Keith Algie & Anor (as Trustees in Bankruptcy of Christopher Michael Hutcheson) v Greta Diane Hutcheson

ICC JUDGE PRENTIS : Introduction

1. Greta Diane Roadnight, 23, married Christopher Michael Fraser Hutcheson, 20, at The Holy Redeemer, Hollington, Hastings on 14 December 1968. They have had four children together: Adam, born in 1970; Orlanda Butland, usually known as Olly, in 1971; Cayetana Ramsay, usually known as Tana, in 1974; and Luke in 1977. While Mrs Hutcheson regards their marriage as “very traditional”, that can only be taken in the sense of household finance: by agreement she did not work after the birth of Adam, and she had no income of her own; instead, “Chris’ earnings funded our household expenses”. In time they also came to fund two other households: one of another lady who called herself Mrs Hutcheson, Frances, and the two children he had by her, Victoria and Christopher Junior; another of Sara Stewart, for whose children he also provided.

2. Mr Hutcheson was bankrupted, probably for the first time, on 30 April 1993 in the Canterbury County Court. His creditors included the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, owed £2,248,550, of which all but £59,740 was being dealt with by their Voluntary Arrangements Section in Worthing. The other large creditor was the National Westminster Bank, owed nearly £572,000. Mrs Hutcheson remembered a previous bankruptcy, but not its date; and, given its age, further records are not obtainable even from the Official Receiver.

3. On 12 February 2018 Mr Hutcheson completed a Bankruptcy Application on which he was adjudicated bankrupt the next day. Keith Algie and Duncan Lyle were appointed his trustees from 27 March 2018, Mr Lyle being replaced by Andrew James Nalliah from 14 May 2025 (the “Trustees”). On 14 April 2018 Mr Hutcheson answered their questionnaire in which he disclosed an earlier bankruptcy “approx. 1989”. It is unlikely he could have built up such debts as were in the 1993 bankruptcy in that short period, so he was probably mistaken as to this.

4. His Bankruptcy Application disclosed debts to, among others, HMRC of £1,579,919 in “personal tax”, starting “6 to 10 years ago”. Another debt was £400,000 with the same range of start dates, owed to Mrs Stewart. The “Reasons for being unable to repay your debts” were given as “Relationship breakdown, Redundancy/ lost my job, other legal fees, failed to deal with taxes”. That too was of some vintage. Tana is married to the eminent chef, Gordon Ramsay. From around 1997 (that is, after discharge from his bankruptcy) Mr Hutcheson was employed by Gordon Ramsay Holdings Limited (“GRHL”). His sacking as CEO in October 2010 was the relationship breakdown. In 2012 a settlement was reached, of which more will be said below. In June 2017 Mr Hutcheson was sentenced to six months imprisonment for conspiracy to access computer files relating to Mr Ramsay without authority, of which he served three.

5. So by the time of the Bankruptcy Application Mr Hutcheson said he was unemployed, living off his state pension. In his interview he told the Official Receiver that he had not worked since his 2010 removal from GRHL, although he also said that he had subsequently founded a company called Scoffs Limited, of which he and son Adam were directors from incorporation on 5 December 2011 onwards. It entered creditors’ voluntary liquidation on 17 September 2015. His Bankruptcy Application also disclosed a recent directorship in Storage & Containers Limited, which seems not to have traded, and of which Mrs Hutcheson was also a (presumably nominal) director.

6. The Bankruptcy Application also answered affirmatively the question “In the last 5 years, have you sold, transferred, or given away any properties?”. As appears from the Official Receiver’s report in support of her successful application against Mr Hutcheson for a bankruptcy restrictions order (now elapsed), these were the “Gifting of financial interest in property to son”, being Christopher, valued at £175,000; and “Gifting of sales proceeds from property sale to wife”, valued at £346,500. The Trustees’ claims

7. It is the latter which forms part of the Trustees’ application sealed on 7 February 2024 and accompanied by a claim form sealed on 8 March 2024 of which this is the trial.

8. By it, they seek relief in respect of dealings with four properties: Flat 1, Lupus House, 120 Mount Street, London W1 (“120 Mount Street”) and Flat 1, 119A Mount Street, London W1 (“119A Mount Street”) (together, the “Mount Street Properties”); 177 Middlebridge Street, Romsey, Hampshire SO51 (“Romsey”); and 4 Wycombe Place, London SW18 (“Wycombe Place”). The Mount Street Properties were registered in the names of Mr and Mrs Hutcheson; the others in his name only. In short, it is said that from each Mrs Hutcheson received sale proceeds “in excess of her legal entitlement”, such receipts being transactions at an undervalue under s.339 (“IA86”); or preferences under s.340; or transactions defrauding creditors under s.423; or resulting in Mrs Hutcheson’s unjust enrichment; or deriving from her dishonest assistance of her husband in putting assets beyond the reach of his creditors, or unconscionable receipt of such benefits. Insolvency Act 1986

9. Helpfully, Miss Rogers for the Trustees at the outset confirmed that they were no longer pursuing the dishonest assistance or unconscionable receipt claims, as being unnecessary; and they have therefore been dismissed. In closing she also agreed, rightly, that the unjust enrichment claims add nothing. I also do not propose to deal further with the preference claims, as there is nothing to establish Mrs Hutcheson as her husband’s creditor at any relevant point.

10. We are left with the claims under s.339 and s.423, the principals of which are said to total £2,359,072, to which the Trustees would add 8% interest being £1,750,798 at the date of issue.

11. There are two other prime issues. First is what beneficial interest, if any, Mrs Hutcheson had in Romsey and Wycombe Place. Secondly, in respect of the Mount Street Properties, it is said that so far as she received sums in excess of her entitlement, Mr Hutcheson has already been fully repaid. The law s.339

12. By s.339 IA86: (1) Subject as follows in this section and sections 341 and 342, where an individual is made bankrupt and he has at a relevant time (defined in section 341) entered into a transaction with any person at an undervalue, the trustee of the bankrupt’s estate may apply to the court for an order under this section. (2) The court shall, on such an application, make such order as it thinks fit for restoring the position to what it would have been if that individual had not entered into that transaction. (3) For the purposes of this section and sections 341 and 342, an individual enters into a transaction with a person at an undervalue if—(a) he makes a gift to that person or he otherwise enters into a transaction with that person on terms that provide for him to receive no consideration, (b) … or (c) he enters into a transaction with that person for a consideration the value of which, in money or money’s worth, is significantly less than the value, in money or money’s worth, of the consideration provided by the individual.

13. s.341 addresses relevant time: “(1) Subject as follows, the time at which an individual enters into a transaction at an undervalue… is a relevant time if the transaction is entered into…— (a) …at a time in the period of 5 years ending with the day of the making of the bankruptcy application as a result of which… the individual is made bankrupt… (2) Where an individual enters into a transaction at an undervalue… at a time mentioned in paragraph (a)… of subsection (1) (not being… a time less than 2 years before the end of the period mentioned in paragraph (a)), that time is not a relevant time for the purposes of section 339… unless the individual— (a) is insolvent at that time, or (b) becomes insolvent in consequence of the transaction or preference; but the requirements of this subsection are presumed to be satisfied, unless the contrary is shown, in relation to any transaction at an undervalue which is entered into by an individual with a person who is an associate of his (otherwise than by reason only of being his employee). (3) For the purposes of subsection (2), an individual is insolvent if— (a) he is unable to pay his debts as they fall due, or (b) the value of his assets is less than the amount of his liabilities, taking into account his contingent and prospective liabilities… .

14. There is here no dispute but that Mrs Hutcheson is an associate of her husband’s; and so the Trustees have the benefit of the insolvency presumption for transactions from 13 February 2016.

15. s.342 provides examples of relief which may be granted and the treatment of proceeds, and need not be quoted here; and neither side has felt the need to cite authority on this. s.423

16. For s.423 the below largely repeats the same section in my judgment earlier this year in Re Roderic Alexander Innes Hamilton [2025] EWHC 756 (Ch) , which has been cited.

17. Although headed “Transactions defrauding creditors”, s.423 is not founded in fraud; neither, though it is in the IA86, is it concerned with insolvency.

18. By s.423(1): This section relates to transactions entered into at an undervalue; and a person enters into such a transaction with another person if- (a) he makes a gift to the other person or he otherwise enters into a transaction with the other on terms that provide for him to receive no consideration;… (c) he enters into a transaction with the other for a consideration the value of which, in money or money’s worth, is significantly less than the value, in money or money’s worth, of the consideration provided by himself.

19. s.423(3) describes the necessary purpose: In the case of a person entering into such a transaction, an order shall only be made if the court is satisfied that it was entered into by him for the purpose- (a) of putting assets beyond the reach of a person who is making, or may at some time make, a claim against him, or (b) of otherwise prejudicing the interests of such a person in relation to the claim which he is making or may make.

20. s.425 provides examples of orders which may, in the court’s discretion, be made if the undervalue and purpose are satisfied, s.423(2) allowing the court to: make such order as it thinks fit for- (a) restoring the position to what it would have been if the transaction had not been entered into, and (b) protecting the interests of persons who are victims of the transaction.

21. By s.423(5) a victim is “a person who is, or is capable of being, prejudiced by” the transaction.

22. A victim is also one of those with standing to bring a s.423 application: s.424(1)(c).

23. In Re Ethos Solutions Limited; Purkiss v Kennedy and others [2025] EWCA Civ 268 , following the recent decision of the Supreme Court in El-Husseiny v Invest Bank PSC [2025] UKSC 4 , Newey LJ at [18] stated as follows: “Case law establishes the following propositions as regards section 423 of the 1986 Act : i) In construing section 423 , the Court must look at the relevant wording “in the context in which it appears in the section and in the Act as a whole, bearing in mind the purpose for which it was enacted”: see R (O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3 , [2023] AC 255 , paras 29 to 31”: El-Husseiny v Invest Bank PSC [2025] UKSC 4 , [2025] 2 WLR 320 (“ El-Husseiny ”), at paragraph 32, per Lady Rose and Lord Richards; ii) It is “unquestionably the debtor’s subjective purpose that must be established”: El-Husseiny , at paragraph 28, per Lady Rose and Lord Richards. The Judge has to be satisfied that the debtor “actually had the purpose, not that a reasonable person in his position would have it”: Hill v Spread Trustee Co Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 542 , [2007] 1 WLR 2404 (“ Hill ”), at paragraph 86, per Arden LJ. “There can be no doubt but that section 423(3) requires the person entering into the transaction to have a particular purpose” and “[i]t is not enough that the transaction has a particular result”: Hill , at paragraph 130, per Arden LJ; iii) Section 423 will apply “if the statutory purpose can properly be described as a purpose and not merely as a consequence, rather than something which was indeed positively intended”: Inland Revenue Commissioners v Hashmi [2002] EWCA Civ 981 , [2002] BCC 943 , at paragraph 23, per Arden LJ. Thus, “where the transaction was entered into by the debtor for more than one purpose, the court does not have to be satisfied that the prohibited purpose was the dominant purpose, let alone the sole purpose, of the transaction”: JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2018] EWCA Civ 1176 , [2019] BCC 96 (“ Ablyazov ”), at paragraph 13, per Leggatt LJ. “It is sufficient simply to ask whether the transaction was entered into by the debtor for the prohibited purpose” and, “[i]f it was, then the transaction falls within s.423(3) , even if it was also entered into for one or more other purposes”: Ablyazov , at paragraph 14, per Leggatt LJ. In paragraph 17 of his judgment in Ablyazov , Leggatt LJ said that the first instance judge had been “correct” to ask whether the debtor had “positively intended” to put funds beyond the reach of a creditor; iv) “The fact that lawyers may have advised that the transaction is proper or can be carried into effect does not by itself mean that the purpose of the transaction was not the [ section 423(3) ] purpose”: Arbuthnot Leasing International Ltd v Havelet Leasing Ltd (No. 2) [1990] BCC 636 , at 644, per Scott J. See also National Westminster Bank plc v Jones [2001] 1 BCLC 98 , at paragraph 107, per Neuberger J; v) For the purposes of section 423(3) (b), “[t]he ‘interests’ of a person are wider than his rights”: Hill , at paragraph 101, per Arden LJ; vi) The transaction at issue need not have been directed at the “victim” making the claim. In Hill , Arden LJ explained in paragraph 101: “For a person to be a ‘victim’ there is no need to show that the person who effected the transaction intended to put assets beyond his reach or prejudice his interests. Put another way, a person may be a victim, and thus a person whose interests the court thinks fit to protect by making an order under section 423 , but he may not have been the person within the purpose of the person entering into the transaction. That person may indeed have been unaware of the victim’s existence”; and vii) The fact that the debtor denies having had a section 423(3) purpose need not bar the Court from inferring that he had such a purpose: see Hill , at paragraph 86, per Arden LJ”.

24. To draw out s.423 ’s relationship with solvency, there is also this quotation from Singh LJ in El-Husseiny [2023] EWCA Civ 555 at [67]: “The important point for present purposes is that, although section 423 finds itself in the same Act as those provisions which are concerned with bankruptcy or corporate insolvency, its scope is wider. There is no need for there to be any insolvency. The unfortunate reality of life is that even very wealthy debtors are sometimes unwilling, rather than unable, to pay their debts. They may well make strenuous efforts to use various instruments, including a limited company, for the purpose of putting their assets beyond the reach of a person who is making, or may make, a claim against them; or otherwise prejudicing the interests of such a person”.

25. Mr Gunaratna also drew my attention to Calver J’s remarks as to the pleading of s.423 in another iteration of the El-Husseiny litigation, Invest Bank PSC v El-Husseini [2024] EWHC 2976 (Comm) , especially at [23]-[31] and [37]-[39]. Beneficial interest in real property of which the claimant is not the legal owner

26. Lord Bridge said this in Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 at 132-133: “The first and fundamental question which must always be resolved is whether, independently of any inference to be drawn from the conduct of the parties in the course of sharing the house as their home and managing their joint affairs, there has at any time prior to acquisition, or exceptionally at some later date, been any agreement, arrangement or understanding reached between them that the property is to be shared beneficially. The finding of an agreement or arrangement to share can only, I think, be based on evidence of express discussions between the partners, however imperfectly remembered and however imprecise their terms may have been. Once a finding to this effect is made it will only be necessary for the partner asserting a claim to a beneficial interest against the partner entitled to the legal estate to show that he or she has acted to his or her detriment or significantly altered his or her position in reliance on the agreement in order to give rise to a constructive trust or a proprietary estoppel. In sharp contrast with this situation is the very different one where there is no evidence to support a finding of an agreement or arrangement to share, however reasonable it might have been for the parties to reach such an arrangement if they had applied their minds to the question, and where the court must rely entirely on the conduct of the parties both as to the basis from which to infer a common intention to share the property beneficially and as the conduct relied on to give rise to a constructive trust. In this situation direct contributions to the purchase price by the partner who is not the legal owner, whether initially or by payment of mortgage instalments, will readily justify the inference necessary to the creation of a constructive trust. But, as I read the authorities, it is at least extremely doubtful that anything less will do”.

27. In Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 , [2012] 1 AC 776 at [51] Lord Walker and Baroness Hale were addressing a different case to Rosset and our own facts being (with those differences marked as they are relevant to the final analysis) “where a family home [note] is bought in the joint names [note] of a cohabiting couple [note] who are both responsible for any mortgage [note], but without any express declaration of their beneficial interests”. They said this: “(1) The starting point is that equity follows the law and they are joint tenants both in law and in equity. (2) That presumption can be displaced by showing (a) that the parties had a different common intention at the time when they acquired the home, or (b) that they later formed the common intention that their respective shares would change”. They continued with an analysis of common intention, relevant as well to single-name cases. “(3) Their common intention is to be deduced objectively from their conduct: ‘the relevant intention of each party is the intention which was reasonably understood by the other party to be manifested by that party’s words and conduct notwithstanding that he did not consciously formulate that intention in his own mind or even acted with some different intention which he did not communicate to the other party’: Lord Diplock in Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886 , 906. Examples of the sort of evidence which might be relevant to drawing such inferences are given in Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432 , para 69”.

28. Baroness Hale had said this in Stack v Dowden at [69]-[70]: “[69] In law, ‘context is everything’ and the domestic context is very different from the commercial world. Each case will turn on its own facts. Many more factors than financial contributions may be relevant to divining the parties' true intentions. These include: any advice or discussions at the time of the transfer which cast light upon their intentions then; the reasons why the home was acquired in their joint names; the reasons why (if it be the case) the survivor was authorised to give a receipt for the capital moneys; the purpose for which the home was acquired; the nature of the parties' relationship; whether they had children for whom they both had responsibility to provide a home; how the purchase was financed, both initially and subsequently; how the parties arranged their finances, whether separately or together or a bit of both; how they discharged the outgoings on the property and their other household expenses. When a couple are joint owners of the home and jointly liable for the mortgage, the inferences to be drawn from who pays for what may be very different from the inferences to be drawn when only one is owner of the home. The arithmetical calculation of how much was paid by each is also likely to be less important. It will be easier to draw the inference that they intended that each should contribute as much to the household as they reasonably could and that they would share the eventual benefit or burden equally. The parties' individual characters and personalities may also be a factor in deciding where their true intentions lay. In the cohabitation context, mercenary considerations may be more to the fore than they would be in marriage, but it should not be assumed that they always take pride of place over natural love and affection. At the end of the day, having taken all this into account, cases in which the joint legal owners are to be taken to have intended that their beneficial interests should be different from their legal interests will be very unusual. [70] This is not, of course, an exhaustive list. There may also be reason to conclude that, whatever the parties' intentions at the outset, these have now changed. An example might be where one party has financed (or constructed himself) an extension or substantial improvement to the property, so that what they have now is significantly different from what they had then”.

29. Baroness Hale had already referred at [61] to Oxley v Hiscock , “a different case from this. The property had been conveyed into the sole name of one of the cohabitants. The claimant had first to surmount the hurdle of showing that she had any beneficial interest at all, before showing exactly what that interest was. The first could readily be inferred from the fact that each party had made some kind of financial contribution towards the purchase…”; so, not an inflexible rule, but a “ready inference”, deriving from Rosset ; and it was in that context that Chadwick LJ made his observations approved in Jones at [51] as to quantification; apposite, he said, “in a case where there is no evidence of any discussion between them as to the amount of the share each was to have- and even in a case where the evidence is that there was no discussion on that point”.

30. Chadwick LJ’s approach was approved in the continuation of paragraph [51] in Jones : “(4) In those cases where it is clear either (a) that the parties did not intend joint tenancy at the outset, or (b) had changed their original intention, but it is not possible to ascertain by direct evidence or inference what their actual intention was as to the shares in which they would own the property, ‘the answer is that each is entitled to that share which the court considers fair having regard to the whole course of dealing… in relation to the property’: Chadwick LJ in Oxley v Hiscock [2005] Fam 211 , para 69. In our judgment, ‘the whole course of dealing… in relation to the property’ should be given a broad meaning, enabling a similar range of factors to be taken into account as may be relevant as ascertaining the parties’ actual intentions. (5) Each case will turn on its own facts. Financial contributions are relevant but there are many other factors which may enable the court to decide what shares were either intended (as in case (3)) or fair (as in case (4))”.

31. Parts of that approach were then treated in Jones as applicable to single-name cases, in a passage which takes us round back to Rosset : “[52] This case is not concerned with a family home which is put in the name of one party only. The starting point [there] is different. The first issue is whether it was intended that the other party have any beneficial interest in the property at all. If he does, the second issue is what that interest is. There is no presumption of joint beneficial ownership. But their common intention has once again to be deduced objectively from their conduct. If the evidence shows a common intention to share beneficial ownership but does not show what shares were intended, the court will have to proceed as at paragraph 51(4) and (5) above”.

32. As Nugee LJ observed in Amin v Amin (deceased) [2020] EWHC 2675 (Ch) at [32], it follows that in a sole-name case “the starting point… is that the presumption is that the sole legal owner is also the sole beneficial owner, and the common intention referred to in [52] is a common intention that the beneficial interests should be something other than the legal owner being also the sole beneficial owner. But that apart, it seems to me that the exercise that Lord Walker and Lady Hale envisaged is similar in a sole name case to that in a joint names case. In each case what needs to be found to displace the presumption that equity follows the law is a common intention that the beneficial ownership should be something different from the legal ownership; and (save for the case where there is evidence of express discussions as referred to by Lord Bridge in Lloyds Bank v Rosset ) that is to be deduced objectively from their conduct”. So, at [35] Nugee LJ could confirm that “the Judge was right to say that financial contributions and many other factors could enable the Court to decide not only what shares the parties intended, but also whether there was a common intention at all that the sole legal owner should not be the sole beneficial owner”.

33. Given the evidence in our case about Mrs Hutcheson’s lack of knowledge of at least some large parts of the relevant transactions, Miss Rogers also took the court to a dictum of Arden LJ in the course of her lead judgment in Lightfoot v Lightfoot-Brown [2005] EWCA Civ 201 , [2005] 2 P&CR 22 , in which at [24] and having set out Lord Bridge’s “sharp contrast” section and the drawing of inferences, she continued: “In addition, the person making the expenditure must show that he acted on the basis of the common intention and did so to his detriment”. As I think, that sentence needs to be read in its context, being the drawing of inferences, rather than separated out and read literally; so, it is directed at the point that expenditure is not by itself necessarily sufficient, but must within the surrounding facts be capable of supporting the objective inferences of intention and detrimental reliance. Facts and findings Marriage; 64 Beulah Hill; the 1970 Document; Mrs Hutcheson’s evidence

34. Mr and Mrs Hutcheson married in December 1968 having met at the beginning of that year. They moved into a rented property in Menlo Gardens SE19 until in about 1970 her father gifted “to us” as a wedding present 64 Beulah Hill, SE19. “My father was very much aware that I had not known Chris for very long when we got married. My father wanted to make sure that I would not be left with nothing if the marriage failed. He insisted that a document… be put in place”.

35. So far as anyone can recall 64 Beulah Hill was put into joint names, so Mrs Hutcheson would not have been left with nothing. But the 1970 Document, as it has been called, is relied on by her in her points of defence as evidencing the “common intention and/ or understanding at or around the outset of their marriage that all real property acquired by them during their marriage would belong to them jointly (in the manner of joint tenants in equity), irrespective of which of them held formal legal title to any such property”.

36. On its own terms, it does not go nearly so far. It is dated 1 July 1970, bears the signatures of each, and reads: “Chris & Greta Hutcheson have agreed that there are and will be for the duration of their marriage, two tenets that they will live by. They are: that they will each pursue separate roles in that Greta will look after the welfare of the family, the management of the household and all matters in which our children are concerned on a daily basis and that Chris will ‘throw the spear’ and be responsible for the financial welfare and earnings of the family, and that it is understood whatever wealth that may accrue as the years pass will be split in value on an equal basis. This agreement will from today be on a ‘goes without saying’ basis”.

37. It therefore does not speak to the acquisition of real property. It divides responsibilities, and contemplates a split in “wealth”. Mr Gunaratna said that Mrs Hutcheson’s acceptance in cross-examination that “wealth” must constitute the monetary balance after payment of household debts was not binding as to its interpretation; he is right; but no alternative definition was or could sensibly be given. Quite whether it covers only wealth deriving from Mr Hutcheson’s spear-throwing, or such wealth as he or Mrs Hutcheson might otherwise accrue, is a matter of interpretation.

38. So it is a document on its own terms at a high level of generality.

39. It also speaks to a future ongoing position; and therefore, as the Trustees emphasise, and Mrs Hutcheson expressly acknowledges, cannot by itself at the moment of its creation generate any constructive trust.

40. Further, being a document as to future position, its tenets may be subject to later alteration by agreement, understanding, or otherwise; and no-one suggests that it contemplates the position which in fact inured, of the marital household being but one of three.

41. The Trustees are doubtful as to its authenticity. To that end, as part of the agreed directions to trial sealed on 13 June 2024, each side had permission to adduce expert evidence in the fields of both “documentation authentication and handwriting analysis, in relation to the authenticity and veracity of the letter… including as to its age and signatories”; and as to the latter, Mrs Hutcheson was to “provide to the expert upon request (i) 3 examples of her signature from 2017-2018; and (ii) 3 examples of her signature from c.1970”. The provision of the 1970 Document itself, or such copy as was provided to Edwin Coe, then Mrs Hutcheson’s solicitors, to allow them to disclose it on 19 December 2018, was assumed.

42. Despite a number of requests, including in the early part of this year, no such copy has ever been disclosed by Mrs Hutcheson; nor have the signatures, save for one; and that though her obligations derive from a consent order.

43. Surprising though that is, it is too far to conclude from this non-disclosure that the 1970 Document is a fake; and anyway its ambit is restricted by its own terms (and so the point might be made that were it a put-up job it is poorly crafted). It is also not improbable that Mr Roadnight was concerned about his daughter’s marriage to a student, especially as it was he who was gifting them their matrimonial home; nor that, as Mrs Hutcheson recalled, the 1970 Document, which “is in Chris’ handwriting… was written in my father’s presence”. Even on her case its effect was limited: after signing “I did not think about it again and do not remember discussing it with Chris… I did not consider it to have any significance beyond showing what we both understood anyway about how we conducted our lives and arranged our affairs together as a married couple”.

44. The non-disclosure does, though, speak to the phantom at this trial, who is Mr Hutcheson; and his ongoing influence over Mrs Hutcheson and this litigation; and her reliability as a witness. As will be apparent from what follows, it is plain that throughout their marriage Mrs Hutcheson went beyond the 1970 Document and placed every financial decision and transaction, and knowledge of most of their details, in the hands of her husband; and as indicated by her repeated references to the traditional nature of the marriage, she did so willingly; and despite the mistresses and bankruptcies, still does. “Throughout our married life, Chris had control of our financial affairs… I had very little knowledge of our finances… because Chris took care of all that”.

45. So, while the main matrimonial bank account was that in her name held at Lloyds, number -5366 (the “Main Account”), “I do not know how to use online banking and have never personally made any electronic transfers out of the account. I have not checked the bank statements for the Main Account or any other account for many years”. She does recollect that it was opened before they were married “but has been operated as a joint account for many years. Money in this account has always been treated as joint funds. As I was not working, Chris would deposit money into this account… household expenditure was mainly paid from the Main Account [and] money would be transferred between accounts to ensure there were enough funds to do so… Chris had complete access to the Main Account and used it as if it was his own account for many years, certainly from when online banking was available… at least thirteen years ago”. She says both had a debit card for it. There was also the Joint Account with Lloyds, number -1368: “I do not know when the Joint Account was set up… [it] was not used as a household account”, but Mr Hutcheson would feed the Main Account from it.

46. Another feature of this relationship was that when it came to financial matters, Mrs Hutcheson would trustingly and unquestioningly sign whatever document Mr Hutcheson put before her.

47. It is now said, on her oral account, that it is her husband who has been running this litigation for her; and that is despite her statement, settled on 14 April 2025, that he is suffering from “cognitive impairment”, short of Alzheimer’s, such that he has “not been able to assist” her with her statement “as his memory is now very poor”. He it was, she says, who dealt with the instructions to Edwin Coe in 2018, and those to Sheridans now. He had jointly with her prepared her points of defence, signed on 14 June 2024. Sheridans were talking to him about the 1970 Document, of whose location he told her he had “no idea”; a topic on which they were corresponding with Irwin Mitchell as late as 6 March 2025. How accurate Mrs Hutcheson is on this I do not of course know; but at the least it shows that as between the Hutchesons, Mrs Hutcheson is still reliant on him; and that is not consistent with the tenor of her statement.

48. As to its contents she says “My memory is also not as good as it once was and I have spoken with family members in order to assist in my recollection of some of the events and relevant dates”; those persons are not identified.

49. With all respect to her, her charm and her age, I therefore have deep reservations about the accuracy of Mrs Hutcheson’s positive recollections. Further, as we will see with the 6 August 2017 letter, she has preferred to meld them in accordance with her husband’s views and aspirations ahead of her obligation to the court to give, so far as she can (bearing in mind that some of these matters are in the deep past, and none of them recent, and that many answers were, understandably, that she could not remember), her own genuine and untrammelled recall. That submission to her husband in matters of finance has been her ongoing choice throughout their long marriage; and, as she observed when asked whether she maintained detailed accounts of their expenditure, her marriage would not have lasted as long had she done so. It is a marriage to which she remains devoted.

50. However, that does not obviate the court’s task of assessing the dealings between Mr and Mrs Hutcheson in light of the evidence before it. Wittersham Manor

51. In about 1977 Mr and Mrs Hutcheson sold Beulah Hill and bought Wittersham Manor, Kent as their home. Who held legal title is not known. When Mr Hutcheson was thought to have been bankrupted in 1989 it was easy enough to link its sale in around 1990 and the Hutchesons moving into rented properties in the Barbican and then Butlers Wharf to that. But Mrs Hutcheson said she just yearned to return to the buzz of London, and that whether the bankruptcy order was in 1989 or 1993 she did not recall receiving any communication from a trustee; and so it would appear that no-one then considered her to hold property with her husband; and again that would point to a bankruptcy date after the sale of Wittersham Manor.

52. Whenever it was, the first bankruptcy drew a line in respect of their financial dealings. 4 Mount Street: purchase

53. On 12 January 1996 Mr and Mrs Hutcheson acquired a new family home, Flat 2, 4 Mount Street W1 (“4 Mount Street”). She recollected that they had seen it together, and Mr Hutcheson was very keen to buy. It has over trial acquired an unheralded importance for two reasons: the use of its equity, and the fact that although it is undisputed that beneficially they owned it jointly, it was placed into the sole name of Mrs Hutcheson; and, correspondingly, it was she who was the sole mortgagor.

54. It remains unclear in what circumstances Lloyds Bank plc granted a mortgage to someone who had not worked for 25 years, and was not going to; and was married to someone who, taking the 1993 date, was still in bankruptcy or had only just exited it. “I was really not aware of this” said Mrs Hutcheson; and doubtless it was Mr Hutcheson who had arranged everything.

55. As between them, though, the uncontentious position is that this was bought as their home; they lived in it as such; and the legal ownership was not determinative of the beneficial, even if (we do not know) Mrs Hutcheson had done no more than acquiesce in the use of her name. 120 Mount Street: purchase

56. In 2005 they moved a little west, to 120 Mount Street. On purchase on 25 February 2005, for £1.875m, this was put into both names, and owned jointly. It was in part funded from the equity in 4 Mount Street. In a series of slightly complicated transactions which seem typical of Mr Hutcheson and were, as with the other properties’, described by him to the Official Receiver, the 5% deposit was met from his GRHL directors’ loan account (the “Loan Account”), and the balance from a Woolwich mortgage of £1.5m together with £368,467, being some of the proceeds of a remortgage on 4 Mount Street with Singer & Friedlander. As confirmed by a cash account of Joelson Wilson & Co, solicitors, of 25 February 2005, the Singer & Friedlander advance of £1.25m was in large excess of what was needed to discharge the £461,890 owed to the Halifax, and meet the 120 Mount Street balance. The remaining £417,141 was not transferred to the legal owner and sole mortgagor, Mrs Hutcheson, nor to both of them, but to an account of Mr Hutcheson’s held with Singer & Friedlander. However the ownership of those free monies may have been treated between Mr and Mrs Hutcheson, he told the Official Receiver that £400,000 of that sum had gone “towards the purchase of a French property”. That was Chateau du Prelong in Druillat (the “Chateau”), put into the names of the children, and in which Mrs Hutcheson says she and her husband lived “from around 2014 to 2019”. (That last cannot be entirely accurate: the Bankruptcy Application gave an address in Wrotham for Mr Hutcheson, into which he said he had moved in August 2017 (so, on his release from prison); and, for what it is worth, he stated his household there as being son Adam, and Mrs Hutcheson). 119A Mount Street: purchase

57. Shortly afterwards, on 14 July 2006 Mr and Mrs Hutcheson bought in their joint names 119A Mount Street, which adjoined 120 and which they knocked through. Again, everyone is agreed that this property too was beneficially shared equally; it was essentially an extension to their home. The £580,000 purchase price was met by a £493,000 Bank of Scotland mortgage, with the Loan Account meeting the deposit and completion balance. 4 Mount Street: sale

58. 4 Mount Street in the end sold on 21 September 2006 for £1.335m. After redemption of the Singer & Friedlander charge and various expenses, the balance of £52,283 was transmitted to Singer & Friedlander, again to an account of Mr Hutcheson’s. Romsey: purchase

59. The Mount Street Properties were the Hutchesons’ primary homes until 2014 or so.

60. While still at 4 Mount Street, Romsey was acquired “as a place for me and Chris to use for weekends”, which they did “frequently… to get out of London”; but also as a home for Olly, who with her family was already renting in the town.

61. Romsey was put into the name of Mr Hutcheson alone. Further, while for each of the Mount Street Properties he had told the Official Receiver that they had been “purchased… by Chris and Greta Hutcheson”, his description this time was different: the “property was purchased by Chris Hutcheson”. It is possible that this refers only to the identity of the registered proprietor.

62. The Romsey purchase, which occurred on 25 September 2003, can be put into further context. Although details are slight, and without having heard him no statement of Mr Hutcheson can be treated as conclusive, it appears from a letter he sent on 1 August 2016 to Beverley Naylor, of HMRC Specialist Investigations, that on 23 December 2002 he had bought 111 Butler & Colonial Wharf, London (“number 111”), “for £275,000 for my daughter, Victoria… The property was gifted to my daughter who lived there after the purchase but I do not have a copy of the letter”. Presumably that was a letter of gift, as number 111 was in Mr Hutcheson’s sole name; and when on 1 February 2017 he attended a meeting with Ms Naylor and a colleague, Andy Armitt, she asked him why, if it had been gifted, it remained in his name on sale, and he had received the sale proceeds before they were passed to Victoria through the Loan Account, “CH stated he did not remember the detail of the gift”.

63. Ms Naylor was puzzled as well by what Mr Hutcheson himself said in the interview “should have been identical situations”, being the gifting of a property in Mr Hutcheson’s name to Christopher, which had been achieved only recently, despite his son living there “for many years”; Mr Armitt asked “was it that this gift was an understanding between family members or a formal transfer involving the land registry. CH wasn’t sure”. That gift is the one which Mr Hutcheson declared in his Bankruptcy Application.

64. It might be too facile a conclusion, but placed beside the 2005 purchase of the Chateau in the names of the other four children all this might indicate a man desirous of providing a property for each. But then again, and without any explanation, the Chateau was from the outset in their names, not his. In his 1 August 2016 letter Mr Hutcheson pronounced, in respect of Wycombe Place, “I do not know what you mean by ‘beneficial owner’. The property is in my name, I live there and I pay the mortgage”, a point he reiterated for the Chateau: “I do not know what you mean by ‘beneficial owner’. The property was purchased in the names of our children and that meant that neither I nor my wife were ever owners of the property. Were it to be sold we would have no claim on the proceeds and it would not form part of our estate when we are deceased”.

65. Given the ownership of 4 Mount Street, bought deliberately in Mrs Hutcheson’s name, it is hard to accept this supposed naivete.

66. As to Romsey, Mrs Hutcheson says that it was theirs jointly. “I do not know why this property was purchased in Chris’ sole name… Chris and I would have jointly decided that we would purchase it. Chris would have dealt with all the paperwork… I assumed it was held in joint names and I always considered that I was a co-owner, and so as far as I am aware did Chris. We both agreed that our daughter and her family could live in [it]. Once we agreed to buy the property it never crossed my mind to check on how it was owned”.

67. Nobody has posited that Romsey was a gift to Olly (and, perhaps, family). Nor does there seem any reason why as between himself and his wife it should be his alone (by itself, a Rosset reasonable arrangement, which would not establish Mrs Hutcheson’s right). And, although we have not been able to explore this at trial, it is possible that as at the time of the Romsey purchase the only mortgage on which Mr Hutcheson was legally liable was the relatively modest one on number 111, while his wife had sole legal responsibility for the larger one on 4 Mount Street, he necessarily had to take sole ownership.

68. What we do have is the evidence of how Romsey was paid for.

69. The purchase price was £575,000. The £28,750 deposit was paid from the Loan Account. A mortgage of £420,000 was obtained from the Halifax, in Mr Hutcheson’s name. The Joelson Wilson 9 October 2003 cash account then has entries of £126,500 being a loan from them to Mrs Hutcheson; and a required balance of £29,041.

70. Joelson Wilson were instructed not just on the purchase of Romsey but also on a re-mortgage of 4 Mount Street, and they billed the Hutchesons separately for each, albeit that there was no separate communication with her. Their loan to Mrs Hutcheson was in anticipation of the successful re-mortgage. On 9 October 2003 they wrote a letter addressed to both, as it dealt with both sides of their instructions: £166,176 had been received from the Halifax’s agents, who had also discharged the £294,799 Lloyds charge on 4 Mount Street. The respective bills were enclosed from which “I calculate that my firm needs to send Greta a cheque for £9,794”. So both the £126,500 Joelson Wilson loan and the £29,041 required balance were met from the 4 Mount Street re-mortgage of £461,000. Mr Hutcheson told the Official Receiver that while his wife had received the Joelson Wilson cheque, on the same day she paid it into his Singer & Friedlander account.

71. In her witness statement Mrs Hutcheson averred that “I can see that I provided £126,250… I do not specifically recall this”, but by trial she confirmed her knowledge that Joelson Wilson had loaned that sum.

72. Even treating the 4 Mount Street monies as a joint payment, it follows that Mrs Hutcheson made a substantial financial contribution to the purchase of Romsey; the purchase being one of which she was aware; which she desired; and which was to be to the mutual benefit of herself and her husband, both directly through their occasional occupation and indirectly through their provision of a non-rented home to their daughter and family. In circumstances where there was an existing arrangement for beneficial interests to differ from legal title, and when there were shortly to be other (at the least intended) arrangements, that the purchase was explicitly crafted to be in Mr Hutcheson’s name alone does not trump the natural inference, being that Romsey was to be jointly owned.

73. Such a finding is also consistent with Mrs Hutcheson’s genuine belief “held since 1968” that as married persons they would share marital property, which had indeed been the case with 64 Beulah Hill and (it may be assumed) Wittersham Manor, then with 4 Mount Street, its legal ownership notwithstanding. It was a belief which had been acted on; but, she explained, would not cover property of which she did not know, such as number 111, or the gift to Christopher. I accept that position, with all its generalities.

74. Aside from the purchase price, the points of defence and witness evidence also aver other contributions to Romsey sufficient to establish a common intention constructive trust. These are not now needed by Mrs Hutcheson but they are, first, payments to the mortgage on it “from her interest in the net sale proceeds of 120 Mount Street and 119A Mount Street”; and, secondly, “funding renovations”, identified in her statement as “a new kitchen, conservatory, two bathrooms, driveway and a summer house, as well as general redecoration. The renovation works were completed around late 2004-2005. I do not know how much the renovation works cost, but this would have been a significant sum of money. I paid for the renovations”.

75. Taking renovations first, Mrs Hutcheson told the court that “obviously I funded” the renovations, as the monies came from her account. Her statement had blended in some law: “I considered myself to be a joint owner… I would not have contributed to the property otherwise”, which is an unlikely proposition given her use of it, and her daughter’s and her family’s. She has produced no relevant account statements, so the origin of any such monies is unknown. Further, with all the caveats surrounding him, Mr Hutcheson gave the Official Receiver a different, but at least more specific, version: “There was considerable expenditure on the property in 2007 with the addition of a downstairs bathroom, a utility room and a conservatory”. He acknowledged he had no documentary evidence, but averred that his payments could be tracked through the Loan Account; and five of those from 9 January to 19 April 2007 are listed, each including pence, and totalling near £87,000. His is the better account.

76. As to the mortgage payments, we will come to the destination of the sale proceeds of the Mount Street Properties, but whether they were sufficient from which to infer a beneficial interest is both not necessary to decide, and would anyway require precise analysis of, among other things, why she did not originally have a beneficial interest but should acquire one with these; her knowledge of the payments; and the particular position at the times they were made between herself and her husband.

77. Her statement goes wider in also relying on payments from 1 March 2012 from the Main Account. There are statements for that account, very heavily redacted, Mrs Hutcheson having “no idea” by whom. That is especially curious, Mrs Hutcheson’s pleaded case being that “Consistent with their common intention and understanding as to the ownership of such real property”, being that covered by the 1970 Document, “Mr & Mrs Hutcheson also held monetary sums for and/ or on behalf of each other (or on their joint benefit) from time to time”; the “fact that a credit balance was held in a bank account in the legal name of one of them was not, as between Mr & Mrs Hutcheson, determinative of the true and beneficial ownership of those funds”; and funds in any account “were held by the relevant account holder on trust or as nominee”, presumably for them both.

78. Mr Gunaratna did not linger on his client’s pleaded status as trustee, and there is a tension between such status and Mrs Hutcheson’s case that “It did not matter whether an account was in my name or our joint names, both Chris and I had access to the accounts and what was in the accounts was ours jointly”, but the production of such redacted accounts to the beneficiary’s trustees in bankruptcy would plainly be contrary to her trustee obligations; and I would not think that, were it material, she could rely upon such excerpted payments without production of full accounts. Further, while nobody has identified accounts held in Mr Hutcheson’s name to which she had entitlement, it remains her case that there were such.

79. Mr Hutcheson exploited the equity in Romsey. In March 2005 the Woolwich advanced £544,000, which redeemed the Halifax mortgage of £420,110 (so, no capital repayments had been made) and after expenses allowed £118,946 to be transferred to Singer & Friedlander. In December 2005 Lloyds TSB Scotland loaned £600,000, meeting the Woolwich balance of £545,529 (again, no capital repaid), allowing payment to the Woolwich of £3,839 in respect of 120 Mount Street, and two small payments for the Ramsay family, and another £41,891 to Singer & Friedlander. Wycombe Place: purchase

80. On 19 April 2007 Mr Hutcheson bought 4 Wycombe Place in his sole name for £810,000. It was “bought as an investment property” said Mrs Hutcheson; “I believe Chris and I viewed [it] together and jointly decided to purchase it”. In the event, Olly and her family moved into it and lived there until 2017, Mr and Mrs Hutcheson using it as their English base when from 2014 to 2019 they were not living in the Chateau. When renovation works were needed, Olly and her husband paid for those.

81. So, except that it was not intended as a secondary home for Mr and Mrs Hutcheson, or to be used by the family, the understanding would seem to overlap with that for Romsey; and Mrs Hutcheson avers they were “joint owners in equity”, as according with their intention at the outset of marriage. Her points of defence, like her statement, referred to direct contributions to the purchase price, again “including contributing to the mortgage” through the sale proceeds of the Mount Street Properties. It was only in Mr Gunaratna’s skeleton that earlier direct contribution was raised, specifically through Romsey.

82. Having viewed it and decided to purchase, “Chris was responsible for handling all the finance with the property purchase and dealing with lawyers”; Mrs Hutcheson was not aware she was not on the title, nor whether she was on the mortgage. “This did not matter because… we shared everything”. She did not recall signing any documents, but confirmed that “If Chris asked me to sign a document I would do so without questioning him”.

83. Again, it seems to me that the critical question here is what contributions Mrs Hutcheson made directly to the purchase; and that especially where, in material distinction to Romsey, she was not at the outset intended to live in or use the property: it was, she says, not bought with the intent that Olly and family should move there, that being a later decision.

84. There is very little contemporary documentation concerning the purchase: a letter from Joelson Wilson of 12 March 2007, sent to Mr Hutcheson at his work address and confirming among other things that the purchase would be in his name; and a 20 April 2007 letter from the Halifax confirming the opening of his mortgage account, to be met by payments from an account ending -3001, held with NatWest, so not the Main Account or any account identified by Mrs Hutcheson.

85. We do have Mr Hutcheson’s narrative to the Official Receiver. He says that with stamp duty and fees £847,520 was required. £400,000 was obtained on the Halifax mortgage; £81,000, being the deposit, from the Loan Account; £293 by his personal cheque; and £366,226 “by a direct payment to the acting solicitors from GJ and CE Ramsay as explained in the final paragraph” of his Romsey text. This was: “In 2007 the house was about to be put on the market when Mr & Mrs Ramsay expressed an interest in purchasing it. The reason for a sale was to finance a new property in London for my daughter and son-in-law, the Butlands, and there was a certain urgency as the intended London purchase had a brief window of availability at the stated price. A sale price of £525,000 for the Romsey property was agreed and paid over…”, and he sets out the tranches: £81,000 on 19 March 2007, £366,226 on 19 April 2007, and £77,773 into his Singer & Friedlander account on 25 May 2007. By the time of his narrative, Wycombe Place had been let for 3 years at an annual rent of £21,600.

86. So, a sizeable proportion of the purchase price derived from Romsey, which was jointly owned. Further, Mr Hutcheson’s narrative appears cogent, including that actually Wycombe Place was by the time of purchase intended for family benefit. In the end, he says, the Ramsays’ proposed purchase petered out as they also wanted to buy the adjoining property, and “hardly used” Romsey. “The situation remained in limbo until it was included in 2012 as one of the terms of a global settlement covering a number of disputes. Any claim on the Romsey property by the Ramsays was dropped and the monies paid over in 2007 were integrated into the… Loan Account as a debit against the outstanding CR balance”. So in 2012, as between himself and the counterparties, he absorbed a repayment obligation. No-one says that event affected the existing beneficial interests, which I consider were again joint: a substantial contribution from Mrs Hutcheson to the purchase price in respect of a property which was to be of family benefit. Wycombe Place: equity release

87. Were there doubt about that position, it would be allayed by later events. On 26 October 2015 Mr and Mrs Hutcheson executed a TR1 by which legal title was put into both names. The consideration was said to be her “assuming one half of the liability of the existing mortgage with Bank of Scotland plc”, rather than this being a transfer for no further consideration because reflecting existing interests. However, as stated by a letter of 24 September 2015 from Ashfords LLP, acting for LV Equity Release Limited, to Mr Hutcheson, “I note that the property is in your sole name and I must say that it is a requirement of Liverpool Victoria that as you are both going ahead with the equity release scheme that the property be in your joint names”. Unless Mrs Hutcheson had equity in Wycombe Place, it is not apparent why she would be involved at all. The equity release of £220,000 redeemed the original charge, now in the name of Bank of Scotland plc and in the value of £173,926, and produced a balance of £45,378, the destination of which is unknown; there were further drawdowns on it of £100,000 in December 2015 and £31,000 in April 2016, again destination unknown. In cross-examination Mrs Hutcheson had no recollection of the equity release, and though her signature is on the TR1 that does not equate to knowledge of anything other than that she was asked to sign a document.

88. It follows that the Trustees’ claim for half the value of Wycombe Place at the time of the transfer into both names, which has been identified based on a non-expert but compelling basis by Edward Jeffery of Sanderson Weatherall in a report of 25 June 2018 as £428,036, fails. The Mount Street Properties: sale

89. By the time of the Wycombe Place equity release the Mount Street Properties had been sold, separately, 120 Mount Street on 31 July 2013 for £4.59m, and 119A Mount Street on 16 May 2014 for £1.335m plus £40,000 for the contents. It is the distribution of the sale proceeds between the Hutchesons which forms the monetary bulk of the Trustees’ case: £874,979 and £683,823 respectively, with a claimed 8% interest added being, at 6 February 2024, another £740,733 and £532,670. 120 Mount Street: sale

90. Clarkson Wright & Jakes of Orpington acted for Mr and Mrs Hutcheson on the sale of 120 Mount Street. Exchange was on 15 February 2013. A deposit of £455,000 was paid, which after redemption of financing and certain costs left a balance of £201,050 which was paid to Mrs Hutcheson.

91. We have a Clarkson Wright & Jakes printout of the completion ledger. On 31 July 2013, after meeting of the £2,003,077 mortgage and costs and expenses, £1,748,907 remained, equating to £874,453 each. £100,000 was transferred to Mr Hutcheson, who was then due to receive £774,453 together with his half of the free deposit monies, being £100,525; hence the Trustees’ figure, once pence have been included, of £874,979.

92. As an opening position, it follows that each of Mr and Mrs Hutcheson ought to have received £974,979 from the sale proceeds of 120 Mount Street.

93. Of the net sale proceeds £361,496 was paid to one Sally Middleton, to discharge a loan. The Trustees say that was Mrs Hutcheson’s liability; she says it was her husband’s.

94. £1,287,411 was described in the solicitors’ narrative as paid to Mrs Hutcheson. It is agreed that it was in fact paid to the Joint Account, and then from 31 July 2013 to 31 December 2015 released into the Main Account. Mrs Hutcheson did not recall being aware of those movements at the time.

95. Her points of defence state that receipt into the Main Account was not her sole beneficial receipt, as it was in practice used as a joint account; which was developed into a pleading point that actually any disposition to her alone occurred only once monies were withdrawn for her benefit from that account. Even were she right on the nature of the Main Account, which need not be determined, it has been acknowledged by the parties that the claims referable to the sale proceeds come down to an account; further, on her own case (which again need not be determined), Mrs Hutcheson was a trustee of the monies in the Main Account; and in fact her points of defence provide accounts both for the proceeds of 120 Mount Street and of 119A Mount Street.

96. It is the Trustees’ case that the only benefit received by Mr Hutcheson from the sale of 120 Mount Street was the £100,000; and so that balance of £774,453 and his £100,525 share of the deposit monies were a gift to his wife.

97. The Sally Middleton loan is a discrete point. Not all the relevant chain of correspondence was originally in the trial bundles, and the letter on which the Trustees found their claim that the loan was Mrs Hutcheson’s liability, of 12 November 2018 from Mrs Middleton to Mr Algie, contained an ambiguity. It was in reply to a letter of 24 October (which was not present), which Mrs Middleton was concerned conveyed the “impression that the loan was from her to myself”, when actually the loan was “ from me to Mrs Hutcheson”, £150,000 initially, to which was added 6% interest paid monthly from January 2012; followed by an additional loan, described with the same underlining, of £200,000 in September 2012, with 7% interest paid monthly from October 2012; all totalled up to the £361,496 which she was paid.

98. No other details were given as to why Mrs Middleton was loaning this money to Mrs Hutcheson. Neither, though the points of reply said that the Trustees would call her, has she been.

99. Some of the further correspondence was handed up, including that from the Trustees recently trying to contact Mrs Middleton. As to the 2018 chain, it begins with a letter from Mr Algie of 12 October 2018 asking for an explanation within 14 days for the receipt of the monies. Mrs Middleton replied on 17 October to say that “I can confirm the monies you refer to were a loan made by me to Mrs Greta Hutcheson. Mrs Greta Hutcheson repaid the loan in full plus a small amount of interest”. That seems to have been misunderstood, as Mr Algie’s letter of 24 October asked for “documentary evidence of the sums advanced by Greta Hutcheson”; and then there is Mrs Middleton’s 12 November response, which while setting right the position, also, again, identifies Mrs Hutcheson as the borrower.

100. One may wonder why Mrs Hutcheson was borrowing such large sums, in 2012 or otherwise; and it is notable that while abiding by her statement that Mrs Hutcheson was the debtor, Mrs Middleton provided none of the surrounding documentation or information requested in the 24 October letter.

101. Her bare assertions, made for whatever reason, cannot stand with the contemporaneous evidence.

102. Mrs Hutcheson said she barely knew Mrs Middleton, whom she had met “around three or four times” and was “a good friend of Olly’s”; “Chris got to know Sally through Olly, as they all used to go running together”. Although she does not say from whom, she says “I understand that Chris asked Sally for a loan and she leant him around £350,000… I think I knew about the Loan at the time, and some of the borrowed money may have been spent by Chris for both of our benefit… but I did not know any details”. She says that Olly has told her that the £150,000 was paid to Olly’s account, “and then Chris told Olly where to send the money to pay off various debts… A second payment of £200,000 was made to the Main Account then £180,000 was transferred to the Joint Account and £20,000 used towards a payment to ‘Adam Hutcheson’”. “I do not understand why Sally said she lent the money to me… it was not me who agreed the Loan with Sally and it was not me who promised to repay her… It would not make sense for me to be lent money by someone I hardly knew”.

103. We have an email from Mr Hutcheson to Olly of 1 December 2011, subject “Transfers”: “Can you please arrange the following transfers (6) when you know that Sally’s money has hit your bank. They total £126,561.17. Love…”. £39,000 was to Mrs Stewart, “this includes Max Clifford’s fee and the cost of changing the £1m + loan from Hoare’s Bank to Barclays”; £7,000 to “Mrs F S L Hutcheson”; £2,000 to Gemgain Ltd; £76,000 to himself at what may be a Credit Agricole account; £2,256 to David Miles; and £305 to Kaupthing Singer and Friedlander reference “Gordon Ramsay Pubs”.

104. It is not realistic to think that Mrs Hutcheson was borrowing this money to make large payments to her husband’s mistresses.

105. On 15 December 2011 Olly emailed her father giving Mrs Middleton’s address and bank details, which indicates both the informality of the loan and that their acquaintance was limited; it also supports Mrs Hutcheson’s recollection that her husband knew Mrs Middleton through Olly. It ended “She has said if you insist on paying interest, can you perhaps make it 5% instead”.

106. It is fair to observe that we do not have any like communications over the £200,000 tranche, paid into the Main Account. However, we do have an email from Mr Hutcheson to Mrs Middleton of 25 February 2013, so shortly after exchange on 120 Mount Street. The subject is ‘Loan’ and it is in strikingly personal terms. “Dear Sally, I hope you are well, fit and running like a hare. I am very pleased to say we have just sold one of our flats in Mount Street. Having said that, it is an unusual sale in that the completion date has been extended to 31 st July. The buyer is a BVI company… This means that the debt I owe you amounting to £350,000 will be satisfied on that date. My forever thanks will follow. Would you mind very much if I held off the interest payments (six months) until that debt when I can pay over the whole debt i.e. £350,000 + £11,496… In the mean time we have Verdon to deal with… I shall carry your bags that week and, in fact, forever. Love….”.

107. I am therefore satisfied that the Mrs Middleton loan was Mr Hutcheson’s liability, not his wife’s.

108. As to the distribution of the balance, Mrs Hutcheson’s points of defence included a table showing that in the 8 months from receipt of the 120 Mount Street monies, £1,242,937 had been disbursed, her husband receiving £705,356 and she £537,580. So, contrary to the Trustees’ case, she would not have over-received.

109. On any basis, including her own self-interest, it would be for Mrs Hutcheson to prove the disbursements from this account which was in her name. Her statement did no more than confirm her reliance on the tables, she having undertaken the same exercise in respect of the 119A Mount Street monies. The Trustees were left without sight of how their figures were arrived at. By letter of 28 January 2025 Irwin Mitchell asked for the calculations behind them. The silence, including to chasing communications, was broken only on 6 March when Sheridans responded to say, remarkably, that the calculations were “not documents to which your client would be entitled” on disclosure; the “calculations are internal, privileged, working documents”; plainly they were not.

110. At trial, Mrs Hutcheson confirmed that she had “no idea” where the tabulated figures came from.

111. It was perhaps in recognition of that evidential void that shortly before closing the figures were disclosed. In the meantime, the Trustees had gone to the effort to try themselves to understand the extent to which they could be justified, and handed up their own calculations. That was, frankly, time on their part wasted by the approach taken by Mrs Hutcheson, for whom it was also submitted that the Trustees with their legal team and accountancy expertise were equipped, and indeed better equipped, to carry out the exercise; and bearing in mind the overriding objective and that Mrs Hutcheson was a non-professional litigant, they could not complain about the effort to which they had been put.

112. Such submissions were meritless: the burden was on Mrs Hutcheson; what she was refusing to hand over were her own calculations, already done and easily produced; and, aside from their inherently greater accountancy knowledge, there is no material difference between the Trustees’ legal team and that of Mrs Hutcheson’s, and so the footings are equal. The submissions also failed to take the slightest account of the primary bankruptcy creditor being HMRC; the additional costs which it was suggested the estate should bear, at the expense of that creditor (if any dividend be projected); yet Mr Hutcheson’s failure to pay HMRC many millions, leading to the 1993 bankruptcy and to this, being of material benefit to Mrs Hutcheson and the modes in which she was able to conduct her life.

113. The points of defence tables were divided into categories, and the Trustees agree the attribution of some of those categories. Now they have seen justification, they also do not dispute the figures within the categories.

114. It is therefore agreed that mortgage payments on Wycombe Place and on Romsey should be shared; so too service charge payments on 119A Mount Street; healthcare; school fees for grandchildren; investments in Scoffs; and sundry expenses. They also agree that Mr Hutcheson was solely responsible for maintenance payments to the other Mrs Hutcheson.

115. That leaves four categories.

116. The Trustees had been minded to accept the £12,870 of payments for Mr Hutcheson’s life assurance policies, but the bank statements show payments with two different references. Mrs Hutcheson was unable to confirm if they were solely his, or for her benefit as well. They must be treated as shared.

117. There also seems no reason in principle why, as Mr Hutcheson was the breadwinner, the costs associated with that, including legal costs, should not be shared; and Mrs Hutcheson agreed.

118. The payments said to be to Mrs Stewart carried reference to “Butland”, “OC” and “OB”. Mrs Hutcheson agreed that these were references to Olly, and that she and her husband would contribute to their grandchildren’s school fees. Those too will be shared.

119. Finally there are credit card payments. While there are no account statements, it seems improbable that these were not for joint benefit. Those which can be identified by their description, for example payments to Olly, or to John Lewis, would indicate as much. While I recognise that we do not know the totality of the dealings between Mr and Mrs Hutcheson, it is right to treat these, too, as shared, as does her table.

120. With those variations, £652,055 of the tabulated sums are attributable to Mr Hutcheson. Together with the £100,000 he received directly, and the £361,496 paid on his behalf to Mrs Middleton, it follows that it can now be established that he received his full share, and more, of the 120 Mount Street proceeds. 119A Mount Street: sale

121. The same principles apply to the 119A Mount Street sale, with the same result.

122. Mr and Mrs Hutcheson again instructed Clarkson Wright & Jakes to act for them on the sale, giving the Chateau as their address. It is agreed that the net sale proceeds were £1,367,647; they were entitled to half each, being £683,823; and that again they were paid to the Joint Account and then transferred to the Main Account, between 16 May 2014 and 31 December 2015.

123. Adopting the same approach to the categories, Mr Hutcheson received a little more than his wife: £692,966. Romsey: sale

124. Romsey was sold on 22 December 2016 for £760,000. The net proceeds were £147,385. The Trustees’ claim to the £40,000 paid to Mrs Hutcheson is founded on her having no beneficial interest. As above, I consider she did have a half interest; which means she received an underpayment. I note that a wider account is not sought which would include the respective receipts from the rent disclosed by Mr Hutcheson to the Official Receiver, of £21,600pa for three years; Mrs Hutcheson had no recollection whether her portion of this was in her tax returns. Wycombe Place: sale

125. On 7 September 2017 Wycombe Place was sold to the Ramsays for £1.067m, being £657,081 net. That entire sum was passed to Mrs Hutcheson, though she was entitled only to her half share.

126. With the disposition of the other claims, and the shifting of the resulting Wycombe Place equity being both at a time when the s.341(2) IA86 presumption applies and anyway when he was manifestly so, exactly when Mr Hutcheson became insolvent, whether on a cash flow or balance sheet basis, no longer needs to be determined. A brief summary, though, is still in order as it casts light on the desperate manoeuvre of the 6 August 2017 letter.

127. To recap, Mr Hutcheson told the Official Receiver he had last worked in 2010, at GRHL. It is doubtful that the court has before it a settled account of all his dealings since then, although either the Trustees through reporting their investigations or Mrs Hutcheson by making enquiries could have ensured that. At that point it would seem he had four assets of any substance, other than the property interests shared with his wife: whatever he could gain from GRHL; shares in One Potato Two Potato Ltd (the “Potato Shares”); shares or their proceeds in Petrus (Kinnerton Street) Limited (the “Petrus Shares”); and his Gordon Ramsay Holdings International Ltd pension, from which he withdrew £896,200 between December 2010 and June 2011.

128. Settlement with GRHL was achieved in 2012, at £2m. “Most of this went to pay outstanding bills to my solicitors some went to others who were due funds directly to them from the settlement”, he told the Official Receiver; “I think I was left with about £700k”. A few lines later the figures were £1.8m of which “around £1m… went to pay legal fees associated with the claim and remaining funds were used for living expenses and commitments”. The timeline of their dissipation is not known.

129. Mr Hutcheson had sold his interest in the Petrus Shares on 17 December 2010 for £100,000. This was disclosed on his tax return. (Mrs Hutcheson confirmed she was unaware of these, and could assert no claim to them).

130. As to the Potato Shares, Mr Hutcheson told the Official Receiver that the “sale was completed in October 2010 but payment was agreed in three tranches and was linked to future performance of the company. For this reason I couldn’t predict what the payment would be and so did not list it on my tax return. I received the first tranche at the time of sale. The other payments were £309k on 22 April 2014 and 22 April 2016 I received £463k. This money was used to pay for legal costs and living expenses… This money was also used to support agreed payments to Ms Stewart. The fact that I did not pay tax on these amounts formed some of the basis of HMRC’s investigations”.

131. That account does not seem wholly correct. On 24 October 2013 HMRC notified Mr Hutcheson of the opening of a COP9 investigation. By 1 December 2015 they had obtained the sale contract for the Potato Shares which contained five tranches of consideration. On 26 April 2017 he was informed by them that he had underdeclared his capital gain in its respect by £1,522,603. In August 2017 they recalculated the tax due leading to substantial retrospective assessments. By statutory demand dated 23 October 2017 and served that month they claimed £1,597,919. The HMRC final proof of debt dated 18 April 2018 was for £2,108,497, including £751,087 for the year to 5 April 2012.

132. So, if further proof were needed, at some point before 1 November 2017, which is when Mr Hutcheson says he became aware he was unable to pay his debts, he was significantly balance sheet insolvent, despite the settlement, pension, and share realisations; and despite the sums of at least £1.6m received from the sales of the Mount Street Properties and Wycombe Place in 2013, 2014, and 2017.

133. That said, no timeline has been provided, let alone one taking into account the large occasional credits to this notional account. Save where a presumption applied, Mr Hutcheson’s insolvency at any point would have been difficult to establish.

134. What is apparent, though, is that Mr Hutcheson knew of the Potato Share liability from at least 2013, yet took no steps to provide for it.

135. On 21 October 2011 his accountant, Stephen Corner at Barnes Roffe, asked him for more information on the Potato Share sale, including a copy of the sale agreement; and told him that “[w]hen a sale is for a consideration which includes deferred (but quantifiable) consideration the normal rule is that the full among of the consideration receivable must be brought into the CGT computation initially… It looks therefore as though we may have to bring in to your CGT computation… the full among of the consideration potentially receivable (i.e. £900,000) and then adjust this figure in due course once it is clear that the full amount will not be received”. Those figures had been supplied by Mr Hutcheson earlier in the day: £600,000 had been received, less his share of legal costs (which quantifies the first tranche); “£300,000 is due after one year (not yet received) and £300,000 is due at the end of the second year. I am fairly sure that the first tranche of £300,000 will be paid in due course… but I somehow doubt that the second payment will ever take place”.

136. What appeared on his tax return was £561,076, being the £600,000 less the legals, but no deferred consideration.

137. On 8 November 2012 Andrew Kent at Barnes Roffe passed to him a letter from HMRC which included a request for a copy of the sale agreement. Mr Kent chased him on 4 January 2013, and on 31 January 2013 enclosed their draft reply to HMRC’s enquiry. “As discussed at our meeting, now that we know that the deferred consideration has been received, we have no option but to accept that it is taxable in the year of disposal 2010-11. I therefore attach your updated tax computations for 2010-11 with a revised capital gains tax calculation which includes all the deferred consideration in sale proceeds, Please let me know if you disagree with anything in the revised calculation before we send to HMRC. Please also check that you can agree my proposed adjustment to the initial consideration received…”. Mr Kent did anticipate some offsets to the £74,000 increase.

138. The draft letter to HMRC confirmed receipt of £300,000 “in early 2012”, and £450,000 in September 2012. “With hindsight, therefore, we believe that the 2010-11 tax return should now be amended to reflect the additional consideration of £750,000 now received for the shares”. “There is one other adjustment required” which was that the initial consideration net of legals was £546,791 rather than the declared £561,076.

139. At a meeting with HMRC on 30 January 2014 Mr Hutcheson was taken to the £750,000 understatement on his return. He “said that this was news to him and he did not recall a discussion about it”. That is most unlikely, as it was just 12 months before.

140. This tax was not paid, nor that on the later instalments. It follows that from at least January 2013 Mr Hutcheson was aware that he was accruing large liabilities to HMRC for which he was making no provision.

141. That does not answer the question of insolvency. But it does indicate a motivator for how Mr Hutcheson chose to use the monies available to him.

142. By August 2017 he was in prison, and financially doomed.

143. As Mrs Hutcheson states, Wycombe Place was sold because “Chris and I needed the money”. There was no point in putting it in his hands, though. HMRC had now assessed the amounts due, and were not going to let matters lie. Indeed, Mr Hutcheson had apparently told them at a meeting on 1 February 2017 that they would receive the Wycombe Place proceeds. Mrs Stewart had issued proceedings in September 2016 for the balance of the loan she had made him; and while he told the Official Receiver that when in prison “there was a judgment made in my favour… then she went and instructed new lawyers to take action further. They wrote to me to advise of what their costs would be if the case went to trial and given the debt I had to HMRC I couldn’t see how I would pay the legal costs of defending the action. This was what made me ultimately decide to petition for bankruptcy”.

144. So, it was decided that the gift of equity to Mrs Hutcheson would be disguised.

145. In her points of defence, Mrs Hutcheson says that “On or around 6 August 2017” she wrote to her husband in prison. The letter was premised on their “agreement and understanding that they had been jointly entitled to the beneficial interest in their real property assets”.

146. The 6 August 2017 letter is from Mrs Hutcheson to her husband. It is couched in personal terms: “Dear Chris, It has not been the best summer for either of us and I think that now you are about to be released we need to plan the immediate future particularly with regard to finances”. Its purpose is clear. It continued “This includes getting the proceeds from the sale of our assets on a level pegging as this has not been the case for some time and you agreed that it needed attention”. It refers to the sale of Wycombe Place, and says this “What is important is that since this is the last of our assets we take this opportunity to square up with regard to the other realisations”. So, it acknowledges Wycombe Place as the last asset.

147. It goes on to bring into account the shortfall on Mrs Hutcheson’s Romsey receipt; and the Potato Shares: “The first payment” (meaning the April 2014 tranche) “was £309,000 and I didn’t receive any of that although £154,500 was mine as we agreed… The second payment was £463,603 and I was due £281,801.50[.] To date all I received was £130,990” (it is not known how) “leaving £100,811.50 outstanding”.

148. Next are references to the proceeds of the Wycombe Place equity release; and last “there is also an amount of £57,170 owing to me for your legal fees that I paid”.

149. The letter ends: “I would be grateful if you would sign a copy of this letter and the accompanying spreadsheet to confirm your agreement so at least that is out of the way and settled. Greta”. Mr Hutcheson signed the letter with the date 7 August 2017. The spreadsheet was headed “Asset Split”, set out the figures in further detail, and concluded that she had under-received by £664,465; a figure remarkably close to what were to be the Wycombe Place net proceeds.

150. Obviously Mrs Hutcheson did not write this letter. She would never have known such figures. Yet she chose to confirm it as hers in her points of defence. Edwin Coe had said the same in a letter to Irwin Mitchell of 19 December 2018, when its origins must have been fresh in everyone’s minds, whether they were receiving instructions from Mrs Hutcheson or her husband.

151. In her witness statement she recanted. “On reflection, I realise that it was Chris who prepared the letter for me to send. I would not have had the relevant knowledge to have prepared the letter. I did however agree that our remaining assets should be split 50/50 as we had always done”. That glosses over how she ever thought she had written the letter; or whether she read it at the time; or of what of its contents she had knowledge; or whether she was still relying on it to sweep the Wycombe Place pot.

152. In cross-examination she gave two further versions. First, that she had written the letter at home under the direction of her children (she did not say which), who gave her the facts and figures. Next, that the children had seen their father in prison; they talked, and worked out what would be best to do; he and the children drafted the letter, which although “not sure” she now thought was after he came out; and “I went along with what the children thought best”.

153. The appearance of the letter was, then, false: it was not Mrs Hutcheson’s. More, it had been crafted deliberately to deceive an outside reader in its chatty and personal opening paragraph. It had also included matters of which, actually, she had no knowledge at all. “I was not aware that Chris had [Potato Shares] or how much these were worth”, so the agreement as to their division was untrue. She still contested that “Any monies from the sale of any shares would have been jointly owned”. That was not right, as Mr Hutcheson’s extensive dealings with HMRC over the Potato Shares show; and how easy it would have been for him to pass off half the liability to his wife, at least if she had included them on her own returns.

154. What, of course, the 6 August 2017 letter does do is manifest Mr Hutcheson’s desire that his interest in this last asset should transfer to his wife, rather than be made available to his creditors.

155. It follows that the s.423 purpose is met.

156. In paying over his share of the Wycombe Place proceeds, he was gifting them to her.

157. This was therefore a transaction defrauding creditors within the meaning of s.423 ; and it was also, and alternatively, a transaction at an undervalue under s.339, made at a time when he was presumably and actually insolvent.

158. On either basis the amount transferred was not half of the amount scheduled to the 6 August 2017 letter, but half of the net proceeds of £657,081, being £328,541 (rounding up the pence). Conclusion

159. The Trustees’ claims succeed as to the net proceeds of Wycombe Place, but not otherwise. They have failed on the 120 Mount Street proceeds and 119A Mount Street proceeds only because of the disclosure provided just before closing.

160. If the parties cannot agree them, debates as to the rate of interest, and costs, will be determined at a consequentials hearing.