Craig Buckwald v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

Introduction

1. This appeal concerns a decision of the Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors (“the Registrar”) made on 17 March 2025 to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register of Approved Driving Instructors (the “Register”). The decision was taken on the grounds that the Appellant had ceased to be a fit and proper person to be an Approved Driving Instructor (“ADI”). This was due to the Appellant having been dismissed from his employment as a Driving Examiner with the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (“DVSA”) for gross misconduct. The Registrar directed that the decision would not take immediate effect.

2. The proceedings were held by video (CVP). All parties joined remotely. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way. The Appeal

3. The Appellant’s Notice of Appeal dated 9 April 2025 relies on the grounds summarised below: (a) The Registrar’s decision is based solely on the Appellant’s dismissal from a role within their own organisation. This represents a conflict of interest. The decision would not have occurred if the Appellant had been employed by a different organisation. Other ADIs may have been dismissed from unrelated roles without the DVSA’s awareness. It is inconsistent and inherently unfair. The decision assumes that any disciplinary matter within DVSA employment equates to unfitness to teach learners safely, which is not supported in law or guidance. (b) The Appellant’s dismissal followed a series of internal procedures which he contested. He was initially suspended and later permitted to return to alternative duties. Only after several months was he dismissed. The outcome was only finalised on 26 February 2025. This shows that even DVSA did not consider the case clear cut or immediate. During this period the Appellant completed and passed all stages of the ADI qualification process. All matters were known to the DVSA. If his conduct was considered incompatible with being an ADI, the Appellant questions why DVSA allowed him to sit the tests. As outlined in R(Hope) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 23 , public bodies must act in a proportionate manner. (c) The Registrar’s actions engage Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) by removing his ability to work in his chosen profession without a fair and independent process. This is supported by R(T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2014] UKSC 35 , which emphasised that decisions affecting a person’s employment and reputation must be based on a fair and proportionate individual assessment not a blanket reliance on past employment issues. The Appellant also raises concerns under Article 14 that DVSA utilised internal access to employment records that would not be available to any other employer. It has placed him in an unequal and prejudiced position compared to other ADIs. (d) The Appellant has no criminal convictions, a clean driving licence, and strong professional record. He submits character references. As per McCool v Secretary of State for Transport (2008) the fit and proper person test must be judged not only on past events but current and future conduct and whether the person poses a risk to pupils or public safety, which the Appellant maintains that he does not. (e) A timeline of events is provided but is not repeated here in the interests of brevity.

4. The Registrar’s Statement of Case dated 29 September 2025 resists the appeal for the following reasons: (a) Whilst the Appellant has not been convicted of any offence, he was dismissed as a DVSA Examiner for gross misconduct, having breached the Civil Service Code and the DVSA’s Dignity at Work policy. (b) Conditions for entry onto the Register extend beyond instructional ability alone and require the applicant to be a fit and proper person. Account is taken of a person’s character, behaviour and standard of conduct. An ADI is expected to have standards of driving and behaviour above that of the ordinary motorist. (c) Teaching generally young people to drive as a profession is a responsible and demanding task that should only be entrusted to those with high standards. The Registrar considers that he would failing in his public duty if he allowed a person to remain on the Register who had conducted himself in such a manner in public office. (d) The good name of the Register would be tarnished and public confidence undermined if it was generally known that the Appellant’s name was allowed to be retained in the Register. (e) It would be offensive to other ADIs and persons trying to qualify, who are scrupulous in their professional conduct, to ignore the inappropriate and unprofessional conduct displayed by the Appellant. Procedural Matters

5. The Tribunal received a hearing bundle of evidence containing 30 numbered pages. A procedural matter was raised by the Appellant who objects to the inclusion within the bundle of his letter of dismissal from the DVSA because it is marked “OFFICIAL SENSITIVE”. He does not believe that it should be referred to as he was told by the DVSA that the letter would not be shared with anybody. He considers that references to the letter breach the official sensitivity.

6. However, the letter was supplied by DVSA (as the author) to the Registrar for the specific purpose of fulfilling his statutory functions. It is plainly relevant to the Tribunal’s consideration of this appeal. The Registrar confirmed at the hearing that records were divulged to him on the basis that they could, if needed, be used in these appeal proceedings. We find no breach of confidentiality or other reason to exclude the letter from evidence. The same applies to the Department for Transport’s appeal decision outcome letter which is similarly marked as “OFFICIAL: SENSITIVE”.

7. On a separate but connected note, the Tribunal is mindful that references are made within the dismissal letter to third parties. We also acknowledge the sensitivity of personal data within an employment record, which has been divulged to the Tribunal for the specific purpose of this appeal only. In the circumstances, it is fair and just that the Tribunal exercises its discretion to prohibit the disclosure of official sensitive information beyond the Tribunal. An order is made accordingly.

8. For the purposes of this Decision, we refer to information within OFFICIAL SENSITIVE communications in broad terms citing findings only to the extent that we consider it necessary to do so. We have, of course, considered the full content. The Law

9. Conditions for entry and retention on the Register require an applicant to be and continue to be a “fit and proper person” to have his name on the Register, as set out in sections 125(3) and 128(2)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (“ the Act ”).

10. The Registrar can remove a person’s name from the Register if satisfied they have ceased to be a fit and proper person to have their name on the Register ( section 128(2) (e) of the Act ). The Registrar may take the view that a person no longer meets this requirement where there has been a change in circumstances.

11. The powers of the Tribunal in determining this appeal are set out in section 131 of the Act . The Tribunal may make such order as it thinks fit ( section 131(3) ). The Tribunal stands in the shoes of the Registrar and takes a fresh decision on the evidence available to it, giving appropriate weight to the Registrar’s decision as the person tasked by Parliament with making such decisions (in accordance with R. (Hope and Glory Public House Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates Court & Ors [2011] EWCA Civ 31 ).

12. In Harris v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors [2010] EWCA Civ 808 , the Court of Appeal described the “fit and proper person” condition as follows: “.. the condition is not simply that the applicant is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor, it is that he is a fit and proper person to have his name entered in the register. Registration carries with it an official seal of approval…It seems to me that the maintenance of public confidence in the register is important. ” [paragraph 30]. The Evidence

13. At the hearing, the Tribunal heard submissions from both the Appellant and Registrar. In addition, the Appellant called Mark Scott and Scott Hadley as character witnesses. Mr Hadley attended by telephone and confirmed that he could hear the proceedings clearly.

14. It was the evidence of Mr Hadley that he has known the Appellant for 14 years. They started as driving instructors at the same time. Mr Hadley was the Appellant’s direct line manager when he worked for the DVSA as an Examiner. At no time did Mr Hadley witness any inappropriate conduct by the Appellant. Mr Hadley now runs his own driving school. He has taken the Appellant on as one of his instructors. He would not have done so if he thought that the Appellant is not a fit and proper person. The Appellant is an exceptional member of the team.

15. Mr Scott said that he has also known the Appellant for around 14 years. The Appellant was very helpful to him when he started as a driving instructor. Mr Scott looked up to the Appellant. He was always open minded and a “nice guy to work around”. Mr Scott has never heard a bad word about the Appellant. He is an approachable person and a very good Examiner. Everyone speaks very highly of him. Submissions The Appellant

16. The Appellant submitted that the Registrar’s decision was procedurally unfair, inconsistent and wrong. There was no criminal conduct, motoring offences, complaints from pupils, dishonesty or inappropriate behaviour. A learner was never placed at risk. The decision was based solely upon his dismissal in another role.

17. The DVSA was aware of the Appellant’s disciplinary process when he was allowed to sit all parts of the Qualifying Examination to become an ADI. Each step required the Registrar to be satisfied that he was a fit and proper person. The Appellant queried how he could now be deemed unfit when the facts were known before.

18. The Appellant believes that the complaint made to the DVSA on 13 February 2025 was not from a member of the public. The complaint contained details only known to persons involved in the disciplinary process or informed of the outcome.

19. When informed of the Appellant’s dismissal, his line manager had seemed genuinely shocked and said he had no concerns about taking the Appellant back as an Examiner.

20. The Appellant considers that he has suffered unequal treatment by the Registrar having access to internal information that is not accessible for other ADIs working outside the organisation. He has been placed in a uniquely prejudiced position.

21. The question is whether the Appellant currently poses a risk to the public. He has no convictions, there are no safeguarding concerns, and he has strong and consistent character references. Removal of his name from the Register would damage his reputation. The decision must be necessary and proportionate. The decision was legally flawed and the outcome is disproportionate.

22. When asked to clarify the basis upon which the DVSA’s decision was “legally flawed”, the Appellant corrected himself to say that the Registrar had been “inconsistent” in removing his name from the Register. The Respondent

23. The Registrar reiterated the points made in his statement of case. He explained that the Registrar became aware of a complaint from a member of the public to the Chief Executive’s office on 14 February 2025. The complaint questioned how suitable the Appellant is to be an ADI. The Registrar had investigated and requested information from the DVSA’s internal Human Resources department, who supplied the outcome and appeal decisions. This alerted the Registrar to the Appellant’s dismissal for inappropriate behaviour including use of vulgar language, crude humour with racist undertones.

24. The Registrar confirmed that he does not normally ask about previous employment and there is no duty to declare an employment dismissal. As a matter of course, background checks are not conducted. In this instance, information had come forward and there was a duty to consider it.

25. The Registrar interprets the “fit and proper person” test as set out in guidance within his “Approved driving instructor register guide” [updated July 2023] as: “ the personal and professional standards, conduct or behaviour that could be unacceptable in the eyes of the public and other ADIs .” Relevant Facts

26. The Appellant’s name was first entered in the Register in June 2010. His certificate of registration was returned in June 2016 when the Appellant became a DVSA Examiner. His name was re-entered in the Register on 13 February 2025. The Appellant’s certificate of registration is due to expire on 28 February 2029.

27. The Appellant’s employment with the DVSA was terminated with immediate effect on 15 January 2025 for actions and behaviours constituting gross misconduct. It followed an internal investigation that concluded there had been an irretrievable breakdown in trust between DVSA and the Appellant’s ability to act in a professional and impartial manner at all times, especially when in a team environment but also when in a vehicle alone with a customer. Further concern was expressed over topics of conversation in the workplace with very large potential for reputational damage. His behaviour was found to be in clear breach of DVSA’s Dignity at Work policy and the Civil Service Code.

28. The Appellant’s appealed against his summary dismissal to the Department of Transport. The appeal was not upheld, and the original decision was found to stand. The appeal decision is dated 26 February 2025.

29. On the same day that the Appellant’s certificate of registration as an ADI was issued on 13 February 2025, a complaint about that decision was emailed to the Chief Executive’s office at the DVSA. The complaint cited the DVSA’s disciplinary action against the Appellant and questioned how he could be deemed “fit and proper”.

30. By letter dated 14 February 2025, the DVSA notified the Appellant that the Registrar was considering removing his name from the Register. This was on the grounds that the Registrar cannot be satisfied that the Appellant fulfilled the “fit and proper person” condition within section 128(2) (e) of the Act . The Appellant was given 28 days to make representations.

31. The Appellant made representations by email on 24 February 2025. He stated that: (a) Throughout his time as the DVSA, the Appellant had an exemplary record in all aspects of performance, customer service, behaviour and absence. (b) He was an ADI from 2010 until joining the DVSA in 2016. During that time, he received no complaints from customers. (c) Whilst working as a DVSA Examiner any complaints received were decision based. None were for conduct or behaviour. (d) In over 40 years of working, the Appellant says that he never received complaints from his peers or staff under his management for inappropriate comments, language or behaviour. (e) He has never made any derogatory comments or those that could be taken the wrong way on social media. (f) The Appellant has started work with a driving school. One of the owners used to be employed by the DVSA. He is fully aware of the allegations and has told the Appellant that if he believed any of the allegations, he would not have asked the Appellant to join his driving school. (g) The Appellant still refutes all allegations made against him that led to his dismissal.

32. Having considered the representations the Registrar decided that the Appellant cannot fulfil section 128(1) (e) of the Act and confirmed the decision to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register on 17 March 2025. That decision has not taken effect pending the outcome of this appeal. Analysis and Conclusions

33. It is apparent that the Appellant feels a strong sense of injustice in: (a) having been dismissed from his previous employment; (b) being allowed to continue with his ADI training if he would not be admitted to the Register; (c) how the Registrar was able to rely upon internal employment records; and (d) the merits of the decision itself.

34. The Appellant vehemently denies that he acted in any way to justify his dismissal from the DVSA. It is not the role of this Tribunal to consider whether the Appellant was unfairly dismissed. We have no jurisdiction to do so.

35. The Tribunal finds, on the balance of probabilities, that the Registrar was unaware of the Appellant’s dismissal from the DVSA when issuing his ADI certificate. Had the Registrar known this information at the time then it is more probable than not that the application would have been refused for the same reasons given subsequently.

36. After receiving a complaint about the Appellant’s name being entered on the Register when he had been dismissed from the DVSA, it was not unreasonable for the Registrar to reconsider his decision. The Registrar has an ongoing duty to maintain the Register under section 125 of the Act . The Registrar must ensure that those who are registered ADIs continue to meet the standards required.

37. The identity of the complainant is irrelevant to the conduct. The identity of the source did not obviate the need for the Registrar to consider the complaint. It was by no means unreasonable for the Registrar to make checks. That was particularly so given the seriousness and potential relevance of the conduct that resulted in the Appellant’s dismissal for gross misconduct whilst holding the position of a Local Driving Test Manager.

38. The Tribunal recognises why the Appellant feels that he has been placed in a worse position than other ADIs because the DVSA held information on his employment with them. However, whilst the information was undoubtedly more accessible to the DVSA than for someone who worked elsewhere, the fact remains that information was in the DVSA’s possession. Once the Registrar became aware of the reasons for the Appellant’s dismissal, he could not ignore it.

39. The important questions are what has the Appellant done (if anything) and does that mean he is not a fit and proper person, rather than how the Registrar found out.

40. The fact the Registrar decided not to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register with immediate effect illustrates that he was not considered to pose a potential risk to the public. As the Appellant says, no safeguarding risk has been raised and there are no misconduct allegations in his capacity as an Instructor. Nor has he been convicted of any offence. Nevertheless, none of these factors either individually or collectively mean that the Appellant is a fit and proper person by default. The test is not confined to such matters as the Appellant appears to suggest.

41. There is no statutory definition of “fit and proper person”. It will involve the exercise of discretion on a consideration of the facts. Of course, a finding of gross misconduct in a previous job does not in itself render a person unfit to be an ADI. It is the Appellant’s behaviour and standards of conduct giving rise to the finding that are directly in issue and the relevance to the ADI role.

42. The Appellant refers to McCool v Secretary of State for Transport 2008 without the citation or copy of the judgment for us to check the details. The case of McCool v Rushcliffe Borough Council [1998] 3 All ER 889 concerned fitness to hold a licence to drive a private hire vehicle. It was referenced by t he Court of Appeal in Harris [2010] (as cited above) as being similar but not identical in context to the issue of whether or not an appellant fulfilled the statutory condition by continuing to be a fit and proper person to be registered as an ADI.

43. The DVSA’s Approved ADI register guide, contains guidance on being a “fit and proper” person. It specifies that the DVSA will check for motoring offences, disqualification from driving, court proceedings pending, a ban or bar from working with children, any substantiated complaints for financially inappropriate or fraudulent activity, and “any substantiated complaints of inappropriate behaviour or misconduct.” It provides a steer on the type of conduct that the Registrar considers relevant to the test.

44. The evidence before this Tribunal shows that an internal investigation was conducted by the DVSA concluding in a detailed report finding inappropriate behaviour in a workplace environment supported by multiple witnesses over a sustained period. The Appellant appealed the decision, and the appeal was not upheld. He did not exercise any further right of appeal after taking legal advice. He said that this was due to the cost involved, which he could not afford, and by that time he had already decided to become an ADI.

45. The Appellant has a clean record and positive references. Numerous character references are supplied from DVSA Driving Examiners, ADIs and the Association of Barnet Driving Instructors. The Tribunal also heard from two character witnesses at the hearing. They are all among the factors to be considered in the round. Evidence of good character alone does not suffice to regard the Appellant as fit and proper when there is reason to question his conduct from the reasons for dismissal.

46. Ultimately, there has been a finding made by the DVSA against the Appellant amounting to a substantiated complaint of inappropriate behaviour or misconduct whilst working in public office. This is set out in the DVSA’s outcome report as upheld on appeal to the Department for Transport. We note that there was no finding of racism, but there was a finding of failure to demonstrate dignity or respect to another person that was sufficiently serious to warrant summary dismissal.

47. The findings are a cause for significant concern given the role of an ADI. The time that has elapsed since the conduct occurred is not so long ago. It does not diminish our concern given the nature of the conduct and the imperative that confidence in the high standard of conduct expected of ADIs is maintained. A substantial level of trust that is placed on ADIs by pupils, parents, the public and the DVSA. The public are entitled to expect that the Registrar will ensure that all pupils are instructed by those who treat others with dignity and respect.

48. If the Appellant’s name is allowed to remain on the Register having demonstrated behaviours which are relevant to fitness, this will diminish the standing of the Register and undermine the public’s confidence in the Register. This includes behaviour involving inappropriate use of language. Other Matters

49. The Appellant alleges a breach by the Registrar of his Article 6 human rights but this in unparticularised. His right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR (as incorporated into UK law by The Human Rights Act 1988) is addressed through this appeal process that led to a hearing before an independent tribunal. Article 8 ECHR provides that everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. It is claimed that upholding the Registrar’s decision would breach Article 8 by removing the Appellant’s ability to work in his chosen profession. Any such interference (which is not concluded) is in accordance with the law as provided by section 128(2) (e) of the Act .

50. Reference is also made to the Appellant’s Article 14 rights. This Article enshrines the protection against discrimination. It is not a generalised prohibition on discrimination. There must be discrimination “ in the enjoyment of the rights set forth in the Convention ” i.e. the ECHR. The discrimination must be based on “ sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status ”. The Appellant has not identified which right/s he believes to be offended or the protected characteristic.

51. From all that we have heard and seen, we find no basis to conclude that there is, or would be, any breach of the Appellant’s ECHR rights in dismissing this appeal. Overall Conclusion

52. Having weighed up all the evidence before us, we find on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant does not currently meet the statutory requirement to be a fit and proper person. In all the circumstances, we conclude that the Registrar’s decision to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register was correct. It was not an unreasonable or disproportionate response to the receipt of new information, not previously considered when the Appellant’s name was added to the Register.

53. The appeal is dismissed.