not currently think this complaint should be upheld. However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an

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Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it. Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship? Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Ms M and the Lender along with all the circumstances of the complaint, I don’t think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at: 1. The standard of the Supplier’s commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material; 2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier; 3. The commission arrangements between the Lender and the Supplier at the Time of Sale and the disclosure of those arrangements; 4. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale; 5. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant 6. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement. I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Ms M and the Lender. The Supplier’s sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale Ms M’s complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was made for several reasons. The PR suggests that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that the Lender wasn’t permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Ms M knew, amongst other things, how much she was borrowing and repaying each month, who she was borrowing from and that she was borrowing money to pay for Fractional Club membership. And as the lending doesn’t look like it was unaffordable for her, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn’t have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can’t see why that led to Ms M experiencing a financial loss – such that I can say that the credit relationship in question was unfair on her as a result. And with that being the case, I’m not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to compensate her, even if the loan wasn’t arranged properly. I acknowledge that Ms M may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But she says little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during her sales presentation that made her feel as if she had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when she simply did not want to. She was also given a 14-day cooling-off period and has not provided a credible explanation for why she did not cancel her membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there

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is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Ms M made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because her ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier. The PR also says that there were one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement. But as I can’t see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Ms M in practice, nor that any such terms led her to behave in a certain way to her detriment, I’m not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy. Overall, therefore, I don’t think that Ms M’s credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to her under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to her. And that’s the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to her as an investment in breach of a prohibition against selling timeshares in that way. The Supplier’s alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Ms M’s Fractional Club membership met the definition of a “timeshare contract” and was a “regulated contract” for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations. Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale: “A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract.” But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale. The term “investment” is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit. A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Ms M the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what she first put into it. But it’s important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn’t prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se. In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold. To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Ms M as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to her as an investment, i.e. told her or led her to believe that Fractional Club membership offered her the prospect of a financial gain (i.e. a profit) given the facts and

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circumstances of this complaint. There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. On the one hand, it’s clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an “investment” or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Ms M, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of their allocated property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to it. On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier’s sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it’s also possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Ms M as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3). However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it’s not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision. Was the credit relationship between the Lender and Ms M rendered unfair? Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Ms M and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Ms M and the Lender that was unfair to her and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier’s breach of Regulation 14(3) led her to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration. The PR has provided a statement from Ms M dated 23 November 2023 containing her recollections of the Time of Sale: Amongst other things, this says: “12. We were taken to a desk by a saleswomen [sic] called Caroline who started discussing what [the Supplier] had to offer with us. 13. She started talking about a product called [the Fractional Club] and explained that we would essentially be buying a piece of a building. I understood it to be like a mortgage that we would pay off meaning the property would eventually be ours. 14. Caroline then went on to explain that if we wanted to increase the size of our fraction, we would be able to upgrade [to a more luxurious apartment] which we saw earlier on our tour.

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15. We were then told that after 16 years, the property would be sold and we would receive a share in the net proceeds of sale. This was a very attractive feature to us as it essentially meant we were purchasing an investment. 16. The word ‘investment’ was used a few times during the meeting however, no one was clearly able to explain what the gain would be. 17. We were given the impression we would have a valuable asset as we would have an investment which we could also use for holidays as well. 18. The main reason we decided to buy the product was because we would get something back at the end of the term. I also liked the accommodation and thought I would only be able to book it as a member. 19. If I was told we would not be able to get money back at the end of the term, I would not have purchased the product.” But it was only after the judgment in R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin) (‘Shawbrook & BPF v FOS’) was handed down, that Ms M recalled that the Supplier led her to believe that Fractional Club membership offered her the prospect of a financial gain. And experience tells me that the more time that passes between a complaint and the event complained about, the more risk there is of recollections being vague, inaccurate and/or influenced by discussion with others. I note that Ms M’s statement was written more than six years after the Time of Sale and there are inconsistencies in her account. The Supplier has confirmed that the sales representative was a man, not a woman. And the order of events differed from how Ms M recalls it. There is also no mention in Ms M’s statement that she was considering purchasing real estate from the Supplier, or that she was interested in making use of its referral scheme, through which she received £1,200 in rewards. Moreover, although Ms M says that she was confused when, around a year after the Time of Sale, she was told she would need to pay maintenance fees, I can see that a few days after her purchase, the Supplier confirmed these would be due biannually. Accordingly, the next maintenance fee she paid after the Time of Sale was in 2019. As there isn’t any other evidence on file to corroborate Ms M’s recent evidence about her motivations at the Time of Sale, there seems to me to be a very real risk that her recollections were coloured by the judgment in Shawbrook & BPF v FOS. And with that being the case, coupled with the inconsistencies in her account and the omission of key details, I’m not persuaded that I can give her written recollections the weight necessary to find that the credit relationship in question was unfair for reasons relating to a breach of the relevant prohibition. On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Ms M’s decision to purchase this at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e. a profit). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Ms M and the Lender was unfair to her even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3). The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

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The PR says that Ms M was not given sufficient information at the Time of Sale by the Supplier about the ongoing costs of Fractional Club membership. As I’ve already indicated, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such failures render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant. I acknowledge that it is also possible that the Supplier did not give Ms M sufficient information, in good time, on the various charges she could have been subject to as a Fractional Club member in order to satisfy the requirements of Regulation 12 of the 2010 Timeshare Regulations (which was concerned with the provision of ‘key information’). But even if that was the case, I cannot see that the ongoing costs of membership were applied unfairly in practice. And as neither Ms M nor the PR have persuaded me in this particular case that she would not have pressed ahead with her purchase had those details been disclosed by the Supplier in compliance with Regulation 12, I cannot see why any failings in that regard are likely to be material to the outcome of this complaint given its facts and circumstances. As for the PR’s assertion that if the degree of the various ongoing costs had been expressly made known by the Supplier then “any right-minded individual” would not have entered into the agreement, given what I’ve said above, particularly about the way the ongoing costs of membership were applied, I don’t think such a generalisation can be made in this case. I note that the PR requested details of any commission paid by the Lender to the Supplier and reserved Ms M’s position until it received the information. I’ve therefore considered whether or not the commission payment rendered the credit relationship unfair. As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33 (‘Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench’). The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A “disinterested duty”, as described in Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough. However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors: 1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson’s case it was 55%. This was “so high” and “a powerful indication that the relationship […] was unfair” (see paragraph 327); 2. The failure to disclose the commission; and

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3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender. The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non- exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA: 1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit; 2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates); 3. The characteristics of the consumer; 4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and 5. Compliance with the regulatory rules. From my reading of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench is relevant law that I’m required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the FCA’s Dispute Resolution rules (‘DISP’). But I don’t think Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench assists Ms M in arguing that her credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to her for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint. I haven’t seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn’t properly disclosed to Ms M, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led her into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have. I acknowledge that it’s possible that the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them. But as I’ve said above, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn’t necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it’s for the reasons set out below that I don’t think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Ms M. In stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson’s case, the amount of commission paid by the Lender to the Supplier for arranging the Credit Agreement that Ms M entered into wasn’t high. At £413.52, it was only 4% of the amount borrowed and even less than that (3.7%) as a proportion of the charge for credit. So, had Ms M known at the Time of Sale that the Supplier was going to be paid a flat rate of commission at that level, I’m not persuaded that she either wouldn’t have understood that or would have otherwise questioned the size of the payment at that time. After all, Ms M wanted Fractional Club membership and had no obvious means of her own to pay for it. And

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at such a low level, the impact of commission on the cost of the credit she needed for a timeshare she wanted doesn’t strike me as disproportionate. So, I think she would still have taken out the loan to fund her purchase at the Time of Sale had the amount of commission been disclosed. What’s more, based on what I’ve seen so far, the Supplier’s role as a credit broker wasn’t a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier’s overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can’t see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn’t acting as an agent of Ms M but as the supplier of contractual rights she obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn’t strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of ‘loyalty’ to her when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty. Overall, therefore, I’m not persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Ms M. S140A conclusion Given all the factors I’ve looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I’m not persuaded that the credit relationship between Ms M and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to her. So, I don’t think it is fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis. Commission: the alternative grounds of complaint While I’ve found that Ms M’s credit relationship with the Lender wasn’t unfair to her for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints to her complaint about an unfair credit relationship. So, for completeness, I’ve considered those grounds on that basis here. The first ground relates to whether the Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from the Lender without telling Ms M (i.e. secretly). And the second relates to the Lender’s compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them. However, for the reasons I set out above, I’m not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Ms M a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren’t, in my view, available to her. And while it’s possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don’t think any such failure on the Lender’s part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint because, for the reasons I also set out above, I think Ms M would still have taken out the loan to fund her purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time.” In conclusion, I was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with Ms M under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of

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the CCA – nor did I see any other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate her. The Lender accepted the PD. The PR did not and provided further comments for me to consider. I am now in a position to finalise my decision. The legal and regulatory context In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4 R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators’ rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time. The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service’s website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant: The Consumer Credit Sourcebook (‘CONC’) – found in the Financial Conduct Authority’s (the ‘FCA’) Handbook of Rules and Guidance Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time: • CONC 3.7.3 R • CONC 4.5.3 R • CONC 4.5.2 G The FCA’s Principles The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses (‘PRIN’). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint: • Principle 6 • Principle 7 • Principle 8 What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Following the responses from both parties, I’ve considered the case afresh and having done so, I’ve reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons. Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn’t to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven’t commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn’t mean I haven’t considered it. Rather, I’ve focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

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The PR’s further comments in response to the PD only relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Ms M and the Lender was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to Ms M as an investment at the Time of Sale. As outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But it didn’t make any further comments in relation to those in its response to my PD. Indeed, it hasn’t said it disagrees with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven’t been provided with anything more in respect of those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions about them as set out in my PD. So, I’ll focus here on the PR’s points raised in response. Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship? The PR has highlighted that under Section 140B (9) of the CCA, the burden of proof falls on the Lender to disprove the allegation that its relationship with Ms M was unfair. I agree that this is correct, placing a burden on lenders during the process of litigation. That does not mean, though, that the Lender – or I – should take a claim at face value. There remains an onus on Ms M to provide some evidence for the claim she is making, despite the overall burden of proof resting with the Lender, as was set out in the judgment in Smith and another v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2023] UKSC 34 at paragraph 40. I also remind both parties that it is my role to make findings on what I consider to be fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of any given complaint. The Supplier’s alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations The PR says that my PD acknowledges that Fractional Club membership contains an investment element but suggests that this alone does not establish that it was sold as an investment. In my PD, I explained that there was competing evidence as to whether Fractional Club was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3). But it was not necessary to make a formal finding on that as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. I remain satisfied with this approach. Part of my assessment of Ms M’s statement was to consider when it was written, and whether it may have been affected by external factors such as the widespread publication of the outcome of Shawbrook and BPF v FOS. I have thought about what the PR has said, but I remain of the view that given the timing of Ms M’s statement, there is a risk that the testimony within was coloured by the outcome in Shawbrook & BPF v FOS. And on balance, the way in which the evidence has been provided makes me conclude that I can place little weight on it. I agree with the PR that just because there are inconsistencies in Ms M’s account when compared with the other available evidence, this does not necessarily mean that the central tenor of her evidence is inaccurate or influenced by others. But my assessment of Ms M’s testimony was done in the round. And the timing of her statement, together with the inconsistencies within it, lead me to the conclusion that I can place little weight on it. So, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) (which I still make no finding on here), I’m not persuaded Ms M’s decision

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to make the purchase was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain. And for that reason, I still don’t think the credit relationship between Ms M and the Lender was unfair to her. Conclusion In summary, I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with Ms M under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA – nor do I see any other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate her. My final decision My final decision is to not uphold Ms M’s complaint about Mitsubishi HC Capital UK PLC, trading as Novuna Personal Finance, for the reasons provided. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Ms M to accept or reject my decision before 21 April 2026. Alex Salton Ombudsman

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