Rory Nash, R (on the application of) v Brighton County Court

1. MRS JUSTICE STACEY: This matter comes before the court on the claimant, Mr Rory Nash's renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review. He appears as a litigant in person and is assisted by his mother. Reasonable adjustments have been made to assist Mr Nash, who is neuro-diverse, to participate effectively at the hearing. The time estimate was increased from 30 minutes to one hour and an afternoon listing given to assist his travel arrangements. An expanded role of McKenzie Friend has been allowed to provide Mrs Nash with a right of audience should she wish, and she contributed a little during the hearing, but Mr Nash largely spoke for himself. I also confirmed that no adverse inference whatsoever would be drawn from his relaxed attire, which was another concern he had expressed in his correspondence with the court before the hearing.

2. I did not however agree to a two -and -a -half hour time estimate for the listing because I was able to read all the 972 pages in the bundle before the hearing, and we discussed and agreed a timetable at the outset. Mr Nash helpfully explained that it would be helpful for him to be able to speak uninterrupted, but that he also wanted to answer questions if I had any, and both were achieved within this one hour hearing.

3. The judicial review claim sought to be brought is against Brighton County Court which considered a possession claim brought against Mr Nash by his former landlord, Clive Gratton, the interested party in respect of his property at 3 Windsor Street, Brighton, East Sussex, BN1 1RJ (“the Property”). The interested party did not participate in the proceedings and the defendant is neutral.

4. Mr Nash no longer lives in the Property. He was evicted in 2025 and the house is now on the market for sale, which has distressed him considerably.

5. Mr Nash seeks a judicial review of the order of HHJ Simpkiss made on 26 March 2025 which dismissed Mr Nash’s application of 1 December 2024 to set aside the earlier order of 21 November 2024, in which HHJ Simpkiss had refused an extension of time for Mr Nash to appeal the decision of the district judge below. HHJ Simpkiss declared the application to be totally without merit. HHJ Simpkiss explained that, although he was dismissing the appeal because he was refusing the extension of time, he had also considered whether there were any underlying merits in the proposed appeal and concluded that there were none.

6. In his order of 26 March 2025 HHJ Simpkiss found that there was no basis to set aside the earlier order and declared it to be totally without merit in accordance with the rules.

7. Mr Nash also seeks to challenge some of the earlier decisions made in the possession proceedings. Firstly, the possession order itself, which is the genesis of this dispute, which was made on 15 March 2024 and subsequent orders of 8 July and 25 November 2024.

8. The ground of judicial review relied on is procedural unfairness and legal errors and Mr Nash relies on the number of provisions in the European Convention of Human Rights, procedural unfairness, Article 6, 8 and 14.

9. DDJ Slack on 15 March 2024 ruled and found that there was a valid periodic tenancy, a valid section 21 notice had been served and granted the possession order that the interested party sought. Mr Nash is highly critical of the conduct of that hearing, considers that he was not fairly heard and he was rushed. He had understood from earlier correspondence with the landlord's solicitors that they had anticipated that the hearing would be adjourned because it was only given 15 minutes and because a substantive defence had been filed.

10. However, events did not proceed like that at the 15 March 2024 hearing and the district judge considered, at the invitation of counsel representing the landlord on that occasion, that they could proceed to make a finding of a valid periodic tenancy and a valid section 21 notice which the judge duly did.

11. The claimant, Mr Nash, therefore seeks to challenge decisions of the county court. The scope of the Administrative Court's jurisdiction to challenge decisions of the county court is well -established in the case law. The circumstances will be very rare and exceptional: see, for example, the case of R (Sivasubramaniam) v Wandsworth County Court [2003] 1 WLR 475 where the judicial process itself has been frustrated or corrupted: see also, for example, R (Strickson) v Preston County Court [2007] EWCA Civ 1132 .

12. The kind of examples and circumstances when the Administrative Court can re-open county court proceedings is where there has been a court that has embarked on an inquiry which it lacks all power to deal with or fails altogether to enquire or adjudicate upon a matter which was its unequivocal duty to address. Examples include a substantial denial of the right to a fair hearing, perhaps where a court has acted in complete disregard of its duties or where the court has declined to go into a point of law in a particular area against a background of conflicting decisions and the public interest requires it to be decided.

13. I find that there is no basis in judicial review on the facts in this case. The arguments were properly heard.

14. The hearing on 15 March 2024 was not a lengthy hearing, but on the basis of what was in Mr Nash's defence and the further letter that he put before the court, it was a decision that the judge was entitled to come to and the arguments that he now seeks to make were not apparent at that hearing from the paperwork. But in any event, the route of challenge is through the appeal process, not judicial review.

15. Mr Nash has sought to appeal and the matter has been considered by different judges in Brighton County Court and reasons have been given and decisions have been made following the rules and procedure for bringing an appeal. The route of appeal is now exhausted. There is no basis for setting aside the notice of eviction to challenge the finding that the section 21 notice was validly served and the interested party was entitled to possession under a section 21 notice.

16. The argument now has developed that the claimant argues that he had an assured shorthold tenancy. The argument put on 15 March 2024, however, was different. He explained that there was no proper tenancy agreement of any sort at all, but the logical consequence of his submission made in the paperwork before the hearing was that he would have had even fewer rights than that of a periodic tenant.

17. Judicial review cannot be used to reopen a case that has been properly decided because a litigant disagrees with the outcome. HHJ Simpkiss quite properly directed the administrative staff to write to the claimant explaining that no further applications could be made to the county court and the only available avenue was judicial review. It was not an invitation to apply for judicial review and it was not intended to give any indication of likely success. It was fairness and transparency that motivated HHJ Simpkiss to assist a litigant in person to know of the only possible technical avenue open to him.

18. There are no exceptional circumstances in this case so as to give this court the jurisdiction in judicial review proceedings to reopen the litigation in the county court. The procedural rules were followed and they were neither irrational, unlawful or procedurally unfair or improper. It is not therefore necessary or appropriate for me to address the 13 detailed grounds sought to be advanced and the application is refused. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: [email protected]