Gable Insurance AG (Incorporated in Liechtenstein) (In Liquidation) v William Dewsall & Ors

1. This judgment deals with various costs consequences following a two week trial in July this year and in respect of which I handed down judgment on 5 September 2025.

2. A two day hearing dealing with consequential matters took place on 27-28 November 2025 which raised numerous issues, including the grant of a further freezing order against the First Defendant, William Dewsall. I was able to give rulings in relation to many of those issues during the course of the hearing and these are embodied in an order which was sealed by the Court on 5 December 2025 and which also gives effect to the judgment in the main action. This included orders relating to the costs of the main action in respect of the claims against Mr Dewsall, the Second Defendant, Mr Hirschfield and the Fourth Defendant, Horatio Risk Consulting LLP (“Horatio”).

3. There was however insufficient time for me to give rulings in respect of the costs of the claim made by the Claimant (“GIAG”) against the Third Defendant, Mrs Dewsall and various applications made during the proceedings where costs had been reserved. The reserved costs relate to three matters: 3.1 An application for a worldwide freezing order against Mr Dewsall which was originally granted in July 2023 and which was continued, with some parts being revoked as a result of undertakings given by Mr and Mrs Dewsall, in August 2023. 3.2 A search order made against Mr Dewsall, Mrs Dewsall and Horatio in July 2024, in respect of which further orders were made at the return date in September 2024 and additional applications were made in February 2025 dealing with privilege and disclosure in respect of the documents obtained as a result of the search order. The matters relating to the search order also include a contempt application which included an application for a bench warrant in respect of Mr and Mrs Dewsall following their refusal to allow the search team entry to their house. 3.3 An application for a second worldwide freezing order, this time against Mr Dewsall, Mrs Dewsall and Horatio which was originally granted in November 2024, which was continued in an amended form in January 2025 pending a further hearing and which was replaced by a domestic freezing order against Mr and Mrs Dewsall in March 2025. Mrs Dewsall appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal against the domestic freezing order and was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.

4. I now need to make a decision in relation to the costs issues mentioned above. Once I have done so, the following will still need to be addressed: 4.1 Interest on any awards of costs in relation to the matters mentioned above. 4.2 Payments on account for all parties other than Mr Hirschfield (who is not affected by any of the issues I now have to deal with) and in respect of whom the payment on account has already been agreed as set out in the order issued on 5 December 2025. 4.3 What should happen to the proceeds of sale of Weald Hall which are currently held in Court. 4.4 Whether the Court should grant a stay of execution in respect of its judgment in favour of Mrs Dewsall in connection with GIAG’s tracing claim relating to Weald Hall. In reality, this point is simply part of the question as to what should happen to the proceeds of sale of Weald Hall which are held by the Court.

5. I would hope that these issues can be dealt with by way of written submissions although I note that GIAG and Mrs Dewsall have indicated that a further short hearing may be necessary. Costs – relevant principles

6. In accordance with CPR Rule 44.2, the Court has a wide discretion in relation to costs. The general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party but the Court may make a different order having regard to all of the circumstances including the conduct of the parties and whether a party has succeeded on part of its case even if it has not been wholly successful. Some examples of conduct which the Court might take into account are set out in CPR 44.2(5).

7. Both GIAG and Mrs Dewsall seek costs in respect of some matters on the indemnity basis. They agree that the test is whether there is some conduct or circumstance which takes the case out of the norm ( Excelsior Commercial and Industrial Holdings Limited v Salisbury Hammer Aspden and Johnson (a firm) [2002] EWCA Civ 879 at [31-32]). The question is not whether what occurred was something that happened often but whether it is “outside the ordinary and reasonable conduct of proceedings” ( Esure Services Limited v Quarcoo [2009] EWCA Civ 595 at [17] and [25]).

8. One particular area where courts have been willing to award costs on the indemnity basis is where there has been a breach of the duty of full and frank disclosure on a without notice application for a freezing order (see for example Franses v Al Assad [2007] EWHC 2442 (Ch) at [85]). Another point made at [106] in Al Assad is that it is not a bar to indemnity costs that the Court grants a more limited injunction to that originally sought.

9. One point which was touched on in submissions is whether, when making a costs order, a court can (or should) consider allegations such as a breach of full and frank disclosure at a without notice hearing in circumstances where no such complaint was made by the relevant party at the return date. Mr Benson, on behalf of GIAG, suggested that this would be a Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100 abuse of process or, at least, that it would be unreasonable to expect a judge dealing with a reserved costs order to investigate at some distance from the original application whether there had in fact been a breach of the duty of full and frank disclosure.

10. Mr Pennington-Benton, acting for Mrs Dewsall, on the other hand submitted that CPR 44.2(4)(a) requires the Court to take into account the conduct of the parties and that this must include matters such as a breach of the duty of full and frank disclosure in relation to a without notice application, whether or not this had been raised previously. Neither party referred to any authorities on the point.

11. In principle, I accept Mr Pennington-Benton’s submission that, to consider such conduct in the context of an award of costs does not amount to a collateral attack on the decision made by the Court when granting or continuing the interim relief and does not therefore amount to an abuse of process. There is no challenge to the decisions which were made by the Court. The issue is whether the way in which (in this case) GIAG approached the applications took matters outside the norm to such an extent that an award of indemnity costs should be made.

12. However, it also seems to me that it is both unrealistic and undesirable to expect a court dealing with reserved costs orders after a trial to carry out a detailed investigation into the question as to whether there was a breach of the duty of full and frank disclosure at a without notice hearing of an application. The Judge at the return date (which will typically be very shortly after the original application) will be in a much better position to reach a conclusion in respect of such an allegation (as, I note, was the case in Al Assad ). In circumstances where no complaint is made until a costs hearing after trial, it is difficult to see how this can carry much weight unless it can easily be seen from the evidence that there was a clear and significant breach of the relevant duty.

13. Turning more generally to the costs of interim applications, Mr Benson draws attention to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Dos Santos v Unitel [2024] EWCA Civ 1109 . The Chancellor (Sir Julian Flaux) observed at [116] that: “In so far as there is a general rule as to the costs of contested interlocutory or procedural applications, it is that a party who contests an application and fights it tooth and nail on every point, thereby causing the successful party to incur costs which would not otherwise be incurred, should be ordered to pay the successful party’s costs at the conclusion of the application. This is clear from CPR r 44.2(2) and is the general rule applied in the Business and Property Courts in relation to contested interlocutory applications. The Court will not usually reserve costs to the trial Judge of, for example, a contested jurisdiction or disclosure application which the defendant has lost, merely because the defendant points out that it might succeed in defeating a claim at trial.”

14. The Chancellor explained in Dos Santos at [119] that the difference between a freezing injunction and an interim injunction granted on American Cyanamid principles based on the balance of convenience is that “even if the claim fails at trial, it does not follow that the freezing order was not correctly granted on the basis that the claimant satisfied the three criteria for the grant of the freezing injunction”.

15. Based on this, Mr Benson submits that, in the context of the search order and the second freezing injunction, it is irrelevant that GIAG failed in its claim against Mrs Dewsall and that, having been successful in its applications, it should have its costs.

16. Mr Pennington-Benton however makes two points. The first is that, as the costs have in fact been reserved, it would be inappropriate to simply ignore the fact that Mrs Dewsall had succeeded in defending the claim against her.

17. The second submission Mr Pennington-Benton makes is that the Court of Appeal in Dos Santos is not saying that it is always the case that the successful party should have its costs of the application but that this is only the case where the respondent fights the application “tooth and nail on every point, thereby causing the successful party to incur costs which would not otherwise be incurred”. In support of this, he refers to comments made by Mr Justice Henshaw in a talk to the Manchester Business and Property Courts Forum on 27 March 2025 where he says at [35]: “I would not regard Dos Santos as laying down any firm rule that the claimant should necessarily get its costs of a successful freezing order application. It is open to the Judge to make whatever costs decision seems appropriate in all the circumstances. If the respondent fights tooth and nail, taking bad points, that is one thing. If, on the other hand, the respondent merely puts in economical evidence or submissions designed to show (for example) that the claimant does not have a good arguable case, the position may be different. Should the defendant’s case be vindicated at trial, there may be a good argument that the claimant, not the defendant, should bear the costs of the injunction application. Reserving the application costs to trial may therefore be entirely appropriate in such situations.”

18. Whilst I accept that the comments made by Henshaw J do not provide any binding precedent, in my view, he is right that the Court of Appeal was not laying down a rule that it is always the case that the successful party in an interim application should have their costs. In the context of an application without notice, there is of course no opportunity for a respondent to agree a way forward with the applicant which would avoid the need for the application. The extent to which any resistance by the respondent at the return date justifies an immediate award of costs irrespective of the outcome of the trial will need to be considered by the Judge hearing the application. Having said that, the clear guidance from the Court of Appeal is that, if the application is seriously contested, the unsuccessful party may well be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party.

19. As I have said however that does not mean that the outcome of the trial is irrelevant where costs have in fact been reserved.

20. With these principles in mind, I will now consider the various costs applications. Costs of GIAG’s claim against Mrs Dewsall

21. GIAG accepts that, in principle, Mrs Dewsall is the successful party and that she should have her costs on the standard basis. However, it suggests that the costs should be reduced to reflect Mrs Dewsall’s conduct during the proceedings. The draft order provided by GIAG proposed a 25% reduction although, in his skeleton argument and in his submissions, Mr Benson argued for a 40% reduction.

22. Mrs Dewsall submits that there should be no reduction and that she should have her costs on the indemnity basis.

23. The conduct referred to by GIAG relates to the following: 23.1 Failure to engage in ADR prior to her being joined as a party to the proceedings in March 2024. 23.2 Filing an inadequate defence. 23.3 Failure to comply with disclosure obligations. 23.4 Allegations that Mrs Dewsall assisted Mr Dewsall in circumventing the first worldwide freezing order by allowing substantial sums to be paid into her bank account.

24. I have considered these points carefully but have concluded that, neither individually nor collectively, do they justify a reduction in the award of costs in favour of Mrs Dewsall.

25. I accept that, in principle, a failure to engage in ADR might be penalised in costs. However, there was no real attempt on behalf of GIAG to engage with Mrs Dewsall separately in relation to the claim against her as opposed to the wider claim against Mr Dewsall. The key letter proposing ADR dated 17 January 2024 very much focuses on the claim against Mr Dewsall, concluding that “our client currently remains open to exploring with Mr Dewsall the possibility of resolving this claim by referring the matter to mediation.”. There is then a request for the solicitors to discuss the matter with Mr and Mrs Dewsall.

26. There are subsequent letters later in January 2024 and in February 2024 addressed to Mrs Dewsall personally or to her new solicitors referring back to the letter dated 17 January 2024 and asking for a response.

27. When the letter of 17 January 2024 was sent to Mr and Mrs Dewsall’s solicitors, Mrs Dewsall was not aware of the nature of the claim against her. The draft amended Particulars of Claim were sent to her solicitors on 1 February 2024 and so these were available when the reminders were sent towards the end of February 2024. However, there was nothing in those letters which suggested in clear terms that GIAG was interested in resolving the claim against her in isolation, particularly given the references back to the initial letter of 17 January 2024.

28. In the circumstances, I consider the onus to have been more on Mr Dewsall to respond to the mediation proposal. Based on the limited nature of the claim against her, it was unrealistic to expect Mrs Dewsall to engage in mediation separately in relation to that part of the claim. I accept that Mrs Dewsall should have responded to the mediation proposal but, in the circumstances, I do not think that her failure to do so was sufficiently unreasonable to justify a reduction in the costs awarded in her favour.

29. GIAG’s complaint about the inadequacy of Mrs Dewsall’s defence has no merit. It is true that it would have been better if the defence had contained more detail. However, when Mrs Dewsall applied (at a relatively late stage) to amend her defence, GIAG’s (successful) response was that there was no need for her to do so as the pleadings contained in the defence were sufficient to enable her to run the arguments which she wished to put before the Court. In these circumstances, it cannot be the case that GIAG can suggest that a reduction in Mrs Dewsall’s costs is justified on the basis that the defence was inadequate.

30. As far as disclosure is concerned, it is true that Mrs Dewsall failed to provide disclosure by the original deadline although this was remedied shortly afterwards. There were also some deficiencies in Mrs Dewsall’s disclosure certificate. The defects were however technical in nature and were remedied.

31. It is also true that the results of the search order demonstrated that Mrs Dewsall had other relevant documents on her electronic devices with approximately 1,000 documents being disclosed as a result of this. In principle, this is something which could justify a reduction in the costs awarded in favour of Mrs Dewsall. However, given that I also have to deal with the costs of the search order (which are almost as much as GIAG’s other costs), it is in my view more appropriate to factor this into my decision in relation to the search order rather than making a reduction in the award of costs in favour of Mrs Dewsall relating to the claim against her.

32. The final point relates to the use of Mrs Dewsall’s bank accounts to receive funds belonging to Mr Dewsall. This is now the subject of a separate proposed claim by GIAG against Mrs Dewsall. In the circumstances, it would be inappropriate for me to make any findings, based on the limited evidence available, as to whether Mrs Dewsall was in breach of any of her undertakings or whether she in some way assisted Mr Dewsall in breaching his undertakings for the terms of the worldwide freezing order. I note that Mrs Dewsall’s position is that she was not in breach of any obligations placed upon her and that the only breach by Mr Dewsall was a possible failure to notify GIAG of the source of his expenditure.

33. Given the likelihood of a separate claim against Mrs Dewsall, which will of course require her to incur costs, it does not seem to me to be appropriate to make a reduction in the costs awarded to her in respect of this claim.

34. Turning to the question of indemnity costs, this is based on what is said to be the poor conduct of GIAG and its agents, in particular in relation to the search order application and the freezing order application, in respect of which I have to make separate decisions about costs. There are complaints about breaches of the full and frank disclosure and fair presentation, incorrectly presented evidence, the use of “fake” evidence and the securing of oppressive and unnecessary orders.

35. However, as these complaints relate principally to the search order and the freezing order applications, it is in my view more appropriate to take these points into account in deciding what order for costs should be made in respect of those applications rather than being a reason (even if the allegations are made out) for awarding Mrs Dewsall her costs on the main action on the indemnity basis.

36. I therefore award Mrs Dewsall all of her costs of the claim against her on the standard basis. This is subject to the costs orders which have already been made against her and my decisions below relating to the reserved costs orders. Worldwide freezing order against Mr Dewsall

37. The cost of the successful without notice application for the freezing order made on 25 July 2023 and the subsequent consent order dated 17 August 2023 pursuant to which the Freezing Order was continued with amendments subject to undertakings being given by Mr and Mrs Dewsall, were reserved. GIAG seeks its costs on the indemnity basis. Mr Dewsall has not made any representations in relation to costs.

38. Notwithstanding the decision of the Court of Appeal in Dos Santos , it is not clear that, even if that decision had been available in 2023 when the reserved costs orders relating to the first worldwide freezing order were made, the Court would have awarded GIAG its costs even though it successfully obtained the freezing order given that, by the return date, Mr Dewsall had agreed that the freezing order should be continued in an amended form and that undertakings should be given. There was no contested application by the return date.

39. However, GIAG was clearly the successful party following the trial in relation to its claim. In the light of that, I have already made an award of costs in favour of GIAG in relation to the claim itself.

40. As GIAG was successful in obtaining the freezing order (which Mr Dewsall accepted should be continued in an amended form subject to the giving of undertakings) and was also successful in its claims against Mr Dewsall, I accept that GIAG should be awarded its costs in relation to the first worldwide freezing order, to the extent that these were reserved.

41. I am conscious that I have made a significant reduction in the costs awarded to GIAG in respect of the claims against Mr Hirschfield given that I rejected the basis on which GIAG originally sought to quantify the extent of any misappropriations. However, it had a greater measure of success as far as Mr Dewsall is concerned (for example findings of dishonesty in relation to various breaches of duty) and, in the absence of any representations from Mr Dewsall, I do not consider it appropriate to make any reduction in the costs awarded to GIAG in respect of the first worldwide freezing order.

42. I also consider that an award of costs on the indemnity basis is appropriate. It is clear that, in the context of the first worldwide freezing order, Mr Dewsall failed to disclose assets which were uncovered as a result of the search order. This is sufficient, in my view, to take Mr Dewsall’s conduct “out of the norm” and to justify an award of indemnity costs given that the undertakings were accepted on the basis of Mr Dewsall’s evidence as to his assets. Search order costs – Mr Dewsall and Horatio

43. Again, GIAG seeks its costs of all aspects relating to the search order from both Mr Dewsall and Horatio on the indemnity basis. The total costs (excluding the bench warrant application – see further below) are in the region of £4.8million. In very rough terms, this breaks down as follows: 43.1 Obtaining the search order - £410,000 43.2 Executing the search order - £850,000 43.3 Subsequent actions, including the return date (broadly speaking, these costs relate to working out how to deal with the materials recovered as a result of the search order including the privilege review and a review as to relevance so that the right documents could then be disclosed) - £3.56 million

44. This is a situation where GIAG was both successful in obtaining the search order and was successful at trial against both Mr Dewsall and Horatio. On this basis, it must be right that, in principle, GIAG should be awarded its costs in relation to the search order both against Mr Dewsall and Horatio. Neither party attended the consequentials hearing nor provided any representations in respect of costs. There is in my view no reason to make a different order.

45. As far as Mr Dewsall is concerned, I consider it appropriate to award costs on the indemnity basis. There is clear evidence of the destruction and concealment of documents during the execution of the search and of Mr Dewsall obstructing the search and making threats against individuals carrying out the search. Such conduct is clearly outside the norm and justifies an award of indemnity costs.

46. As far as Horatio is concerned, it has simply not engaged with the proceedings at all and, as a result, failed to provide any disclosure. I do not however consider that a complete failure to engage with proceedings, of itself, justifies an award of indemnity costs. I was not referred to any authority which would support this. It would of course have been open to GIAG to seek default judgment against Horatio but, for whatever reason, it chose not to do so. It is hard to see why, in these circumstances, GIAG should be awarded its costs relating to the search order on the indemnity basis. Search order - Mrs Dewsall

47. GIAG seeks all of its costs relating to the search order from Mrs Dewsall on the indemnity basis, even though Mrs Dewsall successfully defended the claim against her.

48. Mrs Dewsall, on the other hand, says that, as the successful party, she should not have to pay GIAG’s costs in relation to the search order but instead should be awarded her own costs which, she says, should be assessed on the indemnity basis.

49. GIAG’s primary argument in favour of being awarded its costs relating to the search order against Mrs Dewsall is that, on the basis of Dos Santos , the outcome of trial is irrelevant and that, as it was successful in obtaining the search order it should be awarded its costs irrespective of the outcome of the trial.

50. I do not accept this. The search order was obtained on a without notice basis. By the time of the hearing on the return date, a consent order had been agreed which dealt with the steps to be taken in relation to the analysis of the materials.

51. There was therefore no hearing of a contested application. The Court of Appeal in Dos Santos did not suggest that, in such circumstances, it would generally follow that an award of costs would be made rather than costs being reserved.

52. The purpose of reserving costs is so that the trial Judge can take an overall view of the justice of the case taking into account the result of the trial. Given that I do not consider the principles set out in Dos Santos to be engaged, it seems to me that the fact that Mrs Dewsall was the successful party is a relevant matter which I need to take into account.

53. I do accept that the results of the search order (which revealed over 1,000 previously undisclosed relevant documents contained on Mrs Dewsall’s electronic devices) demonstrates that Mrs Dewsall’s original disclosure was inadequate. However, I also accept Mr Pennington-Benton’s submission that, had it not been for the wider claim against Mr Dewsall, any perceived inadequacy in Mrs Dewsall’s disclosure would, most likely, have been dealt with in some other way such as an application for specific disclosure rather than applying for a search order which is a weapon of last resort given the invasion of privacy which it entails.

54. In his oral submissions, Mr Benson came close to accepting that this was the case, suggesting that Mrs Dewsall needed to be part of the search order application as, had it been made against Mr Dewsall alone, he might have suggested that documents and devices belonged not to him, but to Mrs Dewsall, thus frustrating the purpose of the search order. It is also clear from the results of the search order that Mr Dewsall was the primary target. Although the quantity of documents recovered from Mrs Dewsall is not insignificant, the overwhelming majority of the documents resulting from the search (well over 90%) belonged to Mr Dewsall.

55. As Mr Pennington-Benton points out, this is also supported by the fact that GIAG’s costs schedules show costs relating to the search order being incurred in March 2024 before Mrs Dewsall had even been added as a party to the proceedings.

56. As far as conduct is concerned, GIAG seek to suggest that Mrs Dewsall obstructed the search and also draw attention to the destruction and concealment of documents. However, the clear impression from the evidence I was taken to is that it was very much Mr Dewsall who took the lead in initially denying entry to the search team. It was Mr Dewsall who made threats against the search team and, in the light of that, it is in my view more likely that Mr Dewsall rather than Mrs Dewsall who was responsible for any concealment or destruction of documents.

57. The evidence does show that, at one point, Mrs Dewsall refused access to a jewellery safe on the basis that the contents were privileged, although access was later granted. This is however the only incident during the course of the search where the evidence clearly shows resistance on the part of Mrs Dewsall and does not, in my view, constitute a significant factor as to whether I should order Mrs Dewsall to pay GIAG’s costs in relation to the search order.

58. GIAG also complains that the main reason why the costs following the execution of the search order are so high is that Mr and Mrs Dewsall made a blanket assertion of privilege over all of the materials seized without any proper explanation of the basis for this assertion and which ultimately required a manual review of the documents by the supervising solicitors.

59. There is clearly some truth to this but, on a review of the correspondence, it is clear that the privilege was being asserted primarily by Mr Dewsall, although expressed to be on behalf of both himself and Mrs Dewsall. Again, he was taking the lead. Although it is true that Mrs Dewsall could, independently, have taken a different approach, the reality is that around 90-95% of the documents related to Mr Dewsall rather than Mrs Dewsall.

60. Looking at all of the circumstances and taking account of the overall justice of the case, it would not in my view be right to order Mrs Dewsall to pay GIAG’s costs relating to the search order. She succeeded in defending the claim against her and it would be unjust for her to have to bear the costs of an exercise that, in all likelihood, would never have taken place had the claim been against her alone and not primarily against her husband.

61. Turning to Mrs Dewsall’s own costs, it is not clear whether she has any costs specifically relating to the search order as none of the costs information with which I have been provided on behalf of Mrs Dewsall mentions this.

62. To the extent that there are any such costs, it would not, in my view, be appropriate to order GIAG to pay such costs. Whilst Mrs Dewsall suggests that obtaining a search order against her was inappropriate, the fact is that the Deputy Judge dealing with the application considered it appropriate to grant the search order. No appeal was made against the order and, until this hearing, there was no suggestion on Mrs Dewsall’s part that the conditions for granting a search order against her had not been met or that there were breaches of the duty of full and frank disclosure and/or fair presentation at the without notice hearing, as is now alleged.

63. Although I have found that, had the claim been against Mrs Dewsall alone, GIAG might well have pursued a different approach to what they considered to be her inadequate disclosure, it is in my view relevant that the results of the search order clearly showed that Mrs Dewsall had not in fact disclosed all of the documents which she should have done.

64. I note that Mr Pennington-Benton submits that it is not open to GIAG to assert that Mrs Dewsall provided incomplete disclosure in the light of the fact that she provided a signed disclosure certificate. However, the results of the search are clear and there is no doubt that Mrs Dewsall’s initial disclosure was incomplete. In the context of costs, I am not aware of any reason why this should not be a factor which can be taken into account as part of the conduct of the parties despite the existence of a signed disclosure certificate.

65. It is also the case that, in my view, Mrs Dewsall must bear some responsibility for actions taken by her husband, purportedly on her behalf such as the blanket assertion of privilege. This clearly resulted in increased costs on the part of GIAG and, whilst it may not justify an order requiring Mrs Dewsall to pay GIAG’s costs in the circumstances, it is another factor why, in my view, it is right that Mrs Dewsall should not be awarded her own costs in relation to the search order.

66. As I have mentioned, there are also suggestions that GIAG was in breach of its obligations of full and frank disclosure and fair presentation at the without notice hearing at which the search order was obtained. It is difficult for the Court to come to any conclusion in relation to this on the limited evidence available and without a disproportionate amount of time which would need to be spent investigating such a serious allegation in detail. I do not therefore make any findings in relation to this.

67. However, even if the allegations were made out, it would not, in my view, justify an award of costs relating to the search order in favour of Mrs Dewsall in the circumstances where the results of the search order clearly show that Mrs Dewsall’s original disclosure was inadequate.

68. Mr Pennington-Benton suggests that the costs incurred after the execution of the search order relating to reviewing the documents recovered both for privilege and relevance should simply be treated as part of the normal costs of the proceedings. The result of that would be that Mrs Dewsall would recover her costs in relation to this aspect. However, given the blanket assertion of privilege, for which Mrs Dewsall must bear some responsibility and the increase in GIAG’s costs resulting from this, it would not in my view be appropriate to order GIAG to pay Mrs Dewsall’s costs (if any) relating to this aspect.

69. Taking all of this into account, I have decided that Mrs Dewsall should not be ordered to pay GIAG’s costs in relation to the search order and that GIAG should not be ordered to pay Mrs Dewsall’s costs relating to the search order. For the avoidance of doubt, this relates to all of the stages mentioned in paragraph [43] above. This does not, of course, affect any existing orders for costs which have already been made. Contempt application/Bench warrant - Mr and Mrs Dewsall

70. As a result of GIAG’s search team being unable to gain access to Mr and Mrs Dewsall’s property, it made a contempt application on 31 July 2024 against both Mr and Mrs Dewsall.

71. Green J refused to decide the contempt application or issue a bench warrant but did make an order the same day requiring Mr and Mrs Dewsall to attend Court the following day to explain their apparent non-compliance, with the threat of the issue of a bench warrant should they fail to attend.

72. Mr and Mrs Dewsall attended Court on 1 August, as required. Green J, again, did not make any decision in relation to the contempt application but made it clear to Mr and Mrs Dewsall that they must comply with the search order. Following this hearing, access to Weald Hall was granted.

73. Once again, it appears that it was Mr Dewsall who was taking the lead in refusing access. The contempt application refers specifically to Mr Dewsall refusing to allow access on 30 July 2024. There is also a reference to “the Respondents” (i.e. both Mr and Mrs Dewsall) refusing access on 31 July 2024 although the supporting evidence for the application appears to show that, on 31 July 2024, GIAG’s team were simply unable to gain access rather than actually being refused access.

74. There was some criticism from Green J of the application for a bench warrant. Mr Benson accepted in his submissions that the application may have been somewhat precipitate. Green J considered that the correct course of action was to ask the Court to direct Mr and Mrs Dewsall to attend Court rather than making a contempt application as a way of enforcing the search order.

75. In that sense, the contempt application was not successful, although, as Mr Benson points out, the application had the desired effect as the Court ordered Mr and Mrs Dewsall to attend Court, following which access to Weald Hall was obtained.

76. In the light of all of this, although I think it is right that Mr Dewsall should have to pay GIAG’s costs of the application, I consider that the costs should be reduced by 50% to reflect the somewhat heavy handed and inappropriate mechanism chosen by GIAG to try and secure compliance with the search order.

77. Although Mr Dewsall’s conduct on 30 July 2024 in refusing access to the premises could justify an award of indemnity costs, this needs to be viewed in context. On the same day as the search order was granted, Mr and Mrs Dewsall had been in Court in respect of separate possession proceedings relating to Weald Hall. Their evidence is that they thought that the search team had come to evict them from the property and take possession. Coupled with this, Green J clearly had some sympathy with Mr and Mrs Dewsall given the fact that they would not be familiar with a search order and the terms of the order itself were relatively complicated.

78. Taking this into account, I do not think it appropriate to make an award of indemnity costs as Mr Dewsall’s conduct in refusing access on 30 July 2024 was not so unreasonable as to take his conduct out of the norm. I appreciate that there is other conduct during the proceedings (and, indeed, during the execution of the search warrant) which has led me to award indemnity costs in respect of other aspects. However, I consider that Mr Dewsall would, in effect, be punished twice for the same offence if I awarded indemnity costs in respect of the contempt application.

79. As far as Mrs Dewsall is concerned, the evidence shows that it was Mr Dewsall who took the lead in refusing admission on 30 July 2024 although Mrs Dewsall clearly went along with it. Taking this into account, as well as my comments above in relation to the search order generally, and the fact that Mrs Dewsall was successful in defending the claim against her, I do not consider it appropriate for her to be ordered to pay any of GIAG’s costs in relation to the contempt application.

80. On the other hand, given that Mrs Dewsall clearly went along with Mr Dewsall in refusing access and that the contempt application had the desired effect of gaining access to Weald Hall, it would not, in my view, be appropriate to order GIAG to pay Mrs Dewsall’s costs relating to the application. Second worldwide freezing order

81. In November 2024, GIAG sought a second worldwide freezing order. The application was against Mr Dewsall, Mrs Dewsall and Horatio as well as Mr and Mrs Dewsall’s daughter, Hayley Dewsall and three companies connected with Mr Dewsall.

82. The freezing order was granted at a without notice hearing on 26 November 2024. The freezing order was continued, in effect, by consent pending a return date hearing in January 2025. Following the return date hearing at the end of February 2025, Deputy High Court Judge Shea initially refused to continue the injunction but was subsequently persuaded to make a domestic freezing order against Mr and Mrs Dewsall.

83. The application for the second worldwide freezing order was, to a large extent, triggered by a belief that Mr Dewsall (and to a lesser extent, Mrs Dewsall) had overseas accounts containing significant sums although a subsidiary reason was the discovery of undisclosed assets in the UK as a result of the search order.

84. GIAG had obtained an investigative report giving details of the accounts which Mr and Mrs Dewsall were said to have. Mr Benson explained during his submissions that a significant reason for applying for the second worldwide freezing order was to enable GIAG to try and obtain more information about the overseas accounts which it was not able to do without an English court order. However, on attempting to enforce the worldwide freezing order in a number of jurisdictions, it turned out that none of the accounts in fact existed.

85. As a result of this, Deputy High Court Judge Shea was not satisfied that there was sufficient evidence of overseas assets for a worldwide freezing order to be granted.

86. At a hearing in the BVI on 1 April 2025 (about a month after the return date hearing before Deputy High Court Judge Shea), the BVI Court was highly critical of the relevant report, having received an affidavit from the investigator who prepared the report. This disclosed that the source of the relevant information appeared to be an investigative journalist who had got the information from somebody else whose identity had to be protected and whose name could not therefore be given. The conclusion was that the investigator who prepared the report in fact did not have any personal information about the relevant accounts but simply had hearsay evidence from other individuals. The Judge’s conclusion was that the “report is absolutely no evidence whatsoever of assets of Mr Dewsall in the jurisdiction”.

87. GIAG’s position is that it should have its costs of the application (and subsequent hearings) relating to the second worldwide freezing order as, even though it was not successful in continuing the worldwide freezing order, it was successful in obtaining a domestic freezing order.

88. Mr Benson suggests that GIAG’s costs should be reduced by 25% to take account of the fact that, in the absence of success in tracing any overseas bank accounts, Mr and Mrs Dewsall and Horatio should not be required to pay any costs relating to this aspect, including the costs of overseas lawyers and investigators. GIAG seeks its costs on the indemnity basis.

89. Mr Dewsall and Horatio have not made any representations in relation to costs. Mrs Dewsall, again, seeks her costs (as the successful party) on the indemnity basis.

90. As far as Mr Dewsall and Horatio are concerned, it seems clear that the real driver behind the application for the second worldwide freezing order was the potential existence of overseas accounts. This part of the application was unsuccessful and, it appears, was largely based on evidence which has been discredited. On the other hand, GIAG was successful in obtaining a freezing order against Mr Dewsall and Horatio, albeit a lesser order than the one which it had originally sought. It was also successful at trial against both of these defendants.

91. Taking all of that into account, it is in my view right that Mr Dewsall and Horatio should be ordered to pay GIAG’s costs in relation to the second worldwide freezing order application but that the costs should be reduced by 50% given its failure to establish the existence of any overseas accounts and the unsatisfactory nature of the report upon which it relied in support of the application.

92. GIAG justifies its application for indemnity costs on the basis of Mr Dewsall’s failure to disclose assets in the context of the first worldwide freezing order (which became apparent following the search order), Mr Dewsall’s failure to account for his expenditure following the first worldwide freezing order, alleged attempts to sell Weald Hall in non-arms length transactions and the use of Mrs Dewsall’s bank account to receive proceeds of sale of assets belonging to Mr Dewsall (in the period between the undertakings relevant to the first worldwide freezing order and the granting of the second worldwide freezing order, it is alleged that over £400,000 of such funds passed through Mrs Dewsall’s bank account). It also appears that Mr Dewsall attempted to avoid service of the second worldwide freezing order by denying that he was Mr Dewsall.

93. I accept that Mr Dewsall’s conduct in failing to disclose assets, failing to account for expenditure in breach of the first worldwide freezing order and attempting to avoid service of the second worldwide freezing order was sufficiently unreasonable to take his conduct out of the norm and justifies an award of indemnity costs.

94. It is not clear to me whether or not there was any breach of any orders in using Mrs Dewsall’s bank accounts or attempting to sell Weald Hall in a non-arms length transaction (although apparently for an arms length price) but I make no finding in relation to these aspects given the conclusion I have come to.

95. As far as Horatio is concerned, I do not consider an award of indemnity costs to be appropriate for the reasons I have already explained given that it is has taken no part in the proceedings.

96. Turning to Mrs Dewsall’s position, this is a situation where Mrs Dewsall did fight the freezing order application, including making an (unsuccessful) appeal to the Court of Appeal. It is therefore in my view appropriate to apply the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Dos Santos and order Mrs Dewsall to pay GIAG’s costs of the application. However, as with Mr Dewsall, those costs should be reduced by 50% to take account of GIAG’s ultimate failure to obtain a worldwide freezing order.

97. As well as the discredited report in relation to the offshore bank accounts, Mrs Dewsall relies on alleged breaches by GIAG of its duty of full and frank disclosure and fair presentation in resisting any award of costs against her.

98. However, the only specific point identified in support of this which relates to the application for the second worldwide freezing order is an allegation that the impression was given to the Judge at the hearing in January 2025 that Mrs Dewsall was in breach of her disclosure obligations in respect of the first worldwide freezing order, despite the fact that she had no such disclosure obligations. This was not a without notice hearing and so the duties of fair presentation and full and frank disclosure do not apply in the same way as at a without notice application.

99. It is in any event accepted that the judge was alive to the point and so was not misled, even if Mrs Dewsall’s complaint about the way in which matters were presented is valid. I also note that, although Mrs Dewsall did not have any disclosure obligations under the first worldwide freezing order (or the undertakings which she subsequently gave), she did say in a witness statement relating to the first worldwide freezing order application that Weald Hall was her only significant asset even though she, in fact, owned valuable jewellery. It may be, as Mr Pennington-Benton suggests, that this can be explained by the fact that the witness statement was dealing primarily with matters relating to Weald Hall but, at first glance, it does not appear that Mrs Dewsall was being completely transparent in her evidence.

100. Taking everything in the round, none of this, in my view, provides a reason why GIAG should not have at least part of its costs in respect of this application. The 50% reduction takes account of the matters in respect of which GIAG can be criticised, to the extent that they are relevant. As I have said, this is principally the fact that it sought a worldwide freezing order on the basis of evidence which, at least by the return date, it should have known was suspect.

101. I should note that there are two other grounds put forward by Mrs Dewsall as to why no costs order should be made against her in respect of this application. The first is that the underlying claim had no merit. However, clearly this is not the case all the various Judges involved and the Court of Appeal accepted that there was a serious issued to be tried. The fact that GIAG was not successful at trial does not mean that its claim had no merit.

102. Mrs Dewsall also says that the freezing order was pointless as no claim had been made against her suggesting that she held any assets belonging to Mr Dewsall. I note however that the Court of Appeal upheld the freezing order, partly on the basis that there may have been co-mingling of assets.

103. In effect, in raising both these points, Mrs Dewsall is seeking to go behind the decision of the Court of Appeal. It is difficult to see, on any basis, how I could do this, let alone in the context of a decision in relation to costs.

104. Mrs Dewsall should therefore pay 50% of GIAG’s costs in relation to the application for the second worldwide freezing order.

105. I do not however consider that the points raised by GIAG in relation to Mrs Dewsall’s conduct justify an award of indemnity costs. As far as the allegations relating to the use of Mrs Dewsall’s bank account are concerned and other matters relating to the first worldwide freezing order, these are the subject of the proposed claim against Mrs Dewsall and, as I have said, in the light of that, it would not be appropriate for me to make findings in relation to these points. It is also not clear to me that Mrs Dewsall was in breach of any order or undertaking in attempting to sell Weald Hall in a non-arms length transaction but at an arms length price.

106. Although GIAG complains that Mrs Dewsall did not disclose all her assets at the time of the undertakings given in respect of the first worldwide freezing order, the focus at that time as far as Mrs Dewsall was concerned was on Weald Hall. In addition, Mrs Dewsall did disclose her assets in the context of the second worldwide freezing order. Although it is said that this evidence was inconsistent with earlier evidence, it does not appear to be suggested that the later evidence was inaccurate although I accept that there has been some difficulty in marrying up the description of items taken from valuations found in the jewellery safe when compared with Mrs Dewsall’s list of items of jewellery owned by her. This does not however mean that the list provided by Mrs Dewsall is incorrect.

107. I do not therefore accept that Mrs Dewsall should have to pay GIAG’s costs on the indemnity basis. Costs should, instead, be paid on the standard basis.

108. Given that Mrs Dewsall was successful in relation to the claim against her, and that GIAG’s application for a second worldwide freezing order was unsuccessful, it is in my view appropriate that GIAG should not only be deprived of 50% of its costs in relation to the second worldwide freezing order application but should also have to pay 50% of Mrs Dewsall’s costs relating to that application.

109. Given the findings of the Court in the BVI about the investigative report containing evidence of the alleged overseas accounts, it is in my view appropriate for GIAG to pay these costs on the indemnity basis.

110. As Mr Pennington-Benton notes, at the hearing in January 2025, the Judge was told that the relevant investigators were “experienced investigators” and the report was described as a “detailed and experienced investment report” with reference being made to “the detail and the care of their report”.

111. Given the conclusions of the Judge in the BVI with the benefit of an affidavit from the investigator who prepared the report and bearing in mind GIAG’s failure to identify any of the accounts which were said to exist, I accept Mr Pennington-Benton’s submission that it ought to have been apparent to GIAG and/or its advisers, that the report was perhaps not as reliable as they might have first thought.

112. GIAG’s failure to recognise this by the time of the return date hearing at the end of February 2025 was, in my view, unreasonable in the light of the questions raised about the report by the Judge in January 2025 and takes its conduct sufficiently outside the norm to justify an award of indemnity costs in respect of this aspect. Summary of conclusions

113. GIAG to pay Mrs Dewsall’s costs of the main proceedings on the standard basis.

114. Mr Dewsall to pay GIAG’s costs relating to the first worldwide freezing order on the indemnity basis.

115. Mr Dewsall to pay GIAG’s costs relating to the search order on the indemnity basis.

116. Horatio to pay GIAG’s costs relating to the search order on the standard basis.

117. No order as to costs in relation to the search order as between GIAG and Mrs Dewsall. This includes any costs relating to the subsequent review of the documents obtained as a result of the search order.

118. Mr Dewsall to pay 50% of GIAG’s costs in respect of the contempt application/bench warrant on the standard basis.

119. No order as to costs in respect of the contempt application/bench warrant as between GIAG and Mrs Dewsall.

120. Mr Dewsall to pay 50% of GIAG’s costs in respect of the second worldwide freezing order on the indemnity basis.

121. Horatio to pay 50% of GIAG’s costs in respect of the second worldwide freezing order on the standard basis

122. Mrs Dewsall to pay 50% of GIAG’s costs in respect of the second worldwide freezing order on the standard basis.

123. GIAG to pay 50% of Mrs Dewsall’s costs relating to the second worldwide freezing order on the indemnity basis.

124. None of the above affects any costs orders which have already been made against any party.

125. As I understand it, the parties are agreed that, where there are costs orders going in both directions as between two parties, these should be set off against each other. Next steps

126. I will need to confirm the position in relation to interest on costs. I imagine that this should not be controversial and would invite the parties to agree the position.

127. I would also invite the parties to agree what payments on account should be made.

128. A decision needs to be made as to what should happen to the Weald Hall proceeds currently held by the Court. If GIAG and Mrs Dewsall cannot reach agreement, they should each provide brief written submissions. I would propose to make a decision on the papers but if either party considers that a short hearing is needed, they should explain the reasons for this in their submissions.

129. As previously mentioned, it appears that GIAG’s suggestion that there should be a stay in relation to the claim against Mrs Dewsall pending any appeal appears to relate only to the question as to what should happen to the proceeds of Weald Hall. Any written submissions should therefore address this point to the extent that it is put forward as a separate issue.