Jonathan Charles Ramsey & Anor v Parveen Iqbal & Anor

Key words: Adverse Possession – Schedule 6 Land Registration Act 2002 – factual possession - evidence – permission or licence – effect of transfer of titles – aggregation of successive periods of possession – boundary agreement Key cases referred to: White v. Alder [2025] EWCA Civ. 392 Site Developments Ltd. v. Cuthbury Ltd. [2010] EWHC 10 (Ch.) J Alston & Sons Limited v. BOCM Limited [2009] 1 EGLR 93 Pye v. Graham [2003] AC 419 Brown v. Ridley [2025] UKSC 7 Balevents v Sartori [2014] EWHC 1164 (Ch.) Hughes Jarvis Limited v. Searle [2019] EWCA Civ. 1 Introduction

1. This is a boundary dispute between neighbours. I will spare the parties the usual judicial lecture on how unfortunate, disproportionate and unwise it is to litigate over -as in this case – a small strip of land lying between two houses, consisting mostly of flower beds or the edge of a driveway. They have been unable to settle their differences, by mediation or otherwise. The matter between them which is before this Tribunal must therefore be determined.

2. It is, however, important at the outset for the parties themselves to appreciate what that “matter” is, and more importantly what it is not ; although both experienced counsel in the case obviously did so. The matter before the Tribunal

3. The only application made by either of the parties, and referred to the Tribunal by HM Land Registry, is the Applicants’ application made on form ADV1 dated (for Land Registry purposes) 3 rd August 2022, for title by adverse possession to all that land up to the red line shown on the plan accompanying the application (extract below). Application plan

4. This consists of land in the vicinity of the west-east boundary between the parties’ substantial detached houses – respectively, “Tether’s End” and “Hazel Glen”, registered titles WA26918 and CYM133856 – on Chepstow Road, Langstone. The extracts from the title filed plans below show the general location of the properties. It can be seen from these that the application plan above shows the properties as they are viewed from the road, looking south (i.e. north and south are reversed). Filed plans of titles

5. An important point to repeat and emphasise at the outset is that the title filed plans show general boundaries only . The Land Registration Act 2002 retained the ‘general boundaries’ rule from previous versions of the Land Registration Act. The effect of the rule is well expressed in Ruoff & Roper, Registered Conveyancing , Vol.1 paragraph 5-009 and 5-010: “In short, the general boundaries rule means that the title plan identifies the property within the registered title but does not identify the boundaries, which it only indicates. Hence all official copies of title plans are endorsed with the warning: “This title plan shows the general position of boundaries: it does not show the exact line of boundaries.” So an area of land outside the red edging on the title plan might still be within the registered title, and equally an area of land within the red edging might be outside the registered title…..…. it follows from the general boundaries rule that a disagreement as to the boundary of the registered title (a “boundary dispute”) cannot be determined by the title plan. Boundary disputes will generally be determined in the same way as the boundaries are worked out where the land is unregistered—in particular, by examining the conveyances and transfers, by the application of boundary presumptions, and by the existence of boundary agreements.”

6. It is open to any registered proprietor of a title to make an application under section 60(2) LRA 2002 , on form DB, for determination of the exact boundary between their and the adjacent registered title. Such applications have their own procedures and strict technical requirements e.g. as to the accuracy and scale of the plan to be used, to within +/- 10mm.

7. I consider that one of the fundamental problems with the matter as it has come before the Tribunal is that neither party in this case has made a form DB determined boundary application. Their dispute, however, is essentially one as to the exact boundary between their properties, possibly by a matter of inches in some places. As will be set out below, sections of wall and fence have been removed, and lines (at least metaphorically) drawn in the ground, in the typical manner of such disputes.

8. One might reasonably assume that parties who have embroiled themselves in almost three years of litigation over their property boundaries would want to come out of such a dispute knowing exactly where they stood, and where the exact boundary lay on the ground.

9. This application, and these proceedings, will unfortunately not achieve that. The Applicants’ ADV1 application for title based on adverse possession could only generate a new title lying between the two existing titles (given provisional number CYM851154) which itself would only show a general boundary. The exact boundary between that new title, and the Respondents’ Hazel Glen title to the west of it, would still remain undetermined. At best, the success of such an application might depict a slightly more visually accurate general boundary on the filed plans, but that in itself would not be determinative of any exact boundary.

10. It is however the underlying premise of an ADV1 application, for the purposes of the application at least, that the subject land already forms part of the neighbouring registered title, so that it is necessary to rely on the provisions of Schedule 6 Land Registration Act 2002 to claim title to it. Where, however, the areas in dispute are small, and well within the margin of the general boundaries principle, this generates something of an air of unreality.

11. The Tribunal must nevertheless in such a case do the best it can to determine whether an ADV1 applicant has made out a case through adverse possession under Schedule 6 LRA 2002 to title, with a general boundary, to the land shown in the application plan. In doing so, findings of fact may be made which i) would generally be binding on the parties to the proceedings by way of issue estoppel, and so ii) may assist in the determination of any remaining matters between them, such as the exact boundary location. With those caveats in mind, I will turn to the application as made, and the evidence presented. Title history and parties

12. The Applicants have only been the registered proprietors of Tether’s End since 21 st February 2022. They completed its purchase from the previous owner, Mrs. Catherine Knight, on 4 th February 2022. Mrs. Knight is the daughter of Mr. Steve Hales (d. 2019) and Mrs. Jennifer Hales. Mr. and Mrs. Hales were the registered proprietors from 1986 until 2008. In that year, as became clearer from the oral evidence I heard, they sold the property and transferred title to Mrs. Knight and her then husband Paul Knight on 30 th May 2008, for £195,084; but remained living in the property. Mr. and Mrs. Knight were registered as proprietors with effect from 27 th June 2008. They subsequently divorced, and as part of their settlement the Tether’s End title was transferred to Mrs. Knight alone with effect from 20 th May 2011.

13. Hazel Glen was previously owned by one Martin Paul Daly – it is not known from when. He sold it to Mrs. Celestina Kong on 20 th June 2003, and she was registered as its sole proprietor with effect from 11 th July 2003. Her married name is now Celestina Poskitt-Jones, and she gave oral evidence before me (which I will consider further below). On this point, she seemed to believe that it had been a joint purchase with her then husband Mr. Kong, but the title showed that she was the sole proprietor (whatever the beneficial ownership may have been). She and Mr. Kong later separated then divorced. She remained living at the property until shortly before she sold it, on 29 th September 2010, to the Respondents, Mrs. Parveen Iqbal and her nephew Mr. Kazim Ramzan. Neither Mr. Ramzan, nor Mrs. Iqbal’s husband who has lived there with her, have played any significant part in these proceedings or the evidence. The disputed land and boundary

14. The area subject to the application can conveniently be divided into three general sections. I will use the extract below, and the lettering, from the Land Registry’s requisitioned survey to make this clearer. Survey requisition plan

15. First, from G to F, there is an area beginning at the entrance to the properties on Chepstow Road. The properties are separated from the road by what are clearly their own separate, but connected, sections of wall – that of Tether’s End is curved around the entrance to its driveway, while Hazel’s Glen’s is straight. A telegraph pole (“TP” on the application plan) stands approximately at the point where these walls meet. Going over the wall at that point, it is common ground that the land from G to F consists, and has historically consisted, of various trees, shrubs and plants.

16. There is no clear evidence of there ever having been a continuous, solid boundary feature in this area, such as a wall or a fence. The Applicants referred to two photographs which might appear to show a small section of fencing among the trees, but no further evidence was available as to what this was, who might have put it there, for what purpose or when. As Mr. Sharples pointed out, nor had the Applicants pleaded the previous existence of any fence in this area. The Applicants also referred to the remains of what were described on their plan as “strips of concrete in the flower bed”, but there is likewise no evidence of what these were, what they were for or who put them there. I will refer to this sections as “the trees section” – see below. Trees section at front of properties

17. Second, in the section from approximately F to C – all the way up to the location of the Applicants’ garage, and including from E to D a carport – it is common ground, and a major focus of the evidence in the case, that there was a continuous wall . I will call this “the wall section”.

18. It is also common ground, or undisputed, that there were two successive walls in this location:- i) originally, there was a red brick wall. It is not known when this was built, but it was present when Mr. and Mrs. Hales first purchased Tether’s End in 1986. A small section of it is visible through the kitchen window in a photograph of Mrs. Hales from about the late 1980s. There were no other photographs in evidence of that wall or any part of it. ii) on a date which was not agreed between the parties, and of which neither were sure, Mr. Hales personally removed the red brick wall, and built a new white block wall between points F and C above. There are not as many clear photographs of this wall as might have been expected. One is below. It appeared to be common ground, and can be seen in this 2008 Google photograph, that this wall had some wooden fencing slats attached on top. 2008 photograph of block wall

19. By the time of the hearing, it was common ground that this replacement wall was built by Mr. Hales during the then Mrs. Celestina Kong’s ownership of Hazel Glen – so at some point after 20 th June 2003. She herself was unable in evidence to give a date or year, but thought that it was before 2007.

20. It is also common ground, and indisputable, that on 1 st February 2022 - which was actually between the dates on which the Applicants first exchanged contracts to purchase Tether’s End, then completed the purchase – the Respondent Mrs. Iqbal (through contractors):- i) demolished and removed a large section of this wall, from around point F to point E, and dug a trench in its place: see below. Section F-E after demolition of wall and digging of trench, looking north ii) in the section between points D and C – between the end of the Applicants’ carport and their garage – removed the top two block courses of the wall. A wire mesh fence now separates the Applicants’ flower bed on their side from the remains of this wall – see below (before and after). Section D-C before and after partial wall demolition

21. Third, as can be glimpsed in the first (before) photograph above, the wall comes to an end close to where the Applicants’ garage stands; and beyond that point the boundary feature is a close boarded wooden fence. It was not in dispute that the current fence is a replacement one, erected by the Respondent Mrs. Iqbal in about 2017 or 2018. Nor did it appear to me to be seriously disputed at the hearing, although again clear photographs were hard to come by, that:- i) there was previously another fence in that approximate location, which ran southwards all the way to the rear boundary between these properties; and ii) there was, as there is at present, a gap on the Tether’s End side between the garage and the fence: see below. What I have referred to as the Applicants’ “garage” is, as can be seen from the photograph below, in fact a composite structure consisting of the original garage and then a greenhouse ‘extension’ to it. Gap between garage/greenhouse and fence at rear, B-C, looking north I will refer to this as “the fence section”. Adverse possession: evidence i) the trees section

22. I can deal with this relatively briefly. In short, I am not satisfied that there is any, or any sufficient, evidence of exclusive factual possession by the Applicants and their predecessors in this area, up to the position of the red line drawn on the application plan – which would go beyond the existing trees so as to include them all, and align with the “concrete strips” on the ground of unknown origin and purpose. Those strips in themselves do not amount to factual possession. Mr. Brilliant’s submission that they might be indicative of some unknown historic boundary feature is of little relevance where the application is solely possession-based.

23. Such evidence as there was suggested that this was an area of trees, shrubs and beds which formed a natural barrier between the two properties, with the owners on either side tending that side as and when required. There was no sufficient evidence that Mr. and Mrs. Hales, or Mrs. Knight – upon whose prior possession the Applicants would have to rely in this and every other part of their application – exclusively enclosed or controlled this area, or treated it as their own, or planted particular trees or shrubs. As Mr. Sharples submitted, the boundary in this area is at present somewhat “porous” and malleable. The area ‘presents’ as a conventional shared tree, flower and shrub bed, rather than the trees and shrubs being the exclusive property of one or the other owners on either side of it.

24. If either party really considers it sufficiently important, and worth their while, to have anything other than a general boundary in this area – for example, if they wish, for some particular reason, to establish sole ownership of one or more particular trees – they remain free to pursue a determined boundary application. I am far from encouraging either of them to do so. It should not be beyond their abilities to arrive at an accommodation whereby they share the enjoyment and maintenance of this area, from their respective sides, like most neighbours do. ii) the wall section

25. This was by some distance the most time-consuming and hardest fought area of dispute. It generated the most evidence, the volume of which did not always equate to quality and clarity.

26. What is clear, and beyond dispute as a matter of fact and law, is that from 1986, and for a period well in excess of 12 years prior to the coming into force of the Land Registration Act 2002 on 13 th October 2003, Mr. and Mrs. Hales will have exclusively possessed and enjoyed all the land on their (Tether’s End) side of the red brick wall as occupying owners. That red brick wall is also an obvious candidate for the original defining boundary feature between the properties as a matter of paper title, but had there been any doubt about that, the fact of its existence and the Hales’ possession on their side of it would have removed such doubt. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, or evidence of its origins, it would also have been presumed to be a jointly owned party wall.

27. The far more difficult question, however, is exactly where that brick wall ran. As stated above, there are virtually no photographs of it – even close up ones, let alone any aerial or wider views.

28. That being so, it is necessary to consider the white block wall of Mr. Hales which replaced it, on an unspecified date between June 2003 and about 2007, and which stood until its partial demolition in February 2022. The location of that wall is largely ascertainable on the ground, from those parts which remain, and from the remains of its foundations beside the new trench. Even so, and somewhat incredibly given how recent the demolition was, there was still a partial dispute over precisely where some formerly projecting or ‘inset’ sections of it stood on the Hazel Glen side. Evidence as to construction of the white block wall

29. On this issue, I heard relevant oral evidence from Mrs. Jennifer Hales and Mrs. Celestina Poskitt-Jones. Mr. Hales, who it is agreed actually built this wall, died in 2019 as stated. Mrs. Catherine Knight, who gave oral evidence relevant to other matters, was not (I find) living at Tether’s End at the time of the wall replacement, so was understandably not able to give any direct evidence relating to it. My overall assessment of the evidence on this issue, and findings, are as follows.

30. Mrs. Hales could not remember the exact date or year of the wall replacement, but accepted that it was during Mrs. Poskitt-Jones’s ownership of Hazel Glen. She remembered that the red brick wall was leaning dangerously, and was generally in a shoddy condition. She said that her husband could turn his hand to most works, and decided to demolish it in stages then replace it. While she was not privy to any discussions between Mr. Hales and Mrs. Poskitt-Jones, and generally left her husband to get on with it, she was aware that Mrs. Poskitt-Jones agreed to pay some money towards the work, probably £500 as was suggested.

31. Although she was not directly involved in the works, and was certainly not standing over her husband taking measurements or photographs, her general recollection was that the new wall was built over the foundations and line of the demolished wall. She accepted, as was put to her, that the new wall had insets or ‘steps’ which “jutted out” slightly towards Hazel Glen, but could not recall the exact reason for that. She could not recall hearing, or her husband telling her, of any issue or complaint by Mrs. Poskitt-Jones over the new wall or its position.

32. Mrs. Poskitt-Jones (formerly Kong) gave quite different evidence. She said that she had initially understood that Mr. Hales was going to employ a builder to carry out the works, and so was “alarmed” when he began doing it himself. She said in her brief witness statement that: “When he started building, I told him he had taken too much from my side of the land…. I told him the wall should be further to his side and that he wasn't building it well… After the wall was built I noticed I could not get my car in comfortably and the space was too tight. I told him that and that he needed to fix it… He told me he would do it when he had enough money, After some time he started to build a shelter over the carport. He said everything would be removed when he fixes the wall, so I agreed to that.”

33. In oral evidence, under cross-examination, she could not put a date on these works, but was sure that they were before 2007, when she began to experience personal difficulties in her marriage. When it was put to her that the specific reason she experienced difficulty with her car was that one of the ‘insets’ jutted out into the area where she parked, she denied that the problem was just this area, claiming that the whole wall was built too far over onto her side. She said that it had not been built straight and “zig zagged”. She said that Mr. Hales had taken a larger area of flower bed as a result, and that she said something to him like “why is there so much more space on your side?”. She said that he replied that he would eventually “fix it”, and that she took this to mean the whole wall. She later claimed in oral evidence that she thought he had taken as much as “two feet” on his side by building the new wall.

34. She denied, on various older photographs being put to her, that the flower beds on the Tether’s End side were in the same position both before and after construction of the new wall. She agreed, and it was largely common ground, that on a subsequent date (which neither side could specify) Mr. Hales built the carport which remains in place to date, whose supports rest on the remaining part of the block wall, and abutting which is a flower bed or strip on the carport side (see below). As quoted above, she said in her witness statement that Mr. Hales “..started to build a shelter over the carport. He said everything would be removed when he fixes the wall, so I agreed to that.” Carport area E-D, with border next to wall

35. When challenged, she repeated that Mr. Hales had promised to “fix” or “put right” the whole wall when he had enough money – or at least that is what she took him to mean. Her view in evidence was that he “should” have done this, and that she expected him eventually to do it but had “no clue” when this might be. It was also put to her that there had always been a flower bed in the location shown in the car port photograph above, so that Mr. Hales had not created that afresh when he built the wall. Mrs. Poskitt-Jones denied this. Discussion and conclusion on this issue

36. This issue illustrates well the difficulties the Tribunal faces through this matter coming before it as an ADV1 adverse possession application, rather than as a more precise determined boundary application. Those difficulties are compounded, in my view, by the almost total lack of clear and reliable evidence on the precise relative positions of the old and new walls.

37. No-one took any photographs, or drew any plans, of the walls “before” and “after” the works were carried out. Neither Mrs. Hales, nor in my view Mrs. Poskitt-Jones, could give wholly clear or reliable evidence on the relative positions of those walls. At best their evidence on this issue was a matter of impression.

38. Although Mrs. Poskitt-Jones attempted, in some parts of her oral evidence to quantify the difference and claim that the new wall was built in places some “two feet” closer to her property, I do not consider this to be probable or therefore a possible finding in this case, for these reasons.

39. First, I find that it is inherently improbable that Mr. Hales would have done this, and engaged in some form of “land grab” in this way. It is far more likely, as Mrs. Hales recalled, that he would have taken the old wall as his starting point, then built on or close to its foundations or remains.

40. Second, I consider that such limited photographic evidence as there is, and Mrs. Hales’ evidence, supports the Applicants’ case that there was always some form of border or bed on the Tether’s End side of the old wall; as there then was after the new wall was built. It is improbable that Mr. Hales would have dug up the old bed, laid that with concrete or similar to make it an extension of his driveway, then dug a new bed or border in a two foot or similar strip he had newly enclosed. I find that he did not do so.

41. Third, there is a plausible explanation for Mrs. Poskitt-Jones’ recollection of her concern over the positioning of the wall, and one essentially accepted and agreed by the Applicants, via the evidence of Mrs. Knight. This is the acceptance that the wall built by Mr. Hales did have at least one, or perhaps two “insets” or “steps” towards the Hazel Glen side. It was a matter of some frustration to me, caused mainly by the First Respondent Mrs. Iqbal’s actions in destroying these features in February 2022, that the parties could not even agree on exactly where these insets were, or even (it seemed to me) whether there were one or two of them; although that may have been a matter of cross-purposes over what they counted as a distinct “inset”.

42. Nevertheless, it was accepted on the Applicants’ side that there was some “insetting” in the area of the wall close to where the Respondents’ house begins, and in the area where a vehicle could pass and park. This, I consider, explains Mrs. Poskitt-Jones’s reaction and perception of an effect on her parking and turning in that area. That was the specific issue which she could recall in evidence, possibly some 20 years after these events happened, at a time when by her own admission she was under stress in her personal life.

43. I do not therefore accept either that the new wall did in fact encroach significantly along its whole distance, or that Mrs. Poskitt-Jones told Mr. Hales that it did. I certainly reject any allegation that there was an encroachment or movement of anything like two feet, an acknowledgment by Mr. Hales that he had done this, and a promise or assurance to “fix” this by effectively demolishing and rebuilding the whole wall again. I consider that Mrs. Poskitt-Jones has misremembered this episode, and conflated two different things to form what I consider she has convinced herself is a genuine memory. I consider that she probably later formed the view, personally, that there was some other encroachment by the wall elsewhere.

44. I therefore find that the most probable explanation is that the encroachment, and the matter which Mr. Hales promised to “fix” or “put right”, was far more limited and specific – namely, the area of the inset/s, which Mrs. Poskitt-Jones and other witnesses described (and one photograph – the only useful one in evidence on this point – partly showed, above under paragraph 18) as a slight “zig zag” in the area near where the driveway of Hazel Glen rises and the house begins (below).

45. I also consider that any wider allegation of encroachment, when properly analysed, is an issue on which the Respondents bear the evidential burden. It is essentially an allegation of trespass, made to defeat what would otherwise be a straightforward case of possession by enclosure, through the continuous presence of walls. Moreover, it is of the essence of the Respondents’ case in this regard that they then allege that such trespass along the whole length of the wall was expressly acknowledged, and so became a matter of the licence or permission of Mrs. Poskitt-Jones for the possession a long area of additional land enclosed by the new wall.

46. In circumstances where the Respondents, through the evidence of Mrs. Poskitt-Jones, cannot establish with any precision any general difference in position between the old and new walls (save for the specific and admitted instance of the “inset”), I consider that they fail to discharge that burden. They cannot point to any particular points or lines in the ground, on the Tether’s End side of the block wall (including the section of it which they demolished) as the precise location of the earlier wall, and so establish that any particular section of the replacement wall (save for the inset) was a trespass, or if so by how much.

47. As they have failed to discharge that burden, nor can the Respondents positively establish that there was any “boundary agreement” as to some specific boundary line differing from that constituted by the new wall. They cannot site the location of the red brick wall with sufficient clarity or certainty for such an agreement to be found. Mr. Sharples sought to argue in his skeleton argument that both the initial wall conversation, and the later alleged conversation when the carport was built, could be construed as boundary agreements to this effect; but I consider that this arguments fails for lack of certainty and clarity in each case. On the carport point, the very bare details of this recounted by Mrs. Poskitt-Jones in her statement are not, in my view, sufficient evidence of what would essentially have had to be an agreement by Mr. Hales to tear down part of his car port and dig up a flower bed at some unspecified time in the future.

48. I therefore conclude that - subject only to a further issue, of an alleged 2021 boundary agreement between Catherine Knight and the Respondents (see below) – first Mr. and Mrs. Hales from 1986 to 2008; then Catherine Knight and her husband between 2008 and 2011; then Catherine Knight from 2011 until February 2022, were in continuous factual possession, as part and parcel of Tether’s End, of all land on their side of successive walls which were in the same or substantially the same location (save for the “inset”). Those walls, as stated above, were jointly owned party walls.

49. The extent of that factual possession is sufficiently represented, for general boundaries purposes, by the red line on the Applicants’ plan between points F and C. This line takes in both the remaining sections of the block wall (including the carport section), and the section F-E where the wall was demolished by the First Respondent on or about 1 st February 2022. It is also largely a straight line, and so excludes the area of any “inset” in the approximate areas X and Y marked on the A3 master plan. As I have found above, the new block wall encroached into part of these areas, but Mr. Hales acknowledged that this was in error and that he would eventually “fix” it; so that such possession was by way of licence at that time.

50. That conclusion as to ‘historic’ factual possession by successive owners of Tether’s End, through walls in substantially the same location, does not however conclude the application in the Applicants’ favour to that extent. There are further issues to consider, as to both a subsequently alleged boundary agreement, and the continuity through the Applicants of any possession relied upon in the present application. I shall return to those issues below. iii) The fence section

51. This, like the trees section at the front, turned out to be relatively straightforward on the evidence as it emerged at the hearing.

52. I find, and it was clear on the evidence of Mrs. Hales, Mrs. Knight and the First Respondent, that in the vicinity of the Tether’s End garage, there has always been a fence separating it from Hazel Glen, but with a narrow gap between the garage and fence.

53. I accept the evidence of Mrs. Hales and Mrs. Knight that this gap was historically used for storage of items such as roofing tiles, and for access to the garage wall for maintenance purposes. That latter purpose was confirmed by the presence of a set of steps to the rear of the greenhouse, facing towards the fence and (therefore) the gap. This area may from time to time have been messy with debris and weeds, and it is not the sort of area to be in constant daily use, but it did not need to be.

54. On this point, Mrs. Poskitt-Jones gave some very uncertain oral evidence to the effect that she could not even remember a fence, and thought that the area was “full of trees”, which I reject. That evidence also cast some doubt on her recollection generally.

55. The physical fact of that layout meant that the area on the Tether’s End side of the fence was possessed and enjoyed as part of the curtilage of that property by its successive owners. That is how it would have appeared to the world, and use for minor storage and maintenance is all an occupying owner would do with it.

56. In this regard, I consider it largely irrelevant to consider the effect of an alleged “gap” in the fence at its southern end, which may once have existed, so as to allow possible access from Hazel Glen. There was no clear evidence from Mrs. Poskitt-Jones that she made use of any such in the fence to make any use of the strip of land abutting the Tether’s End garage. In any event, complete physical enclosure is not a prerequisite of factual possession. Even if there had been such a gap, as to which I am not satisfied (there again being a lack of reliable photographic evidence), the successive Tether’s End owners were still in possession of the area of land on their side of the fence.

57. It was common ground that it was the First Respondent Mrs. Iqbal who replaced this fence, and erected the current close boarded version, in about 2017 or 2018. There was no evidence that this was controversial at the time. Whether or not she replaced the fence on exactly the line of the previous fence, or (as she appeared to recall) changed the angle slightly in one location, does not matter for the purposes of this application. The Applicants seek only a general boundary based on the current fence line.

58. As to the wires which the First Respondent appears to have installed at that time on the other side of that fence, to provide electricity and internet connection to parts of the Respondents’ property, it is a matter between the parties what they do about those. There is no application before me for an easement for such services. Their installation and presence, however, does not appear to have been controversial, so I trust that the parties will not waste further time and energy arguing about their continued presence.

59. It is therefore straightforward to conclude that successive owners of Tether’s End have been in factual possession, with intention to possess, all of the land on their side of the fence since at least 1986.

60. While this conclusion is straightforward, I note that the Respondents’ case in these proceedings appeared to have changed by the time of the final hearing, and even in the course of Mrs. Iqbal’s evidence. It was the Applicants’ clear understanding in pursuing this application that the Respondents’ belief and position was that they owned all the land up to the very face of the Tether’s End garage – so including the gap between that garage and the fence which the Respondents themselves replaced in 2017 and 2018. That was a major concern for the Applicants.

61. Such a view had been communicated to Mrs. Knight, by the First Respondent’s daughter Saira, in an email of 17 th November 2021. This contained the common fallacy, but one productive of many misconceived boundary disputes, of extrapolating a precise boundary from registered title filed plans which show general boundaries only. Saira asked Mrs. Knight to “notice the boundary walls show no space between the garage and the fence..”

62. It was not clear (to me at least) from the Respondents’ Statement of Case, or Mrs. Iqbal’s witness statement at paragraph 23, that the Applicants’ application in relation to this area had ever been admitted. Those documents appeared to hold out the prospect of the Respondents asserting title to those areas, by the references to using a gap in the fence for “access” and retaining the wires. That is how the Applicants understood them.

63. In her oral evidence on a further issue I shall discuss below – an alleged 2021 boundary agreement – Mrs. Iqbal then appeared to assert that part of that boundary agreement was that the Respondents were “giving up all the land” between the garage and the fence, to the south of the wall section – although they previously believed it had been theirs (as per the email above). I will consider that evidence and issue below. Summary: the legal position prior to the alleged boundary agreement in November/December 2021 between the Respondents and Mrs. Knight

64. By reason of the above findings, the position was as follows. From 1986 Mr. and Mrs. Hales were in factual possession of, with an intention to possess, all of that land on the Tether’s End side of the red brick wall and the fence to the rear. I have found that save for the inset, Mr. Hales replaced the wall (between 2003 and 2007) in substantially the same location. First Mr. and Mrs. Knight in 2008, then Mrs. Knight alone, seamlessly succeeded to that possession along with the title to Tether’s End.

65. By the operation of the Limitation Act 1980 and section 75 Land Registration Act 1925 , that possession defeated and barred any paper title to the contrary which might be asserted by anyone else. Coupled with the continued actual occupation of Mr. and Mrs. Knight as the then owners (exercised through themselves and the continued occupation of Mr. and Mrs. Hales as their licensees), that bound the Respondents on their acquisition of title to Hazel Glen, by the operation of Schedule 12 paragraph 18 and Schedule 3 paragraph 3 Land Registration Act 2002 .

66. The exception to this was the wall “inset”, which I have found Mr. Hales did acknowledge to Mrs. Poskitt-Jones (then Kong) was in the wrong place and would eventually be “fixed”. That acknowledgment and assurance made Mr. and Mrs. Hales’ continued possession of that inset area after that time a matter of the licence of Mrs. Poskitt-Jones.

67. By basic principles, a licence is personal to the parties who grant and receive it, is not a proprietary interest, and so does not survive the transmission of either of the titles to the land to which it relates. A licence will be “automatically determined by the death of the licensor or by the assignment of the land over which the licence is exercised” ( Terunnanse v Terunnanse [1968] A.C. 1086 (PC) , at 1095 per Lord Devlin). Following termination of a previous licence to possess land, if the possessor remains in possession it is “axiomatic” that the possession then becomes adverse and time starts to run against the paper owner, and “something more than merely letting the previous situation continue is required” to imply any fresh licence: see HHJ Hazel Marshall QC in J Alston & Sons Limited v. BOCM Limited [2009] 1 EGLR 93 (at paragraph 114).

68. Strictly speaking, any licence from Mrs. Poskitt-Jones to Mr. and Mrs. Hales therefore terminated when the latter transferred their legal title to Mr. and Mrs. Knight in 2008. That would certainly have been the position when Hazel Glen was transferred to the Respondents in 2010. The “burden” of that licence did not automatically bind them as a proprietary interest. For any possession of any of their land after that date to continue to be by licence, a fresh licence would have to be granted or implied, which would require “something more than merely letting the previous situation continue..”.

69. Having read and heard the evidence of Mrs. Knight, I am satisfied as to and find the following:- i) she and her then husband purchased the title to Tether’s End in 2008 for valuable consideration, in a sum which was probably calculated as the sum required to discharge her parents’ mortgage indebtedness secured on the property (£195,084). ii) they nevertheless continued to permit her parents to live in the property, as their home. Mrs. Knight saw this as a way of securing the “family home”. Her parents’ occupation status in the property after that date was probably that of informal family licensees. iii) Mrs. Knight herself divided her own time between this property, and a property which she had bought for herself in Caldicot in 2007. Although she was asked many questions about her movements and living patterns, I accept her evidence on this. She accepted that it was unusual to have two homes, but that is how she lived, keeping clothes and possessions at both, save for a period of around 3 years from 2010 when she was in fact letting the Caldicot property and so lived exclusively at Tether’s End. This was also convenient for her during her subsequent separation and divorce from Mr. Knight. As set out above, the property was transferred to her sole name in 2011 following the divorce. I accept that she did not cease using Tether’s End as one of her homes until, after her father’s death in 2019, she decided to sell it and move her mother Mrs. Hales in with her in Caldicot. iv) I am entirely satisfied that in all her time first as a joint, then sole owner of the property, until about November 2021 she never had any conversations about, or awareness of any boundary issues with anyone – not Mrs. Poskitt-Jones before 2010, and not the Respondents after that date. She was not aware of any discussions, licences, potential encroachments by a wall, or anything of that nature. Neither her father or mother, nor the owners of Hazel Glen, ever mentioned any such matters to her. v) as far as she was concerned, therefore, in all her time of ownership until November 2021, the boundary features of the property with Hazel Glen were uncontroversial and clear – the wall and fence. As I have found, the area at the front was unfenced and mostly trees and shrubbery, but there was no particular issue in that area either, with both sides tending their own side of the trees and shrubs.

70. Mrs. Iqbal, the First Respondent, provided a witness statement and was cross-examined. Among her evidence was the allegation that when she purchased Hazel Glen in 2010, Mrs. Poskitt-Jones had told her in detail about Mr. Hales supposedly building the wall in the “wrong position”. Once again, there was a lack of precision over precisely where it was said it had gone “wrong”, and by how much – only the statement that “The original boundary wall ran from the Tethers End side of the Oak Tree. The newly constructed wall Steve built ran from the middle of the trunk of the oak tree..”. In oral evidence, Mrs. Iqbal said that she was told or shown that the extent of the wall being “wrong” varied in width between different areas. No plan or measurements have ever been produced to further explain this. She described Mrs. Poskitt-Jones referring to the “insteps” or “zig zags”, and her difficulty in manoeuvring her car, and as saying that Mr. Hales “was aware he had built the wall incorrectly and she had an agreement with him that he would rebuild the wall in its correct position.” None of this was ever committed to any sort of writing, let alone a statutory declaration. There was no evidence that Mrs. Iqbal mentioned it to her conveyancing solicitors, although she thought that she might have done. Mrs. Iqbal did not ask those solicitors to contact Mr. Hales.

71. I have set out my findings on that issue above. As stated, I found that there was no such acknowledgment or agreement by Mr. Hales to Mrs. Poskitt-Jones, as to the whole wall being incorrectly positioned. I found that he acknowledged only some encroachment by the “instep” or “insteps” (depending on how they are defined and counted), and said that he would put those right. He did not agree to pull down and rebuild the whole of the wall he had just built, or pull down part of his car port and dig up the flower bed.. As also found, I consider that Mrs. Poskitt-Jones misremembered this, then convinced herself that a far wider acknowledgment was made, probably because of her opinion that the boundary “should” have been in a different position. So whatever Mrs. Poskitt-Jones said to Mrs. Iqbal about this, it was not accurate. That error and misconception was therefore passed on to her as the joint owner of Hazel Glen, and has (as I find) informed her views and thinking ever since.

72. Mrs. Iqbal then said as follows: “After purchasing Hazel Glen, I spoke to Steve regarding the conversation I had with Celestina about the wall and he confirmed the same. He had built it in the wrong place and when he had sufficient funds the wall would be rebuilt in its original place. I informed Steve I was willing to allow the wall to remain on the understanding it would be restored to its original position.”

73. That too is a somewhat vague paragraph, lacking in detail where detail is essential. She was challenged on this in cross-examination. She did not provide any detail as to the precise words Mr. Hales was said to have used. It was put to her that he can only have been talking about the “inset” area near the parking area, not the whole wall. Mrs. Iqbal said that the “whole wall was in issue”, but gave little more detail than that. She then claimed for the first time, in her oral evidence, that she spoke to Mr. Hales “a number of times” after this on the same subject.

74. This is another issue on which, I consider, the Respondents bear the evidential burden. They are the ones who are alleging that a long period of undoubted physical possession was by way of licence. In this instance, because of the termination of the previous licence on the transfer of title, there would have to have been a fresh licence granted to, and agreed by, the owners of Tether’s End.

75. Once again, I consider that the Respondents have failed to discharge that burden. They cannot describe or define with any precision the area or areas over which such licence was granted, and over which trespass had allegedly been acknowledged. They cannot name any words or date said to have been used, on their case by Mr. Steve Hales.

76. They have a further difficulty, in that Mr. Hales was not the owner of Tether’s End at the time of this alleged acknowledgment and licence. At the time of the conversations alleged by Mrs. Iqbal, the owners were either Mr. and Mrs. Knight jointly, or if after 2011, Mrs. Knight alone.

77. For the Respondents to say that this was a valid licence and acknowledgment on behalf of the legal owners, they would have to establish that Mr. Steve Hales – by that time, and at all times during the Respondents’ ownership of Hazel Glen, a mere family licensee and occupier of Tether’s End – somehow had actual or apparent authority on behalf of the legal owners to enter into boundary discussions and agreements with legal consequences. As I have found, I am entirely satisfied that Mrs. Knight was never told anything about any such discussions.

78. Mr. Sharples sought to dismiss this difficulty, in his skeleton argument, with the words “so what?” then an assertion – not a matter of evidence - that “Mrs. Knight doubtless trusted her parents and left them to deal with Tether’s End, which had been theirs since the 1980s, as they sought fit.” But the property was not “theirs” by 2010 – it had been transferred to Mr. and Mrs. Knight for valuable consideration. It cannot just be asserted that Mr. Hales had general authority to enter into licences or agreements, or acknowledge trespass, on their behalf as owners.

79. It was also asserted that “The Hales appeared to be (still) Tethers End’s owners, as Mrs Iqbal believed, despite the sale to Mrs Knight. She left them effectively in control of it, able to make decisions about it and to all intents and purposes appear to be its owners…… It is unrealistic to suggest there was any limit on his authority to decide matters relating to it but if there were, they were not communicated to Mrs Iqbal. Thus Mrs Knight was bound by what he agreed on the basis of either actual or usual authority.”

80. I do not consider that any of those assertions follow from the actual evidence in the case, because: i) Mr. and Mrs. Hales were never the owners of Tether’s End at any time during the Respondents’ ownership. ii) if Mrs. Iqbal believed that, then that was her assumption, and her mistake. She could have inspected the Land Register at any time for a few pounds. iii) neither the Hales nor Mrs. Knight had any duty to “communicate” details of ownership to Mrs. Iqbal. iv) If, therefore, she wanted to discuss property or boundary matters with the neighbouring owners, it behoved her to locate and speak to the correct people, rather than just assuming that the elderly man to whom she spoke over the wall was the owner. She gave no evidence that he ever actually said this to her himself. v) there was no evidence, and none that would be known to the Respondents, as to how “decisions” were made in the family about the property.

81. So on this point, to summarise, I find that:- i) there was a conversation between Mr. Hales and Mrs. Iqbal, but this extended no further, and signified no more, that his previous acknowledgment as to the “insets” encroaching slightly. ii) he did not acknowledge or state that the entire wall was an encroachment, and that it would be pulled down and rebuilt in a different position; or that he would pull down part of the car port and dig up the flower bed there. If Mrs. Iqbal took that to be what he meant, then she was mistaken. I consider that this was probably a case in which she heard, and now remembers, what she wanted to hear; to fit with the mistaken view she had obtained from Mrs. Poskitt-Jones. iii) even to the extent he did acknowledge any past error and partial encroachment, he in fact had no actual or apparent authority on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Knight to make agreements or promises on their behalf as to the property and its boundaries. So Mr. and Mrs. Knight were not bound by anything he said, even as to just the “insets”.

82. That is how matters then stood for the next ten or so years. Mrs. Knight continued as sole proprietor of the property after 20 th May 2011. As far as she was concerned, as an owner who – as I have found – occupied that property alternately with the other property she owned, its boundaries never changed and were never discussed with the Respondents. Late 2021 and the sale to the Applicants: boundary agreement?

83. A major element of the Respondents’ case arose from events commencing in late 2021, by which time Mrs. Knight had decided to sell the property, and move her mother in to live with her in the house in Caldicot; which would be refurbished and expanded with the sale proceeds.

84. In summary, the Respondents allege that they and Mrs. Knight made a binding oral boundary agreement , along the whole length of the boundary, which:- i) binds the Applicants as successors to Mrs. Knight, and so defeats the present ADV1 application; and ii) was the reason for, and justified, their partial destruction of the block wall between the dates of the Applicants’ exchange of contracts and completion of their purchase in February 2022.

85. The legal requirements for a valid “boundary agreement” between neighbours, not reduced to writing, were recently considered and re-stated by the Court of Appeal (per Asplin LJ, in particular at paragraphs 53 to 61) in White v. Alder [2025] EWCA Civ. 392 (9 th April 2025) [considering and following a number of previous authorities including Neilson v Poole (1969) 20 P&CR 909, Joyce v Rigolli [2004] All ER (D) 203 (Feb), Haycocks & Anr v Neville & Anr [2007] EWCA Civ 78 and Gibson v New [2021] EWHC 1811 (QB) ] as follows:- i) it is possible for neighbouring owners to form a legally binding “boundary demarcation agreement”, without the need for the usual formalities for transfer of interests in land or even writing, “the purpose of which is to define a previously unclear or uncertain boundary, even if it includes the conscious or unconscious transfer of a trivial amount of land…..The consideration for the agreement is the substitution of certainty for uncertainty and the avoidance of the risk of future disputes.” [per Asplin LJ, paragraph 53] ii) “Such an agreement has proprietary effect and, as a result, also binds successors in title. It does so because of its very nature. It defines and delineates the boundary between the properties as from the root conveyance or transfer.” [54] Where the exact boundary has thus been “conclusively established by a boundary demarcation agreement” [56], it is not necessary for a successor in title to have any knowledge of the agreement to be bound by it [58; 61-65]. The successor takes only such title as their predecessor agreed to have. iii) “The exact boundary of registered land may, therefore, be established by a boundary demarcation agreement.” [55] Accordingly, in relation to registered titles, which initially display general boundaries only, such an agreement may “avoid[] the time and expense involved in making a formal application for the determination of the exact line of a boundary pursuant to Rules 118 and 119 of the Land Registration Rules 2003.” [59]

86. I take it as straightforward and implicit in the above summary that:- i) the burden of proof lies on the party asserting the existence and terms of such a boundary agreement. ii) while the standard of proof is the ordinary civil standard on the balance of probabilities, what they actually have to establish is that the “exact boundary” between the properties has been “conclusively established” and delineated by the agreement. The reference to section 60 LRA 2002 and rules 118 and 199 LRR 2003 makes clear that a high degree of precision is required in relation to an exact boundary said to have been agreed as between two registered titles. Otherwise the parties would be left merely with their existing general boundaries. The evidence on the alleged agreement

87. The contemporaneous evidence on the dealings and communications between Mrs. Knight and the Respondents between October and December 2021 (chiefly represented by Mrs. Iqbal) is as follows.

88. In a letter of 18 th October 2021 from Mrs. Iqbal addressed to Mrs. Hales (“Jen Hales”), she:- i) referred to a “conversation” they had had “regarding the boundary wall build by your late husband Steve Hales”, as to which Mrs. Hales had said “you will get back to us after you have spoken to your daughter.” ii) stated that “It is important to us that appropriate steps are put in place to rectify the position of the boundary wall that Steve incorrectly built. I do hope you will honour his promise to put it right before you sell the property.” iii) expressed the wish “that the issue could be resolved amicably and to avoid hefty legal costs.”

89. On a date which is not clear but probably in late October or early November 2021, Mrs. Knight met and spoke to both Mrs. Iqbal and her daughter Saira. That was the occasion for the email of 17 th November 2021 already quoted above, which Saira began “Following our meeting in our garden you asked me to email you any information I have about the boundary wall between your Mother’s property and our property.” This was then the email in which, as discussed, Saira enclosed the title filed plan, and relied on it to argue her mother’s contention as to the boundary position. There then followed a series of short emails between Saira and Mrs. Knight, with a view to setting up a further meeting “..to discuss and hopefully reach an agreement”, which was eventually agreed for 28 th November 2021.

90. There was then a meeting between them on 28 th November 2021, at which Mrs. Iqbal’s husband was also present. The contents of that meeting are disputed, and not documented. On 11 th December 2021, Saira emailed Mrs. Knight asking: “Any update on whether your mothers wall has been pegged? If so we are able to have a look tomorrow.” Mrs. Knight replied on 12 th December 2021, saying: “..we have put up the new boundary and I will be there later (not sure what time) but before lunchtime.” From the emails which followed, it appears that Saira and Mrs. Iqbal went over to meet Mrs. Knight just after 1.18 p.m.

91. What Mrs. Knight, with the assistance of her brother Stephen Hales, had “put up” at that time is pictured below in close up. It was a run of around 19 feet of wooden posts and rails, on the Tether’s End side of the section of the block wall, approximately opposite the area of Hazel Glen between a bay window and the north-east corner of the house. The posts were affixed to the Tether’s End side of the wall pillars in that location. At that point, the wall and the wooden slats on top of it were still in place in that section, as was a trellis attached to the wall. Wooden post and panel section erected by Mrs. Knight, December 2021

92. Jumping ahead in time slightly, a longer overall view of this area can be seen below, from February 2022, at the time when the section of wall in this location had just been demolished, and by which time Mrs. Knight had also erected a bamboo screen across this section. The wooden posts are still visible through it. Wooden post and panel section (with bamboo screen) in February 2022 The evidential dispute: what was agreed?

93. There is a radical difference between the parties on what transpired at the above meetings, and what the erection of the above posts (with the bamboo affixed later) signified.

94. Mrs. Knight’s evidence on these matters was as follows:- i) at the first meeting at the Respondents’ property, the Respondents and Saira “raised questions over the boundary wall”. They showed her the area of the wall where it “stepped in” towards their house, and “they also asked about the side of the garage”. It was on this occasion that Mrs. Iqbal first told Mrs. Knight about a previous conversation with her father Mr. Hales. Mrs. Knight asked for “evidence” about the boundary. It was in response to this request that Saira sent the email of 17 th November 2021 enclosing the title plan. ii) at the second meeting, which she later accepted was on 28 th November 2021, the Respondents and Saira came to Tether’s End. On this occasion, Mrs. Knight remembered Mrs. Iqbal saying that “she believed the land between the garage and boundary wall along the length of the property belonged to them”. Mrs. Knight said that in response, she emphasised that there had always been a gap between the two, that her father had stored material in the gap beside the garage, that there had always been a plant border in this area on the Tether’s End side, and that the Land Registry plans “were simply an outline”. iii) she then said that as a concession, and “in order to facilitate good neighbourly relations”, she did agree to do something. She would “straighten” the boundary in the area to the front of the Respondents’ house. She understood this to correspond to the area where the wall “stepped” in slightly. Her brother, and his friend, then erected the approximately 19 feet sections of wooden posts and planks (with the bamboo screen later attached) shown above. No other works were carried out, and nothing was agreed or marked anywhere else. iv) once those works had been done, and the Respondents came to inspect them on 12 th December 2021, she recalled that Mrs. Iqbal expressed herself to be “happy” with this, and also “confirmed it was her intention to build a new boundary wall”, for which she was “saving up”. Mrs. Knight advised her to discuss this with the new owners once she was in a position to proceed. She then considered that this “brought matters to an end as works were not imminently planned.” v) Mrs. Knight understood that the building of this new wall would include removing the section of wall behind the wooden posts and planks (and bamboo screen), as to which she had actually asked Mrs. Iqbal “..when she intended to begin the work behind the bamboo fencing”.

95. In her written evidence, and case, Mrs. Iqbal told a somewhat different story.

96. She said that at the meeting on 28 th November 2021, they “discussed the plans Saira had emailed her and the agreement I had with her father regarding the wall he had incorrectly built.” She then said that after they looked at the wall, Mrs. Knight: “ agreed to peg the new boundary in line with the border running under the carport and she would contact us when this was done.” (statutory declaration; emphasis added) So pausing there, that was an allegation that a boundary agreement was made at that first meeting.

97. In her witness statement in these proceedings, Mrs. Iqbal then revised her evidence of what was discussed at that meeting as follows:- “we went outside and looked at the boundary wall. She told me she would get this sorted. I asked her when she would get the wall rebuilt in its correct position but she kept talking about her mother being stressed since Steve died and would speak to her when she could.” (paragraph 32)

98. She then said that an agreement was reached later , at the 12 th December 2021 meeting when (as is agreed) she, her husband and her daughter went to look at the work which Mrs. Knight had done. She said that after the had inspected the wooden panels: “ We agreed the boundary wall to be built being behind the pillars and visible concrete from the garage guttering to where the wall finished by the oak tree. After this agreement [emphasis added] Catherine and her son installed bamboo fencing onto the wooden panels.”

99. Referring back to the Respondents’ pleaded Statements of Case on this issue, it was put as follows:- i) “we discussed and agreed the whole of the boundary.” (paragraph 26); “I (the first respondent) believe it was Catherine Knights legal and moral obligation to make the applicants aware about the agreement I had with her father; that she had honoured that agreement and she had installed the bamboo fencing.” (paragraph 27) ii) “an agreement took place between Catherine Knight and the First Respondent in or around 2021 [emphasis added]. It is averred that that agreement related to the entire boundary and constituted a boundary agreement capable of binding successors in title” (Supplemental Statement of Case, paragraph 114 h; then referring back to the original Statement of Case).

100. Simply from looking at that written evidence, and the Respondents’ case as stated, and even taking the Respondents’ case at its highest, it was extremely difficult for me to discern precisely where they were saying such a newly agreed boundary lay. No plan was ever produced, either following the alleged agreement or even during these proceedings. Save for the works agreed to have been carried out by Mrs. Knight, no physical marks, “pegs” or anything else were inserted in the ground to denote any agreed boundary. There was no further reference to the agreement in any correspondence or document, at any time until the events of February 2022, when the Respondents began to demolish sections of the wall. As the excerpts above show, there was also considerable uncertainty, and variation in the Respondents’ case, on when any agreement was reached.

101. Bearing in mind the authorities cited above, and the assumption within them that a boundary demarcation agreement in relation to registered titles would be the equivalent of an exact boundary determination under the Land Registration Act and Rules, that was not a very promising start for such a contention.

102. Both Mrs. Knight and Mrs. Iqbal gave oral evidence, under cross-examination on their various statements. One of the purposes of an oral hearing is of course to clarify and expand upon matters which may only have been briefly stated in written statements. I therefore considered carefully both witnesses’ oral evidence on this point.

103. Mrs. Knight was adamant that the only agreement she had made in relation to the boundary was as to the one, relatively small section where her brother then put the wooden posts and planks. Even that was by way of a “concession” “out of good will” to placate the Respondents. She did not agree, she said, to a new boundary along the whole line of the wall. In particular, she did not make an agreement which would involve - as the Respondents’ case and position now does – her giving up to them the long established flower and shrub beds on the Tether’s End side of the wall, including the bed covered by the carport.

104. It was put to her that she agreed a continuous boundary line running from what was described as the “oak tree” (but may in fact be a sycamore or maple) at around point F to the corner of the garage, to which she replied “absolutely not”.

105. She did accept that Mrs. Iqbal had discussed her intention to “build a new wall” in the future, but her understanding was that this would be essentially on a ‘like for like’ basis - in the same location and with similar material to the present wall. The only “contentious” area was the on which she made the concession and straightened the boundary with the wooden posts and planks. The section of wall behind that bamboo would be demolished.

106. Under cross-examination, Mrs. Iqbal was asked why, if there had been an agreement as to the whole length of the boundary represented by the wall, the only works done by Mrs. Knight had been in one small section. Her explanation was that this section “lined up…neatly” with the “concrete border” or “plinth” on the Tether’s End side, so that by this small section “we were defining a position of the whole new wall”. In other words, the allegedly agreed whole boundary was an onward projection based on this one small section, which extended all the way to the “oak tree” at point F. It also extended southward to the garage, cutting off and taking in – as Mrs. Iqbal accepted and positively asserted – the flower bed area currently enclosed within the carport, shown above.

107. At this point, my initial understanding of this evidence and case was that this allegedly agreed line continued directly to the north-west corner of the Tether’s End garage, then all the way along its wall in a straight line, so that it would also enclose onto Hazel Glen all of the current gap between the garage and the close boarded fence. As stated above, that is certainly how the Applicants had understood the Respondents’ case up until then.

108. Mrs. Iqbal then said, however – after some probing by Mr. Brilliant – that the new wall would not in fact extend all the way to that point of the garage so as to ‘seal off’, in her favour, the former gap between the garage and the fence. She eventually said, and accepted this characterisation of what this would entail, that the new wall would go up close to, but stop short of the garage, and would then ‘dog leg’ so as to connect with the existing close boarded fence, leaving the gap beside the garage enclosed onto the Tether’s End This was what I eventually understood her to mean by her explanation that the “new wall would be between the garage and the fence”.

109. So the result of this, she then said in oral evidence (for the first time) was that part of their agreement with Mrs. Knight was that they – the Respondents – were “giving up” to her this gap beside the garage wall, which they had previously believed and claimed to be their own – “that’s the agreement we made with Catherine”. Discussion and conclusion on boundary agreement

110. Just listening to, writing down and trying to digest the gist of this oral evidence confirmed two things to me.

111. First, even on their own case and evidence, the Respondents had not in any event articulated and established a sufficiently clear boundary demarcation agreement falling within the principles summarised above. The precise line of any such agreement, and its location on the ground, could not be demonstrated with sufficient clarity. Further, with Mrs. Iqbal’s oral evidence, it had even changed in one important respect, to now produce an apparent “dog leg”, ceding land to the Applicants which the Respondents had previously claimed.

112. The precise terms of the alleged agreement had never been documented even in a single email, let alone expressed on a plan or defined by pegs or other markings on the ground. The case, at its highest, was that what was agreed was essentially an extrapolation from or extension of the section of wooden posts; which there was apparently no need to document or mark further. Had that case been put forward in support of a section 60 LRA 2002 determined boundary application, I see no reasonable basis upon which this Tribunal could have determined an exact boundary with the required precision in any particular location.

113. The second, and perhaps more striking impression I obtained from all of the evidence was that far from reaching an agreement, the parties were at cross-purposes. I do not believe, from considering her evidence, that Mrs. Knight ever thought for a moment that she was entering into what would have been quite a radical change of her boundaries just prior to a sale of her property. She did not think she was agreeing, for example, to surrender a slice of the land occupied by the car port and the flower bed enclosed within it by the wall; or giving up a similarly wide strip of land and flower bed north of there. She had initially understood, from their first conversations, that Mrs. Iqbal believed that the Respondents owned a strip of land up the garage wall, but Mrs. Knight did not simply give in and concede that claim. As she said in her evidence, she met the Respondents’ claim, and reliance on the title plan, by emphasising that the flower beds had always been where they were. She would not have then meekly agreed to give them up, and I find that she did not.

114. On the Respondents’ side, I consider that Mrs. Iqbal, once again, believed and heard what she wanted to hear. She believed that the Respondents were entitled to more land. This had initially been fuelled by the miscommunication to her of the discussions between Mr. Hales and Mrs. Poskitt-Jones. Although she sought to downplay this in her oral evidence, her daughter’s assertion (on her behalf) of a boundary up to the face of the Tether’s End garage wall, by reference to the title filed plan, is also in my judgement a telling detail. She is not the first, and will not be the last, registered proprietor to develop a sense of entitlement to a strip of land measured in a straight line from a neighbouring physical feature, just because that is what the filed plans appear to show.

115. I accept Mrs. Iqbal’s oral evidence that she did not have specific knowledge of the precise conveyancing stage which the sale of Tether’s End had reached (i.e. between contract and completion) when she instructed contractors to begin work demolishing the wall in February 2022. I consider, however, that this was still an unneighbourly and somewhat reckless action. By her own evidence and admission, she had not communicated further with Mrs. Knight since their December 2021 meeting. She did not give Mrs. Knight any notice or warning that she was about to begin demolition of an established wall while (as she knew) Tether’s End was for sale. No email was sent, for example, explaining what was to be done, and the basis for it. As Mrs. Iqbal said in consecutive paragraphs of her statement, “At the end of January 2022, I arranged for a digger to demolish the wall, dig a trench in preparation for the new wall to be erected…..Catherine was at the property when the digger arrived.”

116. In this regard, I place little reliance in this or any case on ‘who said what to whom’ at the time of an incident of this nature; or on whether a particular party reacted or spoke in a particular way. Mrs. Knight was cross-examined on the basis that her reaction to these events was not one of complete outrage or confrontation, so that this somehow supported the Respondents’ case that what was being done had been agreed (e.g. Mrs. Iqbal said in her statement “At no point did she ask for the digger to stop”, although does say that Mrs. Knight was upset and frustrated). I accept Mrs. Knight’s evidence that she preferred to keep her counsel, and speak to her solicitor and estate agents first. She should not be criticised for failing to engage in an angry physical confrontation or (literally or metaphorically) lying down in front of a digger. When these works began, completion of the sale of her property was due in 3 days’ time.

117. As for the Applicants themselves, I accept their evidence that at the time they completed the purchase, they had been made aware by the estate agents that the wall had been partly demolished, but understood that it was going to be rebuilt on a “like for like” basis. They did not yet know that they were purchasing a boundary dispute, or where the Respondents wished to build a new wall.

118. The parties agree that the first time they spoke to each other about boundaries was on 21 st February 2022, when Mr. Ramsey spoke to Mrs. Iqbal, followed by a meeting with both Applicants at the Respondents’ house a week later. I do not need to make findings about exactly what was said on this occasion, or why (as was agreed) it became “heated”, but it is clear that this was the first time the Applicants became aware that the Respondents intended to build a new wall in a different position from the old one. Mrs. Iqbal referred to herself as having then informed the Applicants about the “necessary adjustments to the carport” which this would involve. I also accept the Applicants’ evidence that Mrs. Iqbal said that she intended to re-build the wall in line with the garage wall, which came as a shock to them. It was also common ground that this was the first occasion on which Mrs. Iqbal mentioned the alleged boundary agreement with Mrs. Knight, of which the Applicants had heard nothing previously.

119. Since then, sadly, the parties have been in almost constant dispute, and the present application was made on 30 th July 2022. Although little is generally to be gained from perusing the parties’ subsequent correspondence, directly and through solicitors, I do note the following:- i) when the Applicants repeatedly asked for a “copy” of the agreement said to have been made with Mrs. Knight, rather than just saying “it was an oral agreement, there’s nothing in writing” (as is now her case), Mrs. Iqbal first referred them to Mrs. Knight (“I would advise you to contact Catherine for copies of our correspondence which I am happy for her to share with you”, 2/3/2022), then later claimed that “..I am unable to share the email correspondence we had with the previous owner of Tether’s Edge as there may be data protection issues” (26/4/22), a statement for which there was no basis. This gave the clear impression that something in those emails would provide evidence of the very specific agreement claimed to have been reached, when this was not in fact the case. ii) the latter email referred to above repeated that “the title plans are a good indication of the boundary line”, confirming my conclusion above that this was a belief which partly motivated the Respondents. The Applicants recalled that at their initial meeting on 27 th February 2022 there had been a discussion of plans, and that they had to repeat to the Respondents that title plans showed only general boundaries. iii) Mrs. Knight’s summary of 14 th June 2022 for the Applicants, when providing them with such emails as she had exchanged with Mrs. Iqbal (presumably at the Applicants’ request, following Mrs. Iqbal’s refusals to provide the same) is essentially consistent with her evidence as given in this case, and was at that time a relatively recent summary. As far as she was concerned at that time, her “good will” concession to erect the 19 feet length of wooden posts, then inspected by the Respondents, had concluded the matter. Discussion and conclusion: the law applied to the facts as found

120. Drawing all of the above matters and findings together, the position is as follows; taking matters in ascending order of complexity. The trees section G-F

121. First, as I have already explained and concluded, the ADV1 application cannot succeed in relation to the “trees section” at G-F. There is insufficient evidence of exclusive factual possession by successive Tether’s End owners of the portion of land drawn up to the red line on the application plan in that area, which would have taken in the whole of the trees.

122. That area will therefore remain as the general boundary between the Applicants’ and Respondents’ existing titles. The fence section B-C

123. Second, I find that the application succeeds in relation to the rear “fence section” B-C. As found above, that area was possessed as part of the curtilage of Tether’s End and its garage, with an intention to possess it as such, by Mr. and Mrs. Hales from 1986 to 2008, then Mr. and Mrs. Knight (then just Mrs. Knight) as legal owners of Tether’s End from 2008 to 21 st February 2022. The Applicants, as new owners of Tether’s End from that date, succeeded to that possession. As already found, use of a narrow strip between a garage and a fence, for storage and maintenance purposes, is all that an occupying owner could and would do with such an area. That is sufficient factual possession of, with an intention to possess, land of this nature ( Pye v. Graham [2003] AC 419 ). Despite the reference to there being a gap in the fence allowing access from Hazel Glen, there is no evidence of this ever having been utilised for any purpose. In any event, complete physical enclosure is not a prerequisite of possession. The recent presence of the wires is not an act of possession, but is rather consistent with the exercise of a lesser right (akin to an easement) over that area.

124. To the extent that the ADV1 application under Schedule 6 Land Registration Act 2002 assumes that such an area presently falls within the title of another registered title, I have no hesitation in concluding that all of these successive owners of Tether’s End, at all times, actually and reasonably believed that this land on their side of the fence “belonged” to them, for the purposes of the condition in Schedule 6 paragraph 5(4). There was no reason for them to think otherwise. As stated above, the title plan appearing to show a boundary on the face of the garage showed a general boundary only, which would yield precedence to an obvious physical feature on the ground. That belief was certainly held for a period of at least 10 years within the period of possession relied upon, as that test is now to be understood following Brown v. Ridley [2025] UKSC 7 .

125. Since, on these findings, there was also 12 years’ or more continuous possession prior to 13 th October 2003, to which the Applicants have succeeded, I find that Schedule 6 paragraph 5(3) LRA 2002 is also satisfied, as a pre-existing entitlement to be registered under section 75 Land Registration Act 1925 , preserved by Schedule 12 paragraph 18 LRA 2002 and coupled with continued actual occupation, binds the Respondents and constitutes “some other reason” for the Applicants to be registered as proprietors (see Balevents v Sartori [2014] EWHC 1164 (Ch.) , Morgan J.) It is not necessary to make any findings on the alternative basis of “estoppel” under paragraph 5(2).

126. Such possession was continuous and unbroken throughout that period, and the Applicants are entitled to aggregate the totality of it with their own continued possession: see Site Developments Ltd. v. Cuthbury Ltd. [2010] EWHC 10 (Ch.) paragraphs 173 to 178 per Vos J. The principle was previously summarised thus by Neuberger LJ (as he then was) in Tower Hamlets LBC v. Barrett [2005] EWCA Civ. 923 , at paragraph 36: “..what bars the paper owner from claiming possession is a continuous period of 12 years of dispossession….Accordingly, unless there is a hiatus between the periods of possession of successive squatters (in which case paragraph 8(2) of the Schedule would prevent the second squatter being able to rely on the period of adverse possession by the first) the second squatter, whether he has purchased from the first squatter or dispossessed him in some other way, can rely on the first squatter's period of adverse possession.”

127. Vos J. in Site Developments expressed the principle as applying where each successive squatter had “relinquished possession” in favour of the next. Even, however, where one squatter dispossesses another, their possession can still be aggregated as against the paper owner. Any contest as between the successive squatters would be a matter between them: Vos J. quoted with approval the summary in Megarry & Wade, which is now contained at paragraph 7-037 of the 10 th edition, “If S is dispossessed, the second squatter (S2) can add the former period of occupation to his or her own as against O. This is because time runs against O from the time when adverse possession began, and so long as adverse possession continues unbroken it makes no difference who continues it. But as against S, S2 must be in possession for the full period before S2’s title becomes unassailable.” In this case, in relation to the “fence section”, there was clear continuity of unbroken possession, and each successive owner relinquishing possession in favour the next. The wall section F-C

128. On the findings as set out above, I find that the wall section – i.e. all the land on the Tether’s End side of a party wall – was also factually possessed and enjoyed, with intention so to possess, by successive owners of Tether’s End, as follows.

129. As to the section F-E, this was so possessed from 1986 until about 1 st February 2022; just before the Applicants completed their purchase. As I have already found, the successive walls were in substantially the same location, save for the ‘insets’. I have rejected the contention, which the Respondents failed to prove on the balance of probabilities, that the original red brick wall was in some substantially different location.

130. I have also rejected the contention that Mr. Hales, or any owner/s of Tether’s End, admitted or acknowledged any such trespass, save as to the “insets” Such possession, of the land on the Tether’s End side of the walls, was exercised as that of an occupying owner, and not by licence or permission.

131. I have rejected the contention that there was a wholesale boundary demarcation agreement entered into between the Respondents and Mrs. Catherine Knight, in November or December 2021.

132. As to the “insets” area, while there might be interesting questions on whether i) Mr. Hales’ acknowledgement of trespass, and the express or implied licence flowing from that, actually bound Mrs. Knight on the transfer to her (see above) or ii) given their cross-purposes, there was any sufficiently certain “boundary agreement” with the Respondents to this extent alone from Mrs. Knight’s actions in erecting the wooden post section in December 2021; in the end it is not necessarily to resolve those questions, since the Applicants do not claim those areas in their application.

133. I find that the successive owners of Tether’s End, from 1986 to 1 st February 2022, possessed that land on the Tether’s End side of the wall with the intention to possess it, and in doing so genuinely and reasonably believed at all times that the land on that side of the wall belonged to them, for the purposes of Schedule 6 paragraph 5(4) Land Registration Act 2002 . As with the fence section, almost any reasonably occupying owner would hold such a belief. Partial dispossession/interruption of possession by demolition works

134. There is one complication, however, which arises in relation to this section of the application land.

135. However unneighbourly I consider such actions to have been, the Respondents’ actions on 1 st February 2022 in demolishing the section of wall between F and E, and digging a trench in the ground in that location, amount to a fairly unequivocal interruption of Mrs. Knight’s former possession of the land on her side of the former wall in that area. That can largely be seen from the photograph attached earlier above, but the further Land Registry survey photograph below, taken looking south, shows this even more clearly. Demolished section of wall, F-E, looking south

136. So on 1 st February 2022, without warning, Mrs. Knight was dispossessed to this extent. She would have been entitled, within six months of such dispossession, to bring an application for title to the area by adverse possession under Schedule 6 paragraph 1(2) Land Registration Act 2002 : “A person may also apply to the registrar to be registered as the proprietor of a registered estate in land if— (a) he has in the period of six months ending on the date of the application ceased to be in adverse possession of the estate because of eviction by the registered proprietor, or a person claiming under the registered proprietor, (b) on the day before his eviction he was entitled to make an application under sub-paragraph (1), and (c) the eviction was not pursuant to a judgment for possession.” (I treat “eviction” as synonymous with physical dispossession from any land.)

137. She did not, however, do so. The registered title was transferred to the Applicants only three days later. For the reasons submitted by Mr. Sharples, supported by authority (see Site Developments v. Cuthbury , above, per Vos J. at paragraphs 168-171; cited in Jourdan & Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession , 2 nd edition, paragraph 34-27), I accept that there was on that transfer no automatic transmission to the Applicants, whether by section 62 Law of Property Act 1925 or otherwise, of any right or title of Mrs. Knight to that area of land.

138. Further, the interruption of possession of that area, and the Respondents’ taking of it, prevents the Applicants from relying on the “aggregation of possession” principle discussed in Site Developments and above. In that respect it differs from the fence area. The Applicants did not succeed to Mrs. Knight’s possession of that area, nor did she “relinquish” it to them . There was a “hiatus” created between that previous possession and the Applicants’ ownership.

139. Still further, the right to apply on form ADV1 under Schedule 6 LRA 2002 is a distinct statutory right, conferred on a person under paragraph 1 of that Schedule, in either of the situations in which i) as per paragraph 1(1), he is currently in possession of the land in question, and has been for 10 years or more at the date of the application (or can aggregate successive possessions for such a period); or ii) under paragraph 1(2), where “he” has been evicted from such possession and makes the application within six months. The Applicants never acquired that latter right, because they were never themselves in possession of this land.

140. For this reason alone, however technical it may be, I find that the Applicants’ current ADV1 application does not succeed in relation to this area.

141. This may, however, on my findings as to successive possession first by Mr. and Mrs. Hales, then Mrs. Knight, from 1986 onwards; and the absence of any substantial change in position of the wall; be something of a hollow ‘victory’ for the Respondents on this point. The parties can doubtless seek appropriate advice on the implications of my findings in this regard. The carport section E-D

142. I reach the same conclusions on this area as I did in relation to the fence area. It has been possessed and enjoyed by successive owners of Tether’s End, up to and including the Applicants, as land forming part of the curtilage of their property on their side of the wall, since 1986. Again, in all that time, those successive owners reasonably believed that this land formed part of their property. There had also been 12 years’ possession prior to 13 th October 2003. As above, both paragraphs 5(4) and 5(3) of Schedule 6 are satisfied. It is not necessary to make any finding on any estoppel. The partially demolished wall section C-D

143. I reach the same conclusions on this area as I did in relation to section F to E above. Although not in quite such drastic fashion, I find that the Respondents likewise took possession of this section, by removing the top two courses of the wall and enclosing them onto their side by fencing; changing the physical boundary in that location prior to the transfer to the Applicants. Again, the Applicants cannot therefore aggregate successive periods of possession for the purposes of their present ADV1 application. The point above the implications of my findings as to possession from 1986 onwards, however, likewise applies to this outcome. Disposal

144. However ‘messy’ such a result may be for now, and subject to any future applications on other bases or agreement between the parties, the outcome is that I shall direct the Chief Land Registrar to give effect to the Applicants’ ADV1 application in part , as follows:- - as to sections D-E and B-C only .

145. The balance of the application (as to sections F-G, E-F and C-D) shall be directed to be rejected. That leaves the boundary in those areas as a general boundary only, for now. Costs

146. Any representations on liability for the costs of these proceedings should be made by the date stated in the order. After that date, a further order will be made, and directions given for the assessment of any costs ordered to be paid. Other matters

147. I add, as a postscript, that following the hearing, and shortly prior to my completion and issuing of this decision, I received a letter from Mr. Sharples (counsel for the Respondents) which he copied to the Applicants. He correctly considered that he was professionally obliged to inform me of a breach by Mrs. Iqbal of her duty – which I spelled out to her clearly at the lunch adjournment on 29 th October 2025, when she was still in the middle of giving evidence – not to communicate with anyone about the case or her evidence.

148. It transpires that Mrs. Iqbal, during that lunch adjournment, sent a WhatsApp message (or possibly two messages) to a member of her solicitors’ firm, attaching a video clip and a photograph, and requesting that these be forwarded to her counsel, because they showed the “best” images of the inset area. That was deeply regrettable. Even more regrettable was that the relevant member of her solicitors, a paralegal employee, did then forward these to counsel, by two emails – rather than, as she should have done, reminding her client of her duty and strict ‘embargo’ while giving evidence, and refusing to act on such instructions.

149. I do not propose taking any further action over this matter. I unreservedly accept Mr. Sharples’ word that he did not in fact see or read the emails or their attachments at the time they were sent (very shortly before the hearing resumed), and did not become aware of them until after the conclusion of the hearing. They did not therefore influence the subsequent course of the evidence. Nor does this episode, although it reflects poorly on Mrs. Iqbal and the paralegal, affect my overall appraisal of her evidence or my conclusions above, which I had already arrived at prior to being informed of this incident.

150. Applying the “measured approach” (per Leggatt LJ, paragraph 57) recommended in these situations by the Court of Appeal in Hughes Jarvis Limited v. Searle [2019] EWCA Civ. 1 , I consider that “no damage has in fact been caused to the integrity of the trial process” (per Patten LJ, paragraph 24) by the breach of the witness ‘embargo’. I will therefore say and do nothing further about it, although I am grateful that it was brought to my attention. Judge Ewan Paton Dated this 12 th November 2025 By Order of The Tribunal