Nkiru Deborah Ikenga-Metuh, R (on the application of) v The Student Loan Company

1. The Claimant is a registered childminder and childcare provider. The Defendant, the Student Loan Company (‘SLC’) is a non-profit government organisation that provides financial support to students, including support for their childcare. This specific support is provided through the Childcare Grant Payment Service (‘CCGPS’), which acts on behalf of the Defendant to administer childcare funds to childcare providers who are registered for this purpose with the CCGPS. Until March 2024, these included the Claimant.

2. This is an application for judicial review of the Defendant’s decision, communicated by email on 8 March 2024, to cease childcare grant payments to the Claimant, remove her from the CCGPS system, and block her re-registration as a childcare provider. The 8 March letter stated, “ we’ve reviewed your account and found that some of the claims you made were false ”. No particulars were provided in this regard, but the declaration to which the Claimant had agreed when she registered with CCGPS, of which she was said to be in breach, was quoted. The letter also indicated that the Defendant would “record [the Claimant’s] details with CIFAS, the UK’s fraud prevention service.”

3. The Claimant challenges this 8 March decision on 3 grounds: (1) The Defendant’s decision was irrational and unreasonable in that it failed to take account of all relevant matters and circumstances; (2) The decision was procedurally improper/unfair as it failed to properly investigate the Defendant’s suspicions of false claims by the Claimant, and failed to put its findings to the Claimant or otherwise invite her to make representations; (3) The combined effect of these failings rendered the decision of 8 March unlawful.

4. The relief sought was that the decision of 8 March 2025 be quashed, and that the Claimant receive damages “ or the recovery of the sum due to her since recalling the sum due to her on 12 June 2023 onwards ”.

5. On 12 March 2025, Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, granted permission to the Claimant on all 3 grounds. An order was made for the anonymity of a number of students in relation to whom claims were made, and whose names appear in the correspondence. That order remains in place.

6. The Defendant submits that subsequent events have rendered the challenge to the 8 March decision academic. Before considering the reasons for this, and the Claimant’s submissions in response, it is helpful to consider the regime for the provision of childcare funding by the Defendant, and the factual chronology. The relevant statutory and regulatory regime

7. Section 22 , Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998 provides, in so far as is relevant: (1) Regulations shall make provision authorising or requiring the Secretary of State to make grants or loans, for any prescribed purposes, to eligible students in connection with their undertaking — (a) higher education courses, or (b) further education courses, which are designated for the purposes of this section by or under the regulations. (2) Regulations under this section may, in particular, make provision— (a) for determining whether a person is an eligible student in relation to any grant or loan available under this section;…(b) prescribing, in relation to any such grant or loan and an academic year, the maximum amount available to any person for any prescribed purpose for that year.

8. Section 23 of the 1998 Act , in so far as is relevant, states: (4) The Secretary of State may make arrangements for any person or body specified in the arrangements to exercise on his behalf, to such extent as is so specified, any function exercisable by him by virtue of regulations under section 22 (including any such function in relation to appeals). (5) Any arrangements made under subsection (4) shall not prevent the Secretary of State from exercising the function in question himself.

9. The relevant Regulations, made pursuant to section 23(4) , are the Education (Student Support) Regulations 2011. Regulation 4(1) states: “ An eligible student qualifies for support in connection with a designated course subject to and in accordance with these Regulations ”. Regulation 36 permits grants not only to such students but also to their dependants, which can in turn include “childcare grants” (‘CCG’), by virtue of regulation 43(1). Childcare grans are specifically addressed by regulation 45. In so far as relevant, this provides: (1) An eligible student (“A”) qualifies for a childcare grant in connection with A's attendance on a designated course in accordance with this regulation. (2) Subject to paragraphs (3), (3B) and (4), the childcare grant is available in respect of an academic year in which A incurs prescribed childcare charges for— (a) a dependent child who is under the age of 15 immediately before the beginning of the academic year; … (5) Subject to paragraphs (6) and (8), the basic amount of childcare grant for each week is— (a) for one dependent child, 85 per cent. of the prescribed childcare charges, subject to a maximum amount of [£183.75, from June 2022 until February 2023, changing to £188.90 from February 2023 to February 2024] per week; or (b) for two or more dependent children, 85 per cent. of the prescribed childcare charges, subject to a maximum amount of [£315.03, from June 2022 until February 2023, changing to £323.85 from February 2023 to February 2024] per week except that A does not qualify for any such grant in respect of each week falling within the period between the end of the course and the end of the academic year in which the course ends.”

10. In other words, although the amount of payment altered over time, the rules at all material times required the student being supported to pay 15% of their childcare costs to the childcare provider, whilst the remaining 85% was paid direct by the CCGPS to that childcare provider. The chronology before the grant of permission

11. The Claimant has been a childminder for 10 years. She provides childcare services in her own name but receives payment through Dominion Childcare Ltd, which was registered in June 2022.

12. The Claimant joined the Childcare Grant Payment Portal (‘CCGPP’) in September 2019. Thereafter she was entitled to, and did receive payments from the CCGPS for childcare provided to students receiving childcare support. The terms on which she did so were set out in a declaration to which she assented. She would have assented to this declaration each week when a claim for payment was made, and it would have been supported by a declaration from each student for whose childcare provision such claim was made.

13. In so far as is material, this declaration stated: “I/we declare that the request for payment is for sums due in respect of childcare services provide on the specific dates and that the charges are true and complete, and o no t include free hours the parent is entitled to… I/we understand that if I am/we are found to be making fraudulent request for payments, my/our services and personal information, as well as the student’s information, may be shared with fraud prevention and/or law enforcement agencies I understand that information provided will be shared with the Student Loans Company ltd. …”

14. This declaration was quoted in both the 8 March 2024 decision letter and a further decision letter on 27 June 2025.

15. On 24 March 2023, the Defendant’s Customer Compliance Team requested the Claimant to provide the name of her childcare business, its Ofsted registration certificate, and recent bank statements. These were provided on 28 March 2023, and thereafter she was told that her verification had been successful.

16. On 14 June 2023 the Claimant became aware that a childcare payment of £8367.87 from CCGPS had been recalled, and thereafter her access to the CCGPP was blocked. She was informed that this was because her Ofsted certificate had not been verified. On 15 June she contacted the Defendant in this regard, and to clarify that her Ofsted registration was in her own name and not in that of Dominion Childcare Ltd. The Defendant informed her that her access would be unblocked in 10 days, and she responded to say that this was too long.

17. On 22 June 2023, the Claimant was notified that her account had been placed under indefinite review. On 6 July she complained in relation to this. From August 2023, the Claimant has been informed that students using her services have to submit childcare contracts and payment receipts to the Defendant.

18. On 22 February 2024, solicitors instructed by the Claimant made representations to the Defendant. The 8 March decision letter followed. The 8 March decision letter

19. The 8 March 2024 letter stated, “ we’ve reviewed your account and found that some of the claims you made were false ”. No particulars were provided in this regard, but the declaration to which the Claimant had agreed to when she registered with CCGPS and when she claimed each payment thereafter, of which she was said to be in breach, was quoted.

20. In terms of the consequences of the decision, the letter set out that the Claimant: • Would not be able to get any more CCG payments, • Would be removed from our CCGPS system, • Would not be able to re-register as a childcare provided (‘CCP’) on the CCGPS.

21. The letter also indicated that the Defendant would “ record [the Claimant’s] details with CIFAS, the UK’s fraud prevention service .” The grant of permission

22. The Claimant applied for permission to challenge this decision by judicial review on the three grounds already identified (at paragraph 3 above) on 27 May 2024.

23. On 12 March 2025, Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, granted permission to the Claimant on all 3 grounds. In particular, he determined: “ In my view Ground 2 is arguable. It is arguable that the email of 8 March 2024 reached a concluded decision that the Claimant had committed fraud (“We’ve reviewed your account and found that some of the claims you made were false”) with serious consequences for the Claimant, her business and with reporting to CIFAS. It is arguable that it was procedurally improper/unfair to do so without having identified to the Claimant the Defendant’s concerns and having sought her representations (if necessary coupled with an interim suspension of her account). It is further arguable that the “If you have more information” section of the email (which invited the Claimant to send any additional information or evidence “that you think may change our decision” to an email address “for review”) is insufficient to remedy this in the absence of the concerns being particularised in the email so as to alert the Claimant to what information might be relevant for her to send. It is further arguable that the invitation to the Claimant to participate in a telephone interview on 3 April 2024 did not remedy the issue given the notice given to the Claimant (email of 09.48 on 3 April scheduling a “formal” telephone interview at 15.00 the same day), and the absence of particularisation of the concerns prior to the interview. I am also satisfied that it is arguable that the email of 8 March 2024 failed to provide adequate reasons for the decision (contrast the information contained in the Summary Grounds of Resistance).”

24. The Deputy High Court Judge also considered that “ in the circumstances ” the Claimant should also be permitted to argue ground 1 and ground 3, which as he observed “ is entirely consequential on the other two grounds ”. There have been material developments since permission was granted, and this application for judicial review falls in fact to be determined not just by analysis of the 8 March decision, the deficiencies of which were identified by Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC, but also and importantly by assessment of those developments since. Chronology of events since permission was granted

25. Ther Order made when permission was granted required the Defendant to serve detailed grounds for contesting the claim by 13 May 2025. On 9 May, the Defendant’s solicitor wrote to the Claimant and her legal representative, stating that the Defendant was minded to withdraw its decision of 8 March, and inviting the Claimant to bring her application for judicial review to an end by consent. The Defendant offered to pay the Claimant’s costs to that point. On the morning of 12 May 2025, the Claimant wrote to the Defendant asking them also to resolve “ the 3 punishments meted out to me”, namely the cessation of payments to the Claimant, her removal from the CCGPS system and her report to CIFAS.

26. On 12 May, the Defendant wrote again to withdraw the 8 March decision, and they confirmed that they would be undertaking “ a new review of the claims submitted through the CCGPS ”. They invited the Claimant to attend an interview “ to gain a better understanding of the information we hold and that you have provided ”. The Defendant said that the Claimant’s “ details will be removed from CIFAS ”. The Claimant was made subject to what the Defendant characterises as an interim suspension of her registration, with a suspension of payments through CCGPS, whilst this investigation was being undertaken. This was addressed in the letter in these terms “ your CCGPS account will remain suspended whilst the review is carried out ”.

27. On 12 May, the Claimant responded to submit that the effect of the withdrawn decision of 8 March had therefore not been altered, and that the decision had not therefore, in fact, been withdrawn. This remains her contention now, and one of the issues that falls to be resolved is whether the decision of 8 March has in fact been withdrawn, and, if so, what the consequences of that withdrawal are for the present application.

28. On 13 May 2025, the Defendant emailed the Claimant requesting information relevant to the new investigation. The Defendant included an itemised list which included reference to bank statements, receipts for payments received from named students in relation to whom childcare payments had been made, and copies of contracts with those students for that childcare. The Defendant requested that the information be provided by 26 May 2025. The letter stated, “ if you don’t send us what we’ve asked for you won’t be able to use your account, which means you’ll be unable to get payments from us for any childcare you are providing for students ”.

29. On 29 May 2025 the Defendant wrote to the Claimant requesting a telephone interview. In the letter, the Defendant set out the matters the Defendant wished to discuss at the proposed telephone interview. This focused on 6 students of whom it was said “ SLC found that each of them had submitted false childcare claims . 5 of these six students appealed the sanction and of those one appeal was successful ”. Specific queries in relation to the students in question were set out. The letter also identified “ potential discrepancies ” between the number of children for whom childcare payments were sought, the number of children Ofsted had recorded at its inspection, and the number for whom Ofsted regulation permitted the Claimant to provide care. The letter invited the Claimant to attend interview on 2 or 3 June, adding “ if you are unwilling to attend an interview, you may instead submit a written response addressing the concerns outlined above. Please note that if you choose not to attend an interview or provide the requested evidence or written submissions, a decision will be made based on the evidence currently available to SLC. Your account will remain suspended while our investigation is ongoing”.

30. On 2 June 2025, the Defendant wrote to the Claimant requesting the Claimant attend a formal telephone interview with their Investigation’s Team which was scheduled for Tuesday, 3 June 2025 at 15:15. The Claimant did not attend the interview.

31. On 3 June 2025, the Claimant emailed the Defendant’s Compliance team attaching her response to the Defendant’s Detailed Grounds of Resistance. In this response, the Claimant addressed the six students about whom the Defendant had made enquiries in their letter of 29 May. On 5 June 2025, the Defendant emailed the Claimant again asking to conduct a telephone interview. The 27 June decision letter

32. On 27 June 2025, the Defendant sent a new decision letter to the Claimant. This stated that it was the result of a review of “ all evidence available to us, as well as the documents provided to us in your email of 3 June 2025 ”, which was a reference to the response to the detailed grounds of defence. It set out the details of 5 students in relation to whom “ no evidence has been provided …to show the mandatory 15% contribution they must make towards childcare costs ”. The letter further identified that “ these students were unable to demonstrate the payments of these contributions through either direct transfers to your business or sufficient cash withdrawals to support cash payments ”. The letter also expressed concerns as to delays between care being said to have been provided and claims made for payment, which “are not typical for a childcare business”. As to the distance between 2 of the students’ addresses and the Claimant’s address, which were further than would have been expected and in relation to the discrepancy between the number of children Ofsted permitted and the number claimed for, a difference of 18 spaces according to Ofsted and claims for the care of up to 59 children in some weeks.

33. The letter then stated “ in reaching a conclusion, we have considered all evidence afresh and have taken account of the documents provided by you on 3 June 2025. In doing so, we are satisfied that you have submitted some CCG claims that are false and in breach of CCG policy requirements. This is in breach of the declaration you agreed to for each payment made”. The declaration quoted in the 8 March letter was then repeated. The outcome of the investigation was that the Claimant: • Would not be able to get any more CCG payments, • Would be removed from our CCGPS system, • Would not be able to re-register as a CCP on the CCGPS, and • Her details were sent to CIFAS (the UK’s fraud prevention service).

34. The letter concluded by asking the Claimant if she had any additional evidence that “you think may change our decision” to provide it, and it again listed the items that had been requested in the Defendant’s letter of 13 May 2025.

35. The Defendant now seeks to rely on the fact of this new decision letter in answer to the Claimant’s application for judicial review. The Claimant in turn seeks to amend her claim so as to encompass the content of the decision of 27 June, which she characterises as a “rehash” of the 8 March decision. I will address each of these applications as part of my review of the submissions advanced by each party. In relation to those submissions, I have had the considerable advantage of written and oral submissions from Reza Choudhury acting on a direct access basis on behalf of the Claimant, and Christian Howells on behalf of the Defendant. The Claimant’s submissions re the 8 March decision

36. The Claimant’s grounds state: (a) The Defendant’s decision was irrational and unreasonable in that it failed to take account of all relevant matters and circumstance; (b) The decision was procedurally unfair and improper, because it failed to investigate properly, to put matters raised by that investigation to the Claimant or to invite her representations before the decision was taken; (c) The combined effect of these failings was to render the decisions unlawful.

37. In summary, the Claimant submits that the 8 March decision letter was fundamentally flawed, and that the decision reached was irrational and illogical. In this regard Mr Choudhury relies on R (Bancoult) v SSFCO (no.2) [2008] UKHL 61 , where reference was made (at paragraph 35) to “ review on ordinary principles of legality, rationality and procedural propriety”. He submits that the 8 March letter asserted a finding of fraud without setting out any reasons for why that conclusion had been reached, or referring to any evidence. It failed to set out which claims had been fraudulent, or in what way. Moreover, the decision had been reached without the Claimant having the material on which it was based identified to her, or having any opportunity to address either that material or the conclusion before it was reached. It was unreasonable in its failure to take account of any explanation or evidence from the Claimant. As Mr Choudhury pointed out, the Defendant here was “ under a duty to inform itself of the information relevant to the decision” (as was identified as necessary in R (Law Society) v Legal Services Commission [2010] EWHC 2550 (Admin) , paragraph 109).

38. The Claimant submits that the Defendant’s assertion that the judicial review claim has been rendered academic by the withdrawal of the 8 March decision in May 2025 is misconceived. Mr Choudhury relies on the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide which (at paragraph 6.3.4.1) states: “ where a claim is academic, ie there is no longer a case to be decided which will directly affect the rights and obligations of the parties to the claim, it will generally not be appropriate to bring judicial review proceedings. An example is the situation where the defendant has agreed to reconsider the decision challenged. Where the claim has become academic since it was issue itn is generally inappropriate to pursue the claim”.

39. The Claimant submits that neither the letter of 9 May 2025, setting out the Defendant’s intention to withdraw the decision of 8 March, nor the letter of 12 May 2025, which said that it was withdrawn, was effective in actually doing so. This is because the sanctions that flowed from the 8 March decision letter continued after 12 May. In particular, the Claimant’s CCGPS account remained suspended such that she was prevented from receiving payments, and she was further blocked from re-registration as a childcare provider from the CCGPS. The Claimant adds that while the Defendant invited CIFAS to remove C’s name on their fraud register, she has not received any confirmation of such removal. As Mr Choudhury submitted, the effect of a reference to CIFAS was to preclude the Claimant from obtaining credit or other financial assistance. These are the ”3 points punishment” to which the Claimant referred in correspondence and which continued to have effect after the purported withdrawal of the decision.

40. In the circumstances, it is submitted that the effect of the decision withdrawn has not removed the impediments the decision contained or put the Claimant in the position she was prior to the decision being made on 8 March 2024. In other words, the withdrawal of the decision is inconsequential as it has neither removed nor withdrawn the elements challenged in relation to the effect of the decision. As such, the Claimant avers that the judicial review claim is not academic and the 8 March decision remains outstanding and amenable to judicial review. The defendant’s submissions re the 8 March decision

41. The Defendant’s core submission is that the withdrawal of the decision of 8 March by the letter of 12 May brought the effect of that decision to an end. The outcome sought by the Claimant, the quashing of that decision, had been achieved. The Claimant’s application was thereby rendered wholly academic.

42. The Defendant also relies on the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide at paragraph 6.3.4.1. The Guide cites in support of this principle the following decisions: (a) R v SSHD ex parte Salem [1999] 1 AC 450 , where (at page 457) Lord Slynn accepted that the House of Lords had a discretion to hear an appeal where there is an issue involving a public authority on a point of public law, even if, by the time of the hearing 'there is no longer a lis to be decided which will directly affect the rights and obligations of the parties inter se .' He qualified that by saying that 'The discretion to hear disputes, even in the area of public law, must, however, be exercised with caution and appeals which are academic between the parties should not be heard unless there is a good reason in the public interest for doing so, as for example (but only by way of example) when a discrete point of statutory construction arises which does not involve detailed consideration of facts and where a large number of similar cases exist or are anticipated so that the issue will most likely need to be resolved in the near future' . (b) R (L) v Devon County Council [2021] EWCA Civ 358 , where Laing LJ said (at paragraph 50): “ Judicial review is a flexible and practical procedure. All remedies in judicial review are discretionary, including declarations (a substantial topic on which we received no distinct submissions). The Administrative Court has at its disposal a range of doctrines, with discretionary elements, to control access to its scarce resources. They include the doctrine that judicial review will not generally be available where there is a suitable alternative remedy, and its approach to timeliness. The discipline of not entertaining academic claims is part of this armoury. It enables the court to avoid hearings in cases in which, although the issue may be arguable, the court's intervention is not required, because the claimant has obtained, by one means or another, all the practical relief which the Court could give him. I incline to the view that the claims in these cases were academic, because the As had obtained all the practical relief for which they had asked, that is, the issue of the final amended statements. There was still a potential issue between the parties about the construction of the Regulations, but it was no longer live. It was no longer live in these proceedings, whether or not it was possible, probable, or virtually certain that it would arise again in a future year. As a matter of judicial policy, the best way of controlling access to the court for claims such as these is the rigorous filter of the test in Salem .”

43. Applying that principle here, the Defendant submits that the court's intervention is not required, because the claimant has obtained all the practical relief which the Court could give her, because the decision she sought to have quashed had been withdrawn. In terms of the Claimant’s argument that there remains relief outstanding because the sanctions that flowed from the decision of 8 March, the “ 3 point punishment ”, remain, the Defendant submits that this is in error. The sanctions in question ceased to flow from the 8 March decision when it was withdrawn. From that time on, they flowed instead from the decision of 12 May of the Defendant to impose an interim suspension of the Claimant’s account whilst the fresh investigation instigated on that day was in progress. That was a reasonable decision of the Defendant in circumstances where fraud was suspected against the Claimant whilst that matter was investigated.

44. In so far as the terms of the 12 May letter are in issue, it is submitted that this made clear that the Claimant’s account was suspended, and thus that she would not receive payments on that account, have access to that account or be able to re-register. Those were the consequences of the suspension on 12 May, not the decision of 8 March, from the time of the withdrawal of the latter. The difference between the finding of false claims on 8 March and the suspension pending investigation on 12 May was the referral to CIFAS. That was addressed in the 12 May letter, which stated that the referral had been rescinded. Mr Howells points in this regard to the fact that if complaint is to be made about the sanctions in place against the Claimant from 12 May, then it is the decision set out in the letter of that date which should have been the subject of the Claimant’s challenge, rather than that which it superseded. No such challenge had been brought.

45. In so far as the withdrawal of the 8 March letter did not address the Claimant’s second measure of relief, namely damages, the Defendant submits that a claim for damages was not appropriate relief to be sought from the Administrative Court, especially once the primary relief, the rescinding of the 8 March decision, had been achieved. Mr Howells points to the observations of Dingemans LJ in R (ZA (Pakistan)) v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 146 , at paragraph 69: “ Claims for damages alone may not be brought in the Administrative Court, see CPR 54.3(2) "a claim for judicial review may include a claim for damages, restitution or the recovery of a sum but may not seek such a remedy alone". This procedural rule exists because the Administrative Court seeks to make speedy decisions auditing the legality of decision making by public bodies. The Administrative Court will not be able to do that if its lists are filled with damages claims. Further, the procedures of the Administrative Court are not well suited to determine contested historic events giving rise to claims for damages where disclosure and cross-examination of witnesses will be relevant.”

46. Further, as Dingemans LJ went on to observe (at paragraph 72): “ The overriding objective requires that cases are allotted an appropriate share of the court's resources, see CPR Part 1.1(2)(e) . Parties are required to help the court to further the overriding objective, see CPR Part 1.3 . Therefore, once the appellant had been released from detention both parties should have addressed their minds to the issue of whether the claim should have been transferred either to the Queen's Bench Division or the County Court. There would also have been many advantages in such a transfer for both the Appellant and Respondent. So far as the Appellant is concerned there would have been no need to obtain permission to bring the claim, and there were contested issues about the grant of permission to apply for judicial review in this case, because there would have been unfettered access to the Queen's Bench Division or County Court. There would have been a process for calling witnesses and for cross examination.”

47. It is therefore submitted on behalf of the Defendant that the unparticularised claim to damages brought by the Claimant is a matter for resolution in the Country Court, rather than through the prolonging of the present application for judicial review.

48. Mr Howells submits that the effect of the withdrawal was thus the same as that of the quashing order sought by the Claimant’s application for judicial review. Such a quashing order would not have prevented the Defendant from starting a fresh investigation or from suspending the Claimant’s account, as was done on 12 May, and it would not have prevented the Defendant reaching a fresh decision on the basis of that investigation, as it did on 27 June.

49. The Defendant applies to rely on the fact, as opposed to the content, of the 27 June decision, as further underling that the present application for judicial review is purely academic. Mr Howells submits that not only had the decision of 8 March been withdrawn but it had been replaced first by the decision to commence a new investigation on 12 May, and then by the decision that on the basis of that investigation the interim suspension of the Claimant should be upheld. Analysis: 8 March decision

50. Had the 8 March decision stood alone as at the date of the substantive hearing of the Claimant’s application, I would have needed little persuading that the decision was irrational, unreasonable and procedurally unfair. It did not contain any reasoning as to the basis for the finding of false claims or the decision to cease payments to the Claimant. It failed to take account of any explanation or evidence from the Claimant, and had been reached without affording the Claimant the opportunity to address the evidence obtained by the investigation, which had not been provided or identified, and to provide an explanation of her own. As Mr Choudhury submitted the Claimant had as at 8 March been denied one of “the two fundamental rights accorded to [her] by natural justice or fairness”, as defined by Lord Diplock in O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 (at page 279F), namely “ to have afforded to [her] a reasonable opportunity of learning what is alleged against [her] and of putting forward [her] own case in answer to it ”. As at the time that permission was granted, the reasons for the grant of permission were compelling.

51. However, that decision does not stand alone. In fact, it is clear that it does not stand at all, since it was withdrawn on 12 May 2025. From the time that it was withdrawn, the relief primarily sought by the Claimant has been achieved, because the decision she wished to have quashed had been rescinded. The question, against that background and in accordance with the approach in R (L) v Devon County Council , is whether the Court’s intervention is now “ not required, because the claimant has obtained, by one means or another, all the practical relief which the Court could give him”. That, by reference to the Claimant’s submissions, involves consideration of the “3 point punishment”, and the relief sought in the form of damages.

52. Whilst it is true that after the 12 May the Claimant was subject to the suspension of her account, so that she could not receive payments for childcare from CCFPS, or otherwise to access her account or re-register, on any proper reading of the correspondence, I am satisfied that those consequences after 12 May flowed from the decision of 12 May to suspend her account pending the fresh investigation that the 12 May letter initiated. That is clear from a natural reading of the 12 May letter. It is also illustrated by the fact that the referral to CIFAS that had formed part of the finding of fraud was withdrawn when the decision itself was withdrawn.

53. That this is the correct interpretation of the circumstances is underlined by the fact that the actions of the Defendant on and from 12 May were all actions that they would have been entitled to take had the decision of 8 March been quashed by this Court in accordance with the Claimant’s application for judicial review. The Defendant would have been entitled to launch a fresh investigation, and to both suspend the Claimant’s account and prevent her re-registering whilst that investigation was underway. That, on its face, is what the 12 May letter sought to do. If there was error in the way that this was done by the decision on 12 May, then it was for the Claimant to bring a challenge by way of judicial review to that decision. It does not have the effect of preserving the effect of the 8 March decision, so that challenge thereto remains other than academic.

54. It is clear from the approach of the Court of Appeal in ZA v SSHD that the Claimant’s application for damages by way of additional relief does not alter that position. The claim advanced is, as the Defendant contends, unparticularised. That may be because it is difficult for the Claimant to particularise, but that is all the more reason why the Country Court is the appropriate venue for the determination of that issue, rather than the Administrative Court. Indeed, on a proper reading of the 12 May decision, it involves the suspension of payments to the Claimant pending investigation. It logically follows that if that investigation showed the Defendant’s concerns to have been groundless, the payments would have been reinstated and that which the Claimant sought by way of damages provided to her in a different way.

55. Considering the Claimant’s original grounds for judicial review, and the response of the Defendant to those grounds, I am therefore satisfied that as of 12 May the claim for judicial review of the 8 March decision has become academic, and should not be further entertained by this Court.

56. That is a decision which I reach without consideration of the 27 June decision. It follows that I have not found it necessary to determine the Defendant’s application for permission to rely on the fact of the 27 June decision to reject the Claimant’s application for judicial review of 8 March decision. Application to amend the Claimant’s grounds – the parties’ submissions

57. The Claimant invites me to permit her to amend her grounds so as to permit that consideration. Such an application is made pursuant to CPR rule 54.15, which, in so far as is relevant, states: “ The court’s permission is required if a claimant seeks to rely on grounds other than those which he has bene given permission to proceed”.

58. The Claimant seeks to rely on the 27 June decision to assert that whilst the decision does include an analysis of claims made in relation to a number of students, and sets out a number of areas of concern, like the 8 March letter it fails to identify the basis for the fraud allegation, or to identify which claims were fraudulent. For example: (a) Whilst the letter refers to a number of students who had not established that they had made their 15% contribution to the cost of childcare, that was an issue between those students and SLC, it was not for the Claimant to prove what monies the students had or had not paid. (b) Whilst she had not attended an interview, she had been entitled to refuse to participate in a telephone interview at which her rights would not have been protected or her interests safeguarded. It was also inappropriate for her to attend such an interview in the middle of contested litigation in relation to her judicial review claim. (c) Although it was asserted that the delay in relation to claims, and the distances involved for some students were unusual, it was not identified in what respects and by what point of reference this was the case. It was asserted that there had been breach of CCGPC policy, but no such policy was cited.

59. The Claimant, in her amended grounds, seeks also to rely on the argument that the sanctions taken against the Claimant were disproportionate because of the lack of reasoning or description to relate them to actual conduct by the Claimant. The Claimant in this context relies on the observations of the Court in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No.2) [2013] UKSC 39 , at paragraph 179, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC said “ In my view, the rule is that, before a statutory power is exercised, any person who foreseeably would be significantly detrimentally affected by the exercise should be given the opportunity to make representations in advance, unless (i) the statutory provisions concerned expressly or impliedly provide otherwise or (ii) the circumstances in which the power is to be exercised would render it impossible, impractical or pointless to afford such an opportunity ."

60. In response, the Defendant relies on the observations of Lloyd Jones LJ in R (Tesfay) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 415 in relation to “evolving” or “rolling” judicial review, which (at paragraph 76) it was said “.. can occur where there are external factual developments and where the parties amend their positions in order to take account of them .” Lloyd Jones LJ said (at paragraph 78): “Rolling or evolving judicial review of this kind does, in my view, give rise to difficulties both in principle and in practice. In R (A) v. Chief Constable of Kent [2013] EWCA Civ 1706 Beatson LJ observed that the impact of the reviewing court scrutinising post-decision material is likely to be particularly significant in contexts in which there will frequently be a change of circumstances or in the evidence available between the time of the original decision and the time the matter comes before the reviewing court. Sometimes, in an immigration context for example, the Secretary of State will not object to the court considering further evidence, which was not before the Secretary of State. Here the court may be willing to adopt a flexible approach which will enable it to do justice. However, there are dangers in a court becoming too entangled in post-decision material and the legality of later decisions. “Moreover, in a sense, the court can be said to step outside its primary role. It will not only be adjudicating on the dispute between the parties as to the legality of the original decision made. It will become part of a rolling administrative decision–making process, in which a decision by the Secretary of State is followed by challenge, which is followed by new material which in turn is followed by a further decision, with the possible interposition of the court at any or all of these stages. Such “rolling judicial review” appears unprincipled. It is also liable to lead to confusion and to sideline the administrative process laid down by the legislature.” (at [83]).”

61. The Defendant submits that if the Claimant were permitted to challenge both the decision of 8 March and 27 June in the present proceedings this would itself be unprincipled rolling judicial review of the kind deprecated by the Court of Appeal.

62. Whilst not himself relying on the content of the 27 June letter, Mr Howells did make submissions in relation to its contents to support his submission that the Court should not permit the amendment of the Claimant’s grounds so as to encompass that decision. He submitted: (a) whereas the 8 March decision contained no detail as to the basis on which the decision that “some of the claims [the Claimant] made were false”, the 27 June letter provided significantly more detail. It identified that the investigation had uncovered evidence that in the case of 5 named students they had not made their 15% contribution to the cost of childcare, without which no payment from CCGPS to those costs was appropriate. The Claimant was, or ought to have been in a position to produce evidence on this question, and had not done so. The delay in payment and the distances involved were both consistent with these not being genuine for genuine childcare, and the substantial discrepancy between number of children Ofsted’s registration permitted and the number of claims advanced further supported this. The conclusion reached was therefore rational and supported by evidence. (b) whereas it might be said of 8 March decision that it had been reached without giving the Claimant the opportunity to respond, the same could not be said of the 27 June decision. By the time that decision was reached, the Claimant had been afforded a number of opportunities to attend interview, to make representations and to provide evidence to the investigation. Whilst the interview was a telephone one, that was not an unusual occurrence and the Claimant had not advanced that, or the lack of legal representation, as reasons for not attending such an interview. Not only had she had the opportunity to respond to the Defendant’s suspicions she had done so through her response to the detailed grounds of defence, and that response had been taken into account. The decision had therefore been reached with procedural fairness. Analysis re the application to amend the Claimant’s grounds

63. By reference to Practice Direction 54APD.11, I do consider that the Claimant has explained the timing of this application, which follows the new decision being made on 27 June. But that does not resolve the question of whether the Court should permit it.

64. In approaching this application, I have regard to the observations of the Court of Appeal in R (Tesfay) v SSHD . There is, as was made clear, a need to avoid where possible rolling judicial review proceedings, in which, as fresh decisions are made or fresh steps taken, the challenge is adapted to confront that fresh stage. As Beatson LJ aptly said in R(A) v Chief Constable of Kent [2013] EWCA Civ 1706 , which was approved by the Court in Tesfay , to permit such adaption would mean that the Court “… will not only be adjudicating on the dispute between the parties as to the legality of the original decision made. It will become part of a rolling administrative decision–making process, in which a decision by the Secretary of State is followed by challenge, which is followed by new material which in turn is followed by a further decision, with the possible interposition of the court at any or all of these stages. Such “rolling judicial review” appears unprincipled.”

65. Judicial review is not a process designed to permit such a moving target, but the resolution of proper challenge to a particular decision. Here, that particular decision, namely the 8 March decision, has been withdrawn. In response, through this application to amend, the Claimant is, in my judgement, seeking to amend to attack a new target without having to meet the requirements of the test for permission, namely that the papers disclose that there is an arguable case that a ground for seeking judicial review exists which merits full investigation at an oral hearing (as set out, for example, in R v SSHD ex parte Begum [1990] Imm AR 1). That is neither appropriate nor permissible.

66. It would also be unfair. As the Defendant points out, the SLC has not had the opportunity to which they are entitled to respond with detailed grounds of defence to the challenge now advanced in relation to the 27 June letter. For that to happen an adjournment would be required, which is clearly undesirable when in fact on a proper reading the actual challenge is an academic one, and the proper course is for the Claimant, if she wishes to, to challenge the 27 June in a fresh permission application, for which she would have to demonstrate the fresh grounds to be arguable.

67. Moreover, in relation to any such fresh application, the Claimant would have to show that she had no alternative remedy. This the Defendant submits, with a degree of force, is untenable given that the 27 June letter invited her, in terms, to provide further material, which was identified, if she wished the decision to be re-considered.

68. Accordingly, I refuse the Claimant’s application to amend her grounds of challenge. It follows that I am not required to resolve her criticisms of the 27 June letter, or the Defendant’s contrary submissions. Conclusion

69. For the reasons set out above, I dismiss her application for judicial review of 8 March decision on the basis of her original grounds.