Shaeeb Khan v The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

Preliminary matters

1. References in this decision to a ‘section’ are references to the applicable section of T he Road Traffic Act 1988 .

2. In this decision, we use the following terms to denote the meanings shown: ADIs: Approved Driving Instructors (those whose name appear on the Register) . Appellant: Shaeeb Khan. Register: The Register of Approved Driving Instructors maintained by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency. Registrar: The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors (the Respondent). Registrar’s Decision: The decision of the Registrar, by way of letter to the Appellant dated 15 July 2025, to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register . Introduction - b ackground to the appeal

3. This was an appeal against the Registrar’s Decision.

4. The reasons for the Registrar’s Decision were, in summary, that the Appellant had received a conviction for dishonestly failing to disclose information to make a gain for self/other or to cause loss/expose another to risk (benefit fraud), for which he was sentenced on 13 June 2025. The Registrar accordingly considered that the Appellant had ceased to be a fit and proper person to have their name entered in the Register. The appeal The grounds of appeal

5. The Appellant challenged the Registrar’s Decision, arguing that they were a fit and proper person. The Appellant’s appeal relied, in summary, on the grounds that: a. The offence in question involved failing to declare income from rental properties whilst claiming Universal Credit. The Appellant’s wife had completed the Universal Credit forms, which were signed by the Appellant without checking them. The form mistakenly stated that no other properties were held, as the Appellant’s wife thought that the question was directed at her (not the Appellant). b. This was therefore just a mistake, but the Appellant accepted that he should have checked the forms before signing them. c. The Appellant had repaid the overpayment of Universal Credit, taking out loans in order to do so. d. The Registrar gave insufficient weight to the age and circumstances of the offence and that removal from the Register was disproportionate and was not necessary to support the integrity of the Register.

6. In support of his appeal, the Appellant provided information regarding his character, in the form of client feedback and personal references. He accepted responsibility for the offence and stated that this was an isolated incident. The Registrar’s case

7. The Registrar resisted the appeal. The Registrar’s Statement of Case maintained that the Appellant’s conviction cannot be ignored. The Registrar accordingly upheld their view that the Appellant was not a fit and proper person to have their name on the Register. The Registrar’s view was that, given the offence, allowing the Appellant to remain on the Register would undermine confidence in it.

8. The Registrar also stated that the Appellant had not given notification of the offence within seven days, despite an obligation to do so pursuant to his registration as an ADI. Mode of hearing

9. The proceedings were held by the cloud video platform. The Tribunal Panel, the Appellant, Mr Clarke (on behalf of the Appellant) and Mr Russell (on behalf of the Registrar) joined remotely. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way. There were no interruptions of note during the hearing. The evidence and submission

10. The Tribunal read and took account of a bundle of evidence and pleadings. We also read and took account of the following which were provided by the Appellant: a separate bundle of documents, a skeleton argument, the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Harris v The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors [2010] EWCA Civ 808 and guidance from the Sentencing Council regarding benefit fraud.

11. We heard from the Appellant directly, as well as hearing oral submissions from Mr Clarke on behalf of the Appellant and from Mr Russell on behalf of the Registrar .

12. All of the contents of the above and the parties’ submissions were taken into account, even if not directly referred to in this decision. The relevant legal principles

13. Section 123(1) prohibits the giving of instruction in the driving of a motor car for payment unless the instructor’s name is entered in the Register, or they are the holder of a current licence issued under section 129 .

14. Conditions for entry and retention on the Register require a person to be, and continue to be, a “fit and proper person” pursuant to section 125(3)(e) and section 127(3)(e).

15. A person’s name may therefore be removed from the Register under section 128(2)(e) if the Registrar considers that they have ceased to be a “fit and proper person”.

16. The requirement to be a “fit and proper person” is not simply that the person is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor, but that they are a fit and proper person to have their name entered in the Register. Accordingly, the requirement to be a “fit and proper person” extends beyond instructional ability alone and, in assessing whether someone is a “fit and proper person”, account has to be taken of their character, behaviour and standards of conduct. This involves consideration of all material matters, including convictions, cautions and other relevant behaviour, placing all matters in context, and balancing positive and negative features as appropriate.

17. The entry of a person’s name on the Register carries with it an ‘official seal of approval’ and consequently maintenance of public confidence in the Register is important. The Registrar therefore has the duty of ensuring that ADIs are ‘fit and proper’ persons to have their names entered in the Register. As part of that, the Registrar exercises functions of scrutiny and that is why there are stringent disclosure requirements expected of ADIs and those wishing to become an ADI.

18. In cases involving motoring offences, it is expected that anyone who is to be an ADI will have standards of driving and behaviour above that of an ordinary motorist. Teaching people of all ages (including those aged under 18) to drive safely, carefully and competently is a professional vocation requiring a significant degree of responsibility. Such a demanding task should only be entrusted to those with high personal and professional standards and who themselves have demonstrated a keen regard for road safety and compliance with the law.

19. In cases involving non-motoring offences, the standing of the Register could be substantially diminished, and the public’s confidence could be undermined, if it were known that a person’s name had been permitted onto, or allowed to remain on, the Register when they had demonstrated behaviours, or been convicted or cautioned in relation to offences, substantially material to the question of fitness. Indeed, it would be unfair to others who have been scrupulous in their behaviour, and in observing the law, if such matters were ignored or overlooked.

20. Some of the factors in the preceding paragraph can also be relevant in cases involving motoring offences. The role and powers of the Tribunal

21. An appeal to the Tribunal against the Registrar’s Decision is undertaken by way of a ‘re-hearing’; the Tribunal ‘stands in the shoes’ of the Registrar and takes a fresh decision on the evidence before it, giving appropriate weight to the Registrar’s Decision (as the Registrar is tasked by Parliament with making such decisions). The Tribunal does not conduct a procedural review of the Registrar’s decision-making process but, in reaching its decision, the Tribunal may review any findings of fact on which the Registrar’s Decision was based and the Tribunal may come to a different decision regarding those facts.

22. The powers of the Tribunal in determining the appeal are set out in section 131(3). In summary, for the purposes of the appeal, the Tribunal is empowered to make an order for the removal or the retention of the Appellant’s name in the Register, as it thinks fit.

23. However, under section 131(4A), if the Tribunal considers that any evidence adduced on the appeal had not been adduced to the Registrar before the Registrar’s Decision, it may (instead of making such an order) remit the matter to the Registrar for him to reconsider the Registrar’s Decision.

24. Where the Tribunal makes an order for the removal of the Appellant’s name in the Register, it may also, pursuant to section 131(4), direct that (in essence) the Appellant cannot apply to have their name entered in the Register for a period of up to four years. Discussion and findings

25. In this case, the Appellant had been convicted of benefit fraud, for failing to declare income from a rental property whilst claiming Universal Credit. The Appellant stated that his wife had completed the Universal Credit forms and mistakenly declared that no other properties were held, as she thought that the question was directed at her (not the Appellant). The Appellant stated that he had signed the forms without checking them. Whilst he accepted that he should have checked the forms before signing them, he submitted that this was therefore just a mistake.

26. The Registrar submitted that the Appellant had signed to confirm his acceptance and understanding of guidance regarding fraud. The Registrar’s view was that, in light of the offence, allowing the Appellant to remain on the Register could undermine the public’s confidence in it. They added that it would be unfair to other ADIs who had been scrupulous in observing the law to allow the Appellant to remain on the Register, given the offence.

27. The Appellant made submissions to the effect that: a. there was no intention to defraud; b. the family had a genuine need for financial support; c. the offence was committed in isolation; the Appellant has no prior convictions, no complaints and no regulatory action recorded against him; d. the incident in question (the completion of the forms) took place many years ago, in 2019; e. the offence in question fell into a lower category of harm and that the sentence which was given indicated that the Appellant had been assessed as someone with lesser culpability; f. the Probation Report showed that there was a low risk of the Appellant re-offending; and g. the offence of benefit fraud is distinct from an offence of theft or dishonesty against a passenger or member of the public.

28. The Appellant also stated that he had repaid the overpayment of Universal Credit, taking out loans in order to do so.

29. We have taken into account all of the above arguments, as well as the character references which the Appellant provided. However, in our view the standing of the Register could be substantially diminished, and the public’s confidence could be undermined, if the Appellant’s name remained on the Register in light of his conviction for benefit fraud.

30. In respect of the offence in question, whilst we acknowledge the Appellant’s arguments that it fell into a lower category of harm and that the Appellant was someone with lesser culpability, nevertheless the offence was committed. The Appellant was responsible for signing the Universal Credit forms and it was incumbent on him to ensure that they were correct before signing them and declaring that the information contained within them was correct. We consider that the fact that the completion of the forms took place many years ago is not a material mitigating factor, not least because the Appellant continued to receive the Universal Credit payment for some years after that. We understand that the total amount of the overpayment of the benefit exceeded £41,000.

31. The Appellant submitted that the impact on the integrity of the Register must be measured against the specific details of the offence and the risk of future offending. We have taken those factors into account, but an offence of benefit fraud is something which we consider carries significant weight in the assessment of whether the Appellant is a fit and proper person to remain on the Register.

32. The Appellant submitted that if Parliament had intended to exclude from ADI eligibility all those convicted of dishonesty or fraud offences then that would have been specified in the legislation. However, what the legislation provided for was, of course, the broader condition that someone must be a ‘fit and proper person’ to have their name entered in the Register.

33. As we have noted (and as confirmed in the Harris case which the Appellant cited), an assessment of whether someone is a ‘fit and proper person’ can involve consideration of various factors. This is because the issue is not simply whether someone is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor; it is whether they are a fit and proper person to have their name entered in the Register. That is why there are stringent disclosure requirements for ADIs and those who wish to become one. In this case, we consider that a conviction of benefit fraud (even if it fell into a lower category of harm) is a material factor militating in favour of a conclusion that the Appellant is not a fit and proper person to continue to have his name entered on the Register.

34. We were also mindful of the Appellant’s submissions regarding the potential financial and other implications if his name were removed from the Register. However, in our view that is something which the Appellant should have borne in mind when he made a claim for Universal Credit and (as he asserted) did not check the accuracy of the information he declared. Essentially, the offence was committed at that time, with the associated ramifications that entailed.

35. Turning briefly to the Registrar’s assertion that the Appellant had not given notification of the offence within seven days, the Appellant accepted that he did not notify the Registrar upon his conviction, he did give notification subsequently (before sentencing). The lack of notification upon conviction has not been material to our decision.

36. The Appellant also made reference to his continued status as a ‘fit and proper person’ pursuant to the Private Hire and Hackney Carriage licensing regime and submitted that, in effect, this should be a relevant factor to take into account in assessing whether the Appellant was a fit and proper person to remain on the Register. We consider that argument to be immaterial, given that our remit was to assess whether the Appellant is a fit and proper person to remain on the Register (and not to consider the position under other registration or licensing regimes, or what action may or may not have been taken in respect of them).

37. This was a finely balanced decision but, for all of the reasons we have given, we consider that it would be inappropriate to conclude that the Appellant continues to meet the statutory requirement to be a fit and proper person to remain on the Register. On balance, taking everything into account, we conclude that the Registrar’s Decision was correct. There is, in our view, a risk to the integrity of the Register by allowing the Appellant to remain named on it.

38. We therefore dismiss the appeal and we accordingly order that the Appellant’s name be removed from the Register. Signed: Stephen Roper Date: 7 February 2026 Judge of the First-tier Tribunal