Mahmoud Safaye v The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

Preliminary matters

1. References in this decision to a ‘section’ are references to the applicable section of T he Road Traffic Act 1988 .

2. In this decision, we use the following terms to denote the meanings shown: ADIs: Approved Driving Instructors (those whose name appear on the Register) . Appellant: Mahmoud Safye. Offence: The offence referred to in paragraph 4 of this decision. Register: The Register of Approved Driving Instructors maintained by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency. Registrar: The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors (the Respondent). Registrar’s Decision: The decision of the Registrar, by way of letter to the Appellant dated 28 April 2025, to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register . Introduction - b ackground to the appeal

3. This was an appeal against the Registrar’s Decision.

4. The reasons for the Registrar’s Decision were, in summary, that the Appellant had accrued six penalty points for a conviction on 26 March 2025 for breach of requirements as to control of a vehicle, related to the use of a mobile phone, and accordingly the Registrar considered that the Appellant had ceased to be a fit and proper person to have their name entered in the Register. The appeal The grounds of appeal

5. The Appellant challenged the Registrar’s Decision. In summary, the Appellant’s appeal relied on the grounds that, in respect of the Offence: a. his phone had dropped off its holder when he was instructing someone; b. he had looked at the messages displayed on the phone screen when he picked it up, but he did not open or use the phone; and c. the vehicle was stationary in traffic at the time. The Registrar’s case

6. The Registrar resisted the appeal. The Registrar’s Statement of Case maintained that the Appellant’s driving licence being endorsed with six penalty points cannot be ignored. The Registrar believed that the Appellant, in committing the Offence whilst conducting a driving lesson, had not displayed the level of responsibility or commitment to road safety to be expected from an ADI. The Registrar accordingly upheld their view that the Appellant was not a ‘fit and proper person’ to have their name on the Register. Mode of hearing

7. The proceedings were held by the cloud video platform. The Tribunal Panel, the Appellant and Mr Russell (on behalf of the Registrar) joined remotely. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way.

8. At one point during the hearing, Judge Roper lost his connection to the video link and approximately three minutes passed before he re-connected. The parties and the other members of the Panel had been aware of the lost connection and proceedings were paused pending the Judge re-connecting. When the hearing resumed, it continued from the point when the connection had been lost and the Tribunal was satisfied that nothing had been missed. There were no other interruptions of note during the hearing. The evidence and submission

9. The Tribunal read and took account of a bundle of evidence and pleadings.

10. We heard from the Appellant directly, as well as hearing oral submissions from Mr Russell on behalf of the Registrar .

11. All of the contents of the bundle and the parties’ submissions were taken into account, even if not directly referred to in this decision. The relevant legal principles

12. Section 123(1) prohibits the giving of instruction in the driving of a motor car for payment unless the instructor’s name is entered in the Register, or they are the holder of a current licence issued under section 129 .

13. Conditions for entry and retention on the Register require a person to be, and continue to be, a “fit and proper person” pursuant to section 125(3)(e) and section 127(3)(e).

14. A person’s name may therefore be removed from the Register under section 128(2)(e) if the Registrar considers that they have ceased to be a “fit and proper person”.

15. The requirement to be a “fit and proper person” is not simply that the person is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor, but that they are a fit and proper person to have their name entered in the Register. Accordingly, the requirement to be a “fit and proper person” extends beyond instructional ability alone and, in assessing whether someone is a “fit and proper person”, account has to be taken of their character, behaviour and standards of conduct. This involves consideration of all material matters, including convictions, cautions and other relevant behaviour, placing all matters in context, and balancing positive and negative features as appropriate.

16. The entry of a person’s name on the Register carries with it an ‘official seal of approval’ and consequently maintenance of public confidence in the Register is important. The Registrar therefore has the duty of ensuring that ADIs are ‘fit and proper’ persons to have their names entered in the Register. As part of that, the Registrar exercises functions of scrutiny and that is why there are stringent disclosure requirements expected of ADIs and those wishing to become an ADI.

17. In cases involving motoring offences, it is expected that anyone who is to be an ADI will have standards of driving and behaviour above that of an ordinary motorist. Teaching people of all ages (including those aged under 18) to drive safely, carefully and competently is a professional vocation requiring a significant degree of responsibility. Such a demanding task should only be entrusted to those with high personal and professional standards and who themselves have demonstrated a keen regard for road safety and compliance with the law.

18. In cases involving non-motoring offences, the standing of the Register could be substantially diminished, and the public’s confidence undermined, if it were known that a person’s name had been permitted onto, or allowed to remain on, the Register when they had demonstrated behaviours, or been convicted or cautioned in relation to offences, substantially material to the question of fitness. Indeed, it would be unfair to others who have been scrupulous in their behaviour, and in observing the law, if such matters were ignored or overlooked.

19. Some of the factors in the preceding paragraph can also be relevant in cases involving motoring offences. The role and powers of the Tribunal

20. An appeal to the Tribunal against the Registrar’s Decision is undertaken by way of a ‘re-hearing’; the Tribunal ‘stands in the shoes’ of the Registrar and take a fresh decision on the evidence before it, giving appropriate weight to the Registrar’s Decision (as the Registrar is tasked by Parliament with making such decisions). The Tribunal does not conduct a procedural review of the Registrar’s decision-making process but, in reaching its decision, the Tribunal may review any findings of fact on which the Registrar’s Decision was based and the Tribunal may come to a different decision regarding those facts.

21. The powers of the Tribunal in determining the appeal are set out in section 131(3). In summary, for the purposes of the appeal, the Tribunal is empowered to make an order for the removal or the retention of the Appellant’s name in the Register, as it thinks fit.

22. However, under section 131(4A), if the Tribunal considers that any evidence adduced on the appeal had not been adduced to the Registrar before the Registrar’s Decision, it may (instead of making such an order) remit the matter to the Registrar for him to reconsider the Registrar’s Decision.

23. Where the Tribunal makes an order for the removal of the Appellant’s name in the Register, it may also, pursuant to section 131(4), direct that (in essence) the Appellant cannot apply to have their name entered in the Register for a period of up to four years. Discussion and findings

24. This case involves consideration only of the Offence; no other factors were raised by the Registrar regarding the Appellant being a fit and proper person.

25. The Appellant explained that, because of the difficulties in recent years with booking driving tests, students asked for his help in booking them and accordingly he had joined some WhatsApp groups which would give alerts about potential test slots. He stated that he put his phone on a phone holder in his car so that he could see if messages popped up on his screen with available slots. When such messages showed, he would ask his students to pull over, if safe to do so, and he would see if he could book the slot, to help his students. He stated that this did not actually happen often, perhaps once every two weeks, due to the lack of availability of test slots. However, he stated that due to the problem with booking tests, some students would not use instructors who could not help them in trying to book test slots. This was the background to the situation where he looked at his phone in the circumstances which lead to the Offence.

26. During the hearing, the Appellant expanded on the points raised in his grounds of appeal in respect of the Offence. He confirmed that he did not open his phone (in the sense of unlocking it) on the occasion in question but he accepted that he scrolled through the messages showing on the locked screen, after the phone had dropped off the holder with the intention of seeing if a test slot had become available for his pupil.

27. The Registrar’s position was that that an ADI should fully understand the dangers of being distracted with a handheld device and that this appeared to be a regular occurrence when the Appellant is waiting for messages about test slots.

28. The Appellant stated that he regretted what he did and that he took full responsibility for the Offence. He also stated that he understood the seriousness of the incident and had already altered how he acted. In particular, he stated that since the incident he does not look at his phone and no longer offers to help students book tests, even though this meant he had lost many students.

29. The Appellant referred us to another First-tier Tribunal decision regarding what he described as “similar circumstances”. We have not taken that other decision into account, because other First-Tier Tribunal decisions are not binding on us and, more importantly, each such decision turns on its facts.

30. We understand the Registrar’s concerns about the seriousness of the incident giving rise to the Offence and the bad example set by the Appellant’s actions at the time .

31. However, all things considered, our view is that this was an isolated incident in respect of which the Appellant expressed remorse. We find that the Appellant was consistent and straightforward in his evidence and submissions and that he was sincerely contrite. We consider that he has ‘learned his lesson’ in respect of the incident and that he has taken steps to alter his conduct, even though this has come at a financial cost to him with losing students. We also take into account that the Appellant has largely had an unblemished career as a driving instructor over a period of 18 years and that the specific circumstances of the Offence are such that it would be too draconian to deprive him of his livelihood as an ADI because of that one incident.

32. For all of the reasons we have given, we find that it would be disproportionate to conclude that the Appellant has failed to meet the statutory requirement to be a fit and proper person to have their name retained in the Register. On balance, taking into account all the circumstances, we conclude that the Registrar’s Decision was incorrect. There is, in our view, no risk to the integrity of the Register by the retention of the Appellant’s name on it.

33. We therefore allow the appeal and we order that the Appellant’s name be retained in the Register.

34. We would ask the Appellant to note the following. Following the endorsement of his driving licence with six points, he has come very close to losing his professional career and employment. It should be self-evident that there are significant learning outcomes from this process and that any future transgressions could result in him losing his status as an ADI. Signed: Stephen Roper Date: 17 December 2025 Judge of the First-tier Tribunal